Incorporated v. United States Davidson Transfer Storage Company v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 May 1959
• Docket Number: 96,Nos. 68,s. 68
• Citation: 3 L.Ed.2d 952,79 S.Ct. 904,359 U.S. 464
• Parties: T.I.M.E. INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America. DAVIDSON TRANSFER & STORAGE COMPANY, Inc., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

359 U.S. 464

79 S.Ct. 904

3 L.Ed.2d 952

T.I.M.E. INCORPORATED, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES of America.

DAVIDSON TRANSFER & STORAGE COMPANY, Inc., Petitioner,

v. UNITED STATES of America.

Nos. 68, 96.

Argued Jan. 20, 1959.

Decided May 18, 1959.

Mr. W. D. Benson, Jr., Lubbock, Tex., for petitioner T.I.M.E., inc.

Mr. Bryce Rea, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioner Davidson Transfer & Storage Co.

Mr. Morton Hollander, Washington, D.C., for United States.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners are interstate motor common carriers, certificated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.) under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. ¹ Section 217 of that Act, 49 U.S.C. § 317, 49 U.S.C.A. § 317, requires such carriers to file their transportation charges as tariffs with the I.C.C. These tariffs remain effective until suspended or changed in accordance with specified procedures, and so long as they are effective carriers are forbidden to charge or collect any rate other than that provided in the applicable tariff.²

These cases present in common a single question under the Motor Carrier Act: Can a shipper of goods by a certificated motor carrier challenge in post-shipment litigation the reasonableness of the carrier's charges which were made in accordance with the tariff governing the shipment?

In No. 68, T.I.M.E. transported several shipments of scientific instruments for the United States from Oklahoma to California. One of the shipments, illustrative of all involved in this litigation, originated at Marion, Oklahoma, and was carried over the lines of petitioner and a connecting carrier to Planehaven, California. At the time, the petitioning carrier had on file with the I.C.C. a tariff relating to such shipments which specified a through rate from Marion to Planehaven of $10.74 per hundredweight. Petitioner was also subject to tariffs which provided a rate of $2.56 per hundredweight from Marion to El Paso, Texas, and of $4.35 per hundredweight from El Paso to Planehaven. The through rate thus exceeded to combination rate by $3.83. T.I.M.E. charged and collected on the basis of the through rate. On postpayment audit by the General Accounting Office under § 322 of the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 955, 49 U.S.C. § 66, 49 U.S.C.A. § 66, that office concluded that the combination rather than the through rate was applicable to this shipment and required T.I.M.E. to refund the difference between the sum collected under the through tariff and that which would have been due under the combination tariffs. This T.I.M.E. did under protest.

Thereafter T.I.M.E. brought suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a)(2), claiming that the through tariff was applicable to the shipment and that it was thus entitled to recovery the difference between the through and combination rates. The Government defended on the ground that the combination rate was applicable, and alternatively contended that if the through tariff were applicable the rate specified therein was unreasonably high insofar as it exceeded the combination rate. It asked that T.I.M.E.'s suit be stayed to permit the Government to bring a proceeding before the I.C.C. to determine the reasonableness of the through rate. The District Court in an unreported opinion held that the through rate was applicable, and that neither it nor the I.C.C. had power to pass upon the Government's contention that such rate was as to th pa st unreasonable. Accordingly, the District Court entered summary judgment for T.I.M.E.

The Government appealed, accepting the District Court's determination as to the applicability of the through rate, but contending that the District Court had erred in refusing to refer to the I.C.C. the issue of the reasonableness of that rate as to past shipments. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Government was entitled to an I.C.C. determination upon the question of reasonableness, and that the fact that the Motor Carrier Act gives the I.C.C. no power to award reparations as to admittedly governing past rates does not prevent that body from passing on the question of past reasonableness when that issue arises in litigation in the courts. 252 F.2d 178.

In No. 96, petitioner Davidson transported four shipments of goods for the United States from Poughkeepsie, N.Y., to Bellbluff, Va., and billed the United States on the basis of concededly applicable filed tariffs. On post-payment audit the General Accounting Office concluded that a part of these charges was unreasonable and should be refunded to the United States.³ Davidson refunded under protest the sum demanded, which amounted to $18.34, and then brought suit under the Tucker Act to recover the refund. The Government defended on the sole ground that the applicable rate had been unreasonable. The District Court, without opinion, granted Davidson summary judgment, but on the Government's appeal the judgment was reversed, the Court of Appeals holding that the Government could defend on 'unreasonableness' grounds, and directing a referral to the I.C.C. of the issue as to the reasonableness of the rate in question. 104 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 259 F.2d 802.

We granted certiorari in both cases because of the suggestion that the result reached by the Courts of Appeals conflicted with this Court's decision in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 71 S.Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed. 912, and in order to settle the questions of statutory interpretation involved.⁴ 358 U.S. 810, 79 S.Ct. 27, 3 L.Ed.2d 55.

The courts below held that the right of the United States to resist on the ground of unreasonableness the payment of the charges incurred by it was one deriving from the common law and preserved by § 216(j) of the Motor Carrier Act.⁵ In this Court the Government, although defending this ground of decision, relies primarily on the proposition that the Motor Carrier Act itself creates a judicially enforceable right in a shipper to be free from the exaction of unreasonable charges as to past shipments even though such charges reflect applicable rates duly filed with the I.C.C. The Government concedes that whatever the source of the asserted right may be, the question of the reasonableness of past rates cannot itself be decided in the courts, but takes the position that when such question arises in court litigation it may properly be referred to the I.C.C.for decision, and the results of that adjudication used to determine the respective rights of the litigants.

I.

The contention that the Motor Carrier Act itself creates a cause of action or affords a defense with respect to the recovery of unreasonable rates rests on the provisions of s 216(b) and (d) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316(b, d), 49 U.S.C.A. § 316(b, d), which provide as to interstate motor carriers:

'(b) It shall be the duty of every (such) common carrier * * * to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates, charges, and classifications, and just and reasonable regulations and practices relating thereto * * *.

'(d) All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered by any (such) common carrier * * * shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service or any part thereof, is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. * * *'

The Government urges that this language imposes a statutory duty on motor carriers not to charge or collect other than 'reasonable' rates, and asks us to imply a cause of action under the Motor Carrier Act for any shipper injured by violation of that duty. We cannot agree. As this Court recognized in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251, 71 S.Ct. 692, 695, 95 L.Ed. 912, language of this sort in a statute which entrusts rate regulation to an administrative agency in itself creates only a 'criterion for administrative application in determining a lawful rate' rather than a 'justiciable legal right.' In Montana-Dakota it was held that the Federal Power Act, which like the Motor Carrier Act expressly declares unreasonable rates to be 'unlawful,'⁶ does not create a cause of action for the recovery of allegedly unreasonable past rates. In the absence of any indication that Congress intended that despite the absence of any reparations power in the Federal Power Commission the federal courts should entertain suits for reparation of unreasonable rates, and refer to the Commission the controlling issue of past unreasonableness, the Court declined to permit the Commission to accomplish indirectly through such a proceeding that which Congress did not allow it to accomplish directly.

It is true that under Parts I and III of the Interstate Commerce Act, relating respectively to rail and water carriers, a shipper may litigate as to the reasonableness of past charges even if those charges were based on the applicable and effective filed rates. The structure and history of Part II (the Motor Carrier Act), however, lead to the conclusion that here, as in the Federal Power Act, Congress did not intend to give shippers a statutory cause of action for the recovery of allegedly unreasonable past rates, or to enable them to assert 'unreasonableness' as a defense in carrier suits to recover applicable tariff rates.

The very provisions of Part I, and their counterparts in Part III, which give a right of action to shippers against carriers for damages incurred by carrier violations of the Act and provide the mechanics for the enforcement of that right are conspicuously absent in the Motor Carrier Act. Thus, whereas § 8 of Part I⁷ provides that 'any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter (who) shall do * * * any act * * * in this chapter * * * declared to be unlawful * * * shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of the damages sustained * * *,' Part I h as no comparable provision. Again, whereas § 9 of Part I⁸ gives an...