Ind. PATIENT'S Comp. FUND v. BROWN

• Decision Date: 17 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-1001-CT-80.,49A02-1001-CT-80.
• Citation: 934 N.E.2d 168
• Parties: INDIANA PATIENT'S COMPENSATION FUND, Appellant-Defendant, v. Beverly S. BROWN, as Executor of the Estate of Barbara J. Frieden, deceased, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

934 N.E.2d 168

INDIANA PATIENT'S COMPENSATION FUND, Appellant-Defendant,

v.Beverly S. BROWN, as Executor of the Estate of Barbara J. Frieden, deceased, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 49A02-1001-CT-80.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Sept. 17, 2010.

Matthew W. Conner, Tabbert Hahn Earnest & Weddle, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

James A. Mellowitz, Robert W. York & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

Robert W. Johnson, Nicholas F. Baker, The Hastings Law Firm, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Indiana Trial Lawyers Association.

OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

Beverly Brown, as executor of the estate of Barbara Frieden, settled a medical malpractice claim for the statutory limit and then petitioned the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund (“the Fund”) for additional compensation. The trial court awarded $278,377.55, which included compensation for attorney fees, litigation costs, estate administration costs, and loss of services to Frieden's parents. The Fund contends that these damages are not authorized by the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (“AWDS”). ¹ We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

On August 16, 2004, Frieden suffered a fatal heart attack. Brown, who is Frieden's sister and the executor of her estate, filed suit against Frieden's health care providers. The suit alleged that the health care providers had negligently failed to diagnose and treat Frieden's heart disease. After several years of litigation, Brown settled with the health care providers in an amount that would allow her to petition the Fund for additional compensation. ²

At the time of her death, Frieden was not married and did not have dependent children. Frieden was survived by her parents, but they were not her dependents. Brown sought to recover loss of love and companionship to Frieden's parents, medical bills, and funeral and burial expenses, which the Fund did not contest. Brown also sought to recover for loss of services to Frieden's parents, expenses relating to the administration of her estate, attorney fees, and litigation costs. The Fund did not contest the amounts requested, but argued that these damages were not available under the AWDS. The Fund therefore filed a motion for partial summary judgment on that basis. Brown filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

After a hearing, the trial court ruled that all the requested damages were available under the AWDS and awarded Brown the full amount requested, $528,377.55. The court ultimately entered judgment in the amount of $278,377.55 after applying a setoff of the money received in the settlement with the health care providers. The Fund now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Brown.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

Our standard of review of a summary judgment is well settled:

When determining the propriety of an order granting summary judgment, we use the same standard of review as the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the moving party meets these two requirements, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact by setting forth specifically designated facts. We must accept as true those facts alleged by the nonmoving party, construe the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and resolve all doubts against the moving party. If the trial court's grant of summary judgment can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record, we must affirm. Additionally, where the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo.

Ryan v. Brown, 827 N.E.2d 112, 116-17 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (quotations and citations omitted).

This case hinges on the interpretation of the AWDS. Statutory interpretation is a pure question of law. Gaudin v. Austin, 921 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).

Our goal when interpreting a statute is to determine, give effect to, and implement the legislative intent underlying the statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience. If a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. Rather, we must give such a statute its plain and clear meaning.

In re P.F., 849 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (quotations and citations omitted).

History of Wrongful Death

Our supreme court has described the origin of wrongful death claims as follows:

At common law, a cause of action was extinguished by the death of the plaintiff. Because the victim was viewed as the only person wronged by a negligent killing, even a defendant whose negligence caused the plaintiffs death was insulated from liability. This inequity gave rise to wrongful death statutes, first in England in 1846, and soon thereafter in every United States jurisdiction. The wrongful death action is entirely a creature of statute. Indiana's statute was first adopted in 1852, then again in 1881. It has since been amended on nine different occasions, most recently in 1998.

Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind.2001) (citations omitted).

This General Wrongful Death Statute (“GWDS”) is currently codified at Indiana Code Section 34-23-1-1 and reads as follows:

When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the action shall be commenced by the personal representative of the decedent within two (2) years, and the damages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, and lost earnings of such deceased person resulting from said wrongful act or omission. That part of the damages which is recovered for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense[s] shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the decedent's estate for the payment thereof. The remainder of the damages, if any, shall, subject to the provisions of this article, inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower, as the case may be, and to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin, to be distributed in the same manner as the personal property of the deceased. If such decedent depart this life leaving no such widow or widower, or dependent children or dependent next of kin, surviving her or him, the damages inure to the exclusive benefit of the person or persons furnishing necessary and reasonable hospitalization or hospital services in connection with the last illness or injury of the decedent, performing necessary and reasonable medical or surgical services in connection with the last illness or injury of the decedent, to a funeral director or funeral home for the necessary and reasonable funeral and burial expenses, and to the personal representative, as such, for the necessary and reasonable costs and expenses of administering the estate and prosecuting or compromising the action, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and in case of a death under such circumstances, and when such decedent leaves no such widow, widower, or dependent children, or dependent next of kin, surviving him or her, the measure of damages to be recovered shall be the total of the necessary and reasonable value of such hospitalization or hospital service, medical and surgical services, such funeral expenses, and such costs and expenses of administration, including attorney fees.

Thus, the GWDS addresses two scenarios: in the first, the decedent dies leaving a surviving spouse, dependent children, or dependent next of kin; in the second, the decedent has no surviving spouse or dependents, but there are costs and expenses associated with the death that require payment to service providers.

In 1987, the legislature enacted the Child Wrongful Death Statute (“CWDS”), which applies if the decedent is

an unmarried individual without dependents who is:

(1) less than twenty (20) years of age; or

(2) less than twenty-three (23) years of age and is enrolled in a postsecondary educational institution or a career and technical education school or program that is not a postsecondary educational program.

Ind.Code § 34-23-2-1. Damages recoverable under the CWDS include loss of the child's services, loss of the child's love and companionship, health care expenses, funeral and burial expenses, counseling expenses for surviving parents and minor siblings, uninsured debts of the child, probate administration expenses, and attorney fees. Ind.Code § 34-23-2-1(f).

In Miller v. City of Hammond, we held that nondependent parents of a twenty-three-year-old college student could not recover under the wrongful death statutes in effect at the time. 691 N.E.2d 1310, 1313 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. The following year, the legislature enacted the AWDS, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) As used in this section, “adult person” means an unmarried individual:

(1) who does not have any dependents; and

(2) who is not a child (as defined in IC 34-23-2-1).

(b) If the death of an adult person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another person, only the personal representative of the adult person may maintain an action against the person whose wrongful act or omission caused the death of the adult person.

(c) In an action to recover damages for the death of an...