Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Hoage

• Decision Date: 09 May 1932
• Docket Number: No. 5435.,5435.
• Citation: 58 F.2d 1074
• Parties: INDEMNITY INS. CO. OF NORTH AMERICA v. HOAGE, Deputy Com'r (VOEHL, Intervener).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

58 F.2d 1074 (1932)

INDEMNITY INS. CO. OF NORTH AMERICA v. HOAGE, Deputy Com'r (VOEHL, Intervener).

No. 5435.

Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.

Argued April 7, 1932.

Decided May 9, 1932.

Rehearing Denied May 27, 1932.

G. Bowdoin Craighill, Charles B. Tebbs, and Frank H. Myers, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Leo A. Rover, John J. Wilson, and Israel J. Mendelson, all of Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, and GRONER, Associate Justices.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity filed by appellant insurance company to enjoin the enforcement of a compensation award made by defendant, Deputy Commissioner Hoage, in favor of Karl F. Voehl, an employee of the National Electric Supply Company, which company carried compensation insurance with the plaintiff corporation.

It appears that, while Voehl was driving his own automobile from his home in Maryland to his employer's warehouse in Washington, the automobile overturned as the result of a defect in the steering gear, causing the injuries complained of. The accident occurred on Sunday, April 6, 1930, at a point between Voehl's residence and his place of employment.

It further appears, from the evidence, that on the morning of the accident Voehl, in company with his brother-in-law, was on the way from his home to the warehouse of his employer to get a load of ashes which they planned to dump in a mudhole in the road near Voehl's residence. The evidence discloses beyond dispute that the main object of the trip was to obtain the load of ashes. It is, however, claimed by Voehl that it was his intention when he reached the warehouse to clean up some trash which had accumulated there. It is conceded, however, that this was not part of Voehl's duties. He was "Head of the products division," which involved the management of the warehouse, supervising the unloading of refrigerators at the warehouse, unpacking, delivering, and installing them in customers' homes, and the keeping of the buildings in order with special reference to the observance of the fire regulations. He was also "Service manager," in charge of the company's twenty-four hour a day service on refrigerators in customers' homes. He had from eight to twelve men under him at the warehouse, and two service men to take care of calls. Voehl's regular hours were from 7:30 a. m. to 5:30 p. m., with an hour off for lunch. To take care of service calls, the company had installed in his home a telephone, and, when a call came from a customer after regular store hours, it was relayed to Voehl's home. Voehl would either take care of the call personally or instruct one of the service men to do so.

In attendance on service calls outside of regular hours, Voehl was allowed overtime pay from the time he left his home until his return, and, if he used his own automobile, he was allowed five cents per mile. No allowance was made for his automobile in going to and from work during the week days. If he deemed it necessary to go to the warehouse on Sunday, he was not required to obtain special authority to do so, and, when he made such a trip, if in connection with his work and in the interest of his employer, he would receive overtime pay and his mileage for use of the automobile.

Voehl was awarded compensation by Deputy Commissioner Hoage under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1424 (33 USCA §§ 901-950) made applicable to the District of Columbia by the act of Congress of May 17, 1928, 45 Stats. 600 (D. C. Code 1929, T. 19, §§ 11, 12, (33 USCA § 901 note). The bill for injunction in this case was filed under the provisions of section 21 of the Compensation Act (33 USCA § 921) on the ground that the claim does not come within the provisions of the Compensation Act, averring that the Commissioner's finding is "not in accordance with law," and is contrary to the evidence presented at the hearing. The sole question before the court, therefore, is whether or not Voehl's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

It is urged by counsel for appellee that the findings of the Deputy Commissioner are not subject to review by the courts where there is a conflict in the testimony — in other words, that, while the courts may review the Commissioner's conclusions of law, they may not set aside his findings of fact merely because they might disagree with his conclusions. Section 20 of the Compensation Act (33 USCA § 920) provides: "In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary — (a) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter."

This statutory presumption, however, furnishes merely a basis for proof and not a substitute therefor. It does not shift the burden of proof from the claimant to prove by substantial evidence that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. To determine whether or not the Commissioner's conclusions of law are correct, it is necessary for the court to ascertain...