Independence-Nat. Educ. v. Independence Sch.

Decision Date31 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. WD 63697.,WD 63697.
PartiesINDEPENDENCE-NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION ("INEA"), Independence-Transportation Employees Association ("ITEA"), Independence-Educational Support Personnel ("IESP"), Wendy Biggerstaff, Gene Hope, Elizabeth Scott, Richard Jones, Randi Louise Mallett, Ron Cochran, and Jack Cobb, Appellants, v. INDEPENDENCE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Sally E. Barker, St. Louis, MO, for appellants.

Duane A. Martin, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.

Before JAMES M. SMART, JR., Presiding Judge, JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge and LISA WHITE HARDWICK, Judge.

JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge.

Appellants, who are various employees of Respondent Independence School District ("the District") and unions representing employees within the District, appeal from the trial court's decision to sustain a motion for summary judgment filed by the District.

The District is a public school district located in Jackson County, Missouri. The District is governed by an elected, seven-person Board of Education ("the Board"). The District employs a significant number of people, including teachers, bus drivers, transportation workers, custodians, maintenance personnel, and paraprofessionals.

Appellants are comprised of four separate categories of those employees and their respective unions: (1) transportation employees, who are member of the Independence Transportation Employees Association ("ITEA"); (2) custodial and maintenance employees, who are members of the Independence Educational Support Personnel ("IESP"); (3) teachers, who are members of the Independence National Education Association ("INEA"); and (4) paraprofessionals, who are also members of INEA.

On April 23, 2002, after having conducted two open meetings with employees to discuss such a policy, the Board adopted a "collaborative team process" for negotiating with employee groups in which multiple employee groups would be represented on a single "collaborative team" that would address employment issues. The collaborative team was to be comprised of six teacher representatives, one representative from each of six other employee groups (bus drivers, custodians, paraprofessionals, secretaries, nurses, and nutrition service employees), six District administrators, and two members of the board of education. Those members were to be provided with training in team building and cooperative decision-making. The collaborative team was to operate under the direction of an outside facilitator. After the collaborative team reached a consensus on an issue under discussion, such as work environment, benefits or compensation, a recommendation would be provided to the Superintendent. The Superintendent would then present the team's recommendation to the Board along with his own recommendation on whether to adopt, modify, or reject the team's recommendation, and the Board would subsequently adopt, modify, or reject the team's recommendation.

Previously, District representatives had discussed employment issues one-on-one with the exclusive bargaining representative for the transportation employees (ITEA) and the exclusive bargaining representative for the custodial and maintenance employees (IESP),1 and the proposals resulting from those one-on-one discussions had been forwarded to the Board. District representatives had also held separate discussions with the "recognized group" for the majority of the teachers (INEA) pursuant to a "Discussion Procedure for Salary, Benefits and Policy Proposals" that had been adopted by the Board in the late 1970s. The Board rescinded that Discussion Procedure when it adopted the collaborative team process.

Subsequent to the Board's adoption of the collaborative team process, Appellants filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. In general, Appellants alleged that the District failed to comply with Missouri's Public Sector Labor Law, § 105.500 et seq., by adopting the collaborative team process and refusing to meet and confer separately with the ITEA, IESP, and INEA as the exclusive bargaining representatives for the transportation employees, custodial and maintenance employees, and paraprofessionals. Appellants also claimed that the District had improperly failed to meet and confer with these groups about the collaborative team process prior to its adoption by the Board. Appellants also asserted that the foregoing actions violated the terms of the Memoranda of Understanding that the District had with the ITEA and IESP. Appellants further contended that the District violated the Discussion Procedure that it had agreed upon with the teachers and District policy when it adopted the collaborative team process.

On October 29, 2003, the District filed is Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 2, 2003, Appellants filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 10, 2003, the trial court sustained the District's motion for summary judgment and denied Appellants' motion. Appellants bring four points on appeal from that judgment.

We first address Appellants' final two points. In their third point, Appellants ask this Court to reverse the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947), holding that Article I, Section 29 of the Missouri Constitution, which grants employees "the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing," does not apply to public employees. In their fourth point, Appellants ask this Court to reverse the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. banc 1982), holding that a memorandum of understanding that was approved by a legislative body does not constitute a binding collective bargaining agreement. Appellants contend that these cases and their progeny were wrongly decided.

A claim that the Missouri Supreme Court has incorrectly decided a previous case or cases is not cognizable in the Missouri Court of Appeals. State v. Patterson, 18 S.W.3d 474, 481 (Mo.App. S.D. 2000). "This court is constitutionally bound to follow the most recent controlling decision of the Missouri Supreme Court." Kinder v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., 43 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Mo.App. W.D.2001) (citing Mo. Const. art. V, § 2). Points denied.

We now turn to Appellants' first two points challenging the propriety of the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the District. The entry of summary judgment is proper "if `the motion, the response, [and] the reply ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 53 v. City Power & Light Dep't, 129 S.W.3d 384, 386 (Mo.App. W.D.2003) (quoting Rule 74.04(c)(6)). Our review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo. Id. We review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record. Id. "Only when the evidence, viewed in that light, shows that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, may we affirm. If there remains a genuine dispute of material fact, summary judgment is inappropriate, and we must reverse." Rodgers v. Threlkeld, 80 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Mo.App. W.D.2002).

In their first point, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the District's motion for summary judgment because the collaborative team approach improperly imposed a joint bargaining procedure upon the various exclusive bargaining representatives and that the District has failed to meet and confer with ITEA, IESP, and INEA separately, which they claim is required by § 105.520. Appellants further claim that the District improperly failed to meet and confer separately with representatives from these unions prior to adopting its collaborative team approach. Appellants also argue that the District improperly refused to present proposals that had previously been agreed upon in accordance with the old negotiation procedure to the Board of Education.

Under Missouri's Public Sector Labor Law, "Employees, except police, deputy sheriffs, Missouri state highway patrolmen, Missouri national guard, all teachers of all Missouri schools, colleges and universities, of any public body shall have the right to form and join labor organizations and to present proposals to any public body relative to salaries and other conditions of employment through the representative of their own choosing." § 105.510. Section 105.520 provides:

Whenever such proposals are presented by the exclusive bargaining representative to a public body, the public body or its designated representative or representatives shall meet, confer and discuss such proposals relative to salaries and other conditions of employment of the employees of the public body with the labor organization which is the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in a unit appropriate. Upon the completion of discussions, the results shall be reduced to writing and be presented to the appropriate administrative, legislative or other governing body in the form of an ordinance, resolution, bill or other form required for adoption, modification or rejection.

The foregoing statutory provisions give public employees (with certain exceptions) a "`vehicle for petitioning their employer through their designated representative.'" Sumpter, 645 S.W.2d at 362 (quoting Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Public Serv. Employees Local No. 45, 520 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Mo. banc 1975)). "`When this representative submits proposals and grievances relative to salaries and other conditions of employment, the...

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