Independent Congregational Soc. v. Davenport
| Decision Date | 27 January 1978 |
| Citation | 381 A.2d 1137 |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
| Parties | INDEPENDENT CONGREGATIONAL SOCIETY v. Isaac DAVENPORT et al. |
Eaton, Peabody, Bradford & Veague by Clarissa B. Edelston (orally), Thomas M. Brown, Bangor, for plaintiff.
Harold C. Hamilton, II, Bangor (orally), Eugene W. Beaulieu, Old Town, John M. Dudley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendants.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.
The present site of the Unitarian Church structure and parsonage at the corner of Union and Main Streets in Bangor is comprised of what were at one time three contiguous parcels of land. Appellant Society derives its title to the site as follows:
To Parcel I from a deed in 1827, made by Isaac Davenport, containing the following language:
"Provided, however, that if said subscribers shall not proceed to erect a church thereon within one year and also provided that the aforegranted premises shall cease to be used occupied and improved by said Society as a place of the public religious meetings of said Society this deed is to be void, and the said premises are to revert to me or my heirs."
To Parcel II from a deed in 1830, made by trustees of the estate of Isaac Davenport, stating:
"This Deed is given on the condition that the same shall be kept forever for the accommodation of the said meeting house."
To Parcel III by deeds in 1852, stating:
"Subject to the condition that said premises shall be used for the sole purpose of promoting the object of said society by the erection and maintenance thereon of a house of public worship or other uses connected therewith & appropriate to the object and constitution of said corporation and no other."
The Independent Congregational Society has used the property as the site of a church and parsonage to this day. It is stipulated by the parties to this action that the attendance of worshipers at the church has dropped from about five hundred regular members to about thirty, that the recent active membership is now about sixty persons, and that the financial strain of maintaining the building with so small a congregation is inhibiting efforts to revitalize the church.
The Society brought suit in Superior Court to quiet and establish title and remove any cloud from its title to the three parcels created by the restrictive language in the deeds. Because the identity or location of any heirs of the several grantors was not known, a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent them in their absence. From the denial of its requested relief the plaintiff makes timely appeal.
The controlling consideration for this case is that the several instruments conveying the parcels comprising the tract assembled for the church should be construed, if reasonably possible, in such a way that the restrictions on use set forth in the later deeds have legal effects identical to the effect of the related restriction in the deed of the first parcel. Contiguous parcels were conveyed at different times, with restrictions varying somewhat in exact language but all having as their main purpose limiting the use of the tract to construction of the appellant's church edifice and maintenance of its functions. Doubtful language in those deeds should be so interpreted as to yield similar legal consequences of the restrictions. It makes no sense to import any intention on the part of the various grantors to create different kinds of restrictions or reversionary interests when all parcels were intended to be, and finally were, united in one tract used for construction of a large church.
The grantee's interest in Parcel I was a fee subject to condition subsequent. The 1827 deed provided that if the land ceased to be used for religious meetings it was "to revert to me or my heirs." Besides being expressed in the language of condition, the restriction was coupled with another condition, the erection of a church within one year, breach of which was plainly intended to empower the grantor or his heirs to bring about a forfeiture. The natural conclusion is that the two restrictions in Parcel I were to be given similar legal effect and that the deed of Parcel I thus created a fee subject to two conditions...
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Prieskorn v. Maloof
...Hardman v. Dahlonega-Lumpkin County Chamber of Commerce, 238 Ga. 551, 233 S.E.2d 753, 755-56 (1977); Independent Congregational Society v. Davenport, 381 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Me.1978); Ohm v. Clear Creek Drainage District, 153 Neb. 428, 45 N.W.2d 117, 119-20 (1950) (mere expression that the lan......
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DeHart v. Ritenour Consolidated School Dist.
...(Tex.App.1901); Fuchs v. Reorganized School District No. 2, Gasconade County, 251 S.W.2d 677 (Mo.1952). In Independent Congregational Society v. Davenport, 381 A.2d 1137 (Me.1978), the deed recited the conveyance was void if the land "shall cease to be used, occupied and improved ... as a p......
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City of Casper v. J. M. Carey & Bro.
...a claim that a condition subsequent has been extinguished by its observance over a period of time is Independent Congregational Society v. Davenport, Me., 381 A.2d 1137 (1978). The Supreme Court of Maine "When a fee on condition subsequent is created by a deed or will stating no time during......
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Mildram v. Town of Wells
...brought suit in Superior Court claiming ownership in the property by virtue of a breach of the condition. In Independent Congregational Society v. Davenport, 381 A.2d 1137 (Me.1978), we adopted the rule that when a fee on condition subsequent is created by a deed or will stating no time dur......