Independent Dist. of Eden, No. 2, v. Rhodes

Decision Date25 May 1893
Citation55 N.W. 524,88 Iowa 570
PartiesINDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF EDEN, NUMBER 2, et al. v. ANTHONY RHODES, President of Board of Directors, Appellant
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Marshall District Court.--HON. J. L. STEVENS, Judge.

ACTION for mandamus to compel the defendant to file and approve a teacher's contract. Judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

J. L Carney, for appellant.

O Caswell, for appellees.

OPINION

GRANGER, J.

On the first day of April, 1891, the board of directors of the plaintiff district, by a majority vote, agreed to employ the plaintiff Gambell as a teacher for the district for the period of nine months from September 14, 1891, in pursuance of which a contract in writing was prepared and signed by Gambell and the secretary of said board, and presented to the defendant, to be, by him, as president of the board, approved and filed, which the defendant refused to do, and this action is to compel the performance of that duty. The answer is in four divisions, the first being of admissions and denials. To the other three divisions the district court sustained a demurrer, and the substance of each division can better be stated as we reach the different questions for consideration.

I. In the second division it is averred that there is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff. It will be seen that the district and the teacher, the contracting parties, are the plaintiffs. The argument by appellant is that, while the "causes of action are the same kind," they are not in favor of the same party; and reference is made to Code, section 2630 which is as to joinder of causes of action, and not parties. Section 2545 treats of joinder of parties plaintiff, and is as follows: "All persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs, except where it is otherwise provided in this code." For the purpose of this question we, of course, assume the facts to be as pleaded. It then appears that the district and Gambell have made a contract. The law requires that it shall be reduced to writing, approved, and filed, and designates by whom this shall be done. This suit is to compel the performance of that agreement. The "subject of the action" is the contract. The "relief demanded" is the performance of the duty by the president of the board. Is it to be doubted that both the district and the teacher are interested in the subject of the action, the contract and the relief demanded, the approving and filing of the same? The question will hardly admit of discussion. Presumably, one party to the contract would be as much interested as the other, at the time of making it, in having the law complied with as to the manner of its making and preservation, and not, as claimed, that the teacher alone would have that interest.

II. It is contended that, because the district has only a public interest, the action should have been in behalf of the state, and by the public prosecutor, and reference is made to Code, section 3377, as follows: "The order of mandamus is granted on the petition of any private party aggrieved, without the concurrence of the prosecutor for the state, or on the petition of the state by the county attorney, when the public interest is concerned, and is in the name of such private party, or of the state, as the case may be, in fact brought." While the case, in a sense, involves a public interest, it is exceedingly doubtful, in view of the law as to the duties of the public prosecutor, and creating school districts, if such a public interest comes within the legislative intent of the section. It is not, however, necessary that we should determine the question. The plaintiff, Gambell, is a private person seeking relief, and comes clearly within the rule of Code section 3378, and if it should be held that the interest of the district should be represented by the state, as a party, it would not have the effect to dismiss the suit as to Gambell. Nor would it in any way change the relief to be granted. With Gambell alone as plaintiff, the result would be the same as to defendant, under the issues, and hence there is no prejudice.

III. The third division of the answer, after some admissions, including the presentation to the defendant of the contract, contains the following defensive matter: "That said paper was presented for the approval of defendant, as president of said school board, and acting under and in accordance with law, this defendant refused to file or approve the said paper as a contract with the said Gambell, and that said action was taken after due consideration, and for the reason that the contract did not conform to the provisions of the law, and because the plaintiff, V. C. Gambell, was not a person of good moral character; that his employment was protested against by a large number of patrons of the school, who had become dissatisfied by the said Gambell's former connection as teacher with the schools of Rhodes, and, because of the inefficiency and failure of the said Gambell to discharge the duties of a teacher, a large number of the people residing in the independent school district refused to send their children to school. The defendant further shows that during the school year of 1890, the said Gambell failed to instruct his pupils at Rhodes, in physiology and hygiene, with special reference to the effect of alcoholic drinks and stimulants upon the human system, as required by the law of this state. The defendant further avers that acting, as he believed, in the best interests of the school at Rhodes, Iowa and to faithfully discharge the duties of his office, as president of the board, in the exercise of his best judgment, and with the discretion vested in him under the law, he had, a long time prior to the beginning of this action, refused to approve or file the said paper as a contract with V. C. Gambell. Defendant further avers that each of the plaintiffs had full notice of the refusal of defendant to approve the contract prior to any services being rendered by said Gambell as a teacher."

The law governing district townships makes express provisions as to the employment of teachers for subdistricts, and devolves that duty upon the subdirector of each subdistrict, under such rules and restrictions as the board of directors may prescribe. Code, section 1753. All contracts with teachers shall be in writing, * * * and shall be signed by the subdirector or secretary and teacher, and be approved by, and filed with, the president. Code, section 1757. The general school...

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