Independent School Dist. No. 8 of Seiling, Dewey County v. Swanson
| Decision Date | 01 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 48253,48253 |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
| Parties | INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 8 OF SEILING, DEWEY COUNTY, State of Oklahoma, Petitioner, v. The Honorable J. Russell SWANSON of the Fourth Judicial District, Garfield County, Oklahoma, et al., Respondents. |
J. Harry Johnson, Oklahoma City, Larry L. French, Edwards & French, Seminole, for petitioner.
Andrew J. Moore, Woodward, Tom J. Ruble, Taloga, for respondent Ruble.
Shirley Collier, Collier & Fahle, Taloga, for respondent Peters.
This litigation concerns the validity of a student hair code adopted by the Board of Education of the Seiling Public School District. Plaintiffs are four male students of the district (one each from the high school and junior high, and two from the elementary school) who were threatened with imminent suspension by their respective principals, if, within five days, they failed to cut their hair so that the length conformed to that required by the code.
The code in question required boys to wear their hair 'above (the) eyebrows, collars and ears' and the high school boys were further required to have their hair well-groomed at all times and to wear their sideburns no longer than the bottom of the earlobes.
Through their next friends, the students sought a restraining order from the District Court of Dewey County to prohibit the Board and its agents from suspending or expelling them for failure to come within the code provisions.
The students alleged, inter alia, that the hair regulation denied them rights of individual freedom and liberty guraranteed under various provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions, and deprived them of the right to a free education guaranteed by the Constitution of Oklahoma. Further, that the Seiling School Board acted outside the scope of its statutory authority in adopting the hair code as it has no reasonable connection to the educational function of the school, and that the manner of the enforcement of the regulation denied them procedural due process. The students asserted that unless restrained, the school authorities would suspend and expel them and that they would suffer irreparable harm and damage.
The district court granted plaintiffs the relief they sought and a date was set for hearing on temporary injunction. Essentially, the subsequent procedural steps were these. The Board applied to this Court for extraordinary relief, requesting us to assume original jurisdiction of the matter and to compel the trial court, by writ of mandamus, to set a hearing date earlier than that originally scheduled. We did assume original jurisdiction and returned the matter to the trial court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing 'without out undue delay' and to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon, same to be forwarded to this Court together with the transcript of the hearing.
Hearing was held, and evidence was presented by both parties. The district court held in favor of the plaintiff students, enjoining the school board and its agents from further enforcement of the code. For reasons set forth below, we accept the findings of the trial court and affirm that judgment.
Plaintiffs' evidence showed that they were good students and that aside from hair code problems, they had not been involved in any disciplinary actions. The length of their hair had no effect on their desire or ability to learn and it did not have any effect on the learning processes of the other students. The length of their hair did not disrupt other students and, in fact, the only hair related disruption problems in the Seiling Schools came about from the enforcement of the code. Plaintiffs' expert winess, a clinical psychologist, testified that she had never observed any relationship between the length of a person's heir and their motivation to learn, nor was she aware of any such relationship. A school administrator from another district testified that his school had abandoned its hair code as the atmosphere created by its enforcement caused the school to resemble a 'police state' more than a learning institution. He stated that he had not been able to determine any connection between learning and hair length, since learning resulted from processes within the brain cells, not hair cells.
The School Board's evidence showed that Seiling had 'always had' a dress code and that it became the written policy of the school in 1972. No reason for the adoption of the code was offered. Testimony from school administrators from other districts showed that they were of the opinion that hair codes served a purpose in their respective districts. One administrator thought that with the implementation of a dress code, the students developed pride in their school. Another felt that students will only perform to standards which are set for them and that the administration therefore set the standards high. As he was of the opinion that manner of dress was a part of education and character building, restrictions on dress were necessary. Another administrator was of the opinion that every institution needed certain rules and regulations in order to carry out the functions entrusted to it. None of these administrators' opinions were supported by facts showing a cause and effect relationship between short hair and better education in their respective schools.
The district court held the hair code was unreasonable. In part, the trial court observed as follows:
The School Board challenges the ruling of the district court, asserting in its briefs the following positions: that the length of a student's hair does not involve constitutional issues; that in adopting this hair code the Board acted within its statutory power; and that this entire matter falls within the Board's proper exercise of its discretionary power to preserve discipline in the schools. The Board further contends that questions of procedure due process raised by the students are not properly in issue as no suspension or expulsion occurred due to the issuance of the restraining order.
At the outset, we find that the Board's position regarding the procedural aspects of these intended suspensions is correct. As no suspensions or expulsions took place, we do not find it necessary to pass on the acceptability of the intended suspension procedures in light of the holding of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), which established the right of students to receive procedural due process protections when facing a temporary suspension from public school.
We also agree with the School Board's position that upon the facts of this case, the rights of students to control the length of their hair does not raise substantive constitutional issues.
We are of the opinion that the question presented is whether, in adopting that protion of the dress code disputed here, the School Board acted beyond the proper scope of the statutory power granted that board to adopt regulations governing student behavior.
In deciding this question, we are greatly persuaded by a leading writer in the area that:
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and Status; A nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U.Pa.L.Rev. 373, 377 (1969).
Even a cursory study of the federal 'hair' cases reveals wide variance of opinion concerning the constitutional dimensions of students' rights to wear their hair at the length of their choice. The circuits are divided as to whether a constitutional question is presented. 1 Those courts which have found that the Constitution insures and protects a student's right to determine his individual personal appearance, do not agree as to the source and nature of that right. 2 Even though the circuits are divided, the Supreme Court has consistently denied certiorari. 3 Likewise, State Courts are divided in their holdings 4 and those cases invalidating regulations often utilize widely divergent rationales. 5
We also agree with Justice Breitenstein's observation in Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 261, (10th Cir. 1971) that this problem should be resolved through state procedures, because:
Oklahoma has made a public commitment to the education of its young people. The Constitution makes the offer of a free public education to children of school age who are sound in mind and body obligatory on the part of the state. 6
Supervision of instruction in the several schools is vested in a ...
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McIntire v. Bethel School
...§ 24-101, provides that student compliance with rules may be enforced through suspension from school. Independent School District No. 8 of Seiling v. Swanson, 553 P.2d 496, 501 (Okla.1976). The requirement that Defendants' actions were taken under color of state law is Plaintiffs have prove......
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Oea v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Legislature
...P.2d 164, 171-172 (footnotes omitted). 41. Id. 42. Okla. Const. art. IV, § 1. 43. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Swanson, 1976 OK 71, ¶ 25, 553 P.2d 496, 501. ...
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Barber v. Colorado Independent School Dist., 94-0054
...purely in-school appearance, such as a rule about lengths of skirts. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 8 of Seiling, Dewey County v. Swanson, 553 P.2d 496 (Okla.1976.); see also Neuhaus, supra. CISD's argued justification for this dramatic incursion into male students' private lives is too unsubst......
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Oklahoma Education Association v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Legislature, 2007 OK 30 (Okla. 5/8/2007)
...P.2d 164, 171-172 (footnotes omitted). 41. Id. 42. Okla. Const. art. IV, § 1. 43. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Swanson, 1976 OK 71, ¶ 25, 553 P.2d 496,...