Independent School District of Virginia v. State
| Decision Date | 09 January 1914 |
| Docket Number | 18,253 - (27) |
| Citation | 144 N.W. 960,124 Minn. 271 |
| Parties | INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA v. STATE |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
The Independent School District of Virginia petitioned the district court for St. Louis county for an order adjudging that petitioner was entitled to condemn the land described in the petition, for the purpose of instruction, experimentation and demonstration in agriculture; for the appointment of commissioners to ascertain and appraise the damages occasioned by such taking and the compensation to be made to the owners and others interested in the real estate.
Notice having been given of the time and place of hearing, the state of Minnesota appeared specially and moved to set aside the attempted service upon it of the notice of hearing and to dismiss the proceedings, in so far as the state was concerned, on the grounds: (1) That the court had no jurisdiction in the premises, because the state was immune from suit without its consent, and the proceeding was an attempted suit against it brought without its consent, no permission having been granted for the bringing of it either by the legislature or by any other authorized authority; (2) that the court was without jurisdiction because the proceeding was an action at law wherein an attempt was made by an unauthorized political subdivision of the sovereign state, to-wit: An independent school district, to take from the state without its consent public property by proceedings in eminent domain; (3) that the court was without jurisdiction, because the right did not exist in the applicant to take other than private property by proceedings in eminent domain; (4) that the court was without jurisdiction, because the proceeding was one attempting to take from the state certain of its school lands and thereby contrary to the provisions of the state Constitution, effect the sale thereof otherwise than at public sale. The matter was heard before Dancer, J., who denied the motion to dismiss the proceedings as to the state. From the order denying the motion, the state appealed. Affirmed.
Eminent domain -- appropriation of state land.
1. State lands are not subject to appropriation in condemnation proceedings, except when the right to so acquire them is expressly or by necessary implication granted by the legislature.
Act construed.
2. Chapter 53, Laws 1872 (section 2606, G.S. 1894), construed and held to grant, by necessary implication, the right to acquire such lands for other public purposes, and the right so granted was carried forward in the statutory revision of 1905, and thereby in effect extended to all corporations entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain, including school districts.
Appropriation of school land.
3. Under chapter 258, Laws 1913, a duly-organized school district of the state may thus acquire an interest in and to a tract of state school land for the educational purposes namely, experimentation and instruction in agriculture, provided for by that statute.
Constitution not violated.
4. Rights acquired in such condemnation proceedings are equivalent to and answer every purpose of a public sale, and the statutes, which by implication grant the right, are not in violation of article 8, § 2, of the Constitution.
Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, and Clifford L. Hilton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Arnold & Pickering, for respondent.
Proceedings under the authority conferred by chapter 258, p. 355, Laws 1913, to condemn a tract of state school land for the use and benefit of Independent School District of the city of Virginia, this state, for instruction and experimentation in agriculture. The land so sought to be taken being the property of the state, notice of the proceeding was served upon the attorney general as required by section 2524, R.L. 1905. The attorney general appeared at the hearing and moved for a dismissal on the ground, among others, that the school lands of the state are not subject to condemnation for the purpose stated or otherwise, that the proceeding is one to acquire rights in such lands contrary to the provisions of the state Constitution, to the effect that no state school lands shall be sold otherwise than at public sale, (section 2, art. 8, Const.) and, therefore, that the court is without jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding. The motion was denied and the state appealed.
1. We come directly to the principal question in issue, namely, whether a tract of state school land is subject to appropriation for educational purposes by a duly-organized school district in condemnation proceedings under chapter 258, Laws 1913, for all other incidental questions are necessarily determined by a decision of that question.
2. The generally accepted doctrine of practically all of the courts is that the public lands of the state may be taken under the power of eminent domain only when authority to do so is expressly or by necessary implication granted by the legislature. The rule is particularly applicable to lands owned and in actual use by the state, or by some of its municipal subdivisions. It is also settled law that a general grant of the right of condemnation does not include state property, whether in actual use or not, or whether held in its proprietory or other capacity, unless the state is expressly mentioned therein. State v. Boone County, 78 Neb. 271, 110 N.W. 629, 15 Ann. Cas. 487, and note. It is further settled that the municipalities of a state, including cities, villages, towns, counties and school districts, have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only upon express or implied legislative grant. 15 Cyc. 568. In this state the power has been conferred upon the municipalities named, and the purposes for which the power is here sought to be exercised is granted to school districts by chapter 258, supra. But our examination of the various pertinent statutes has brought to light no provision expressly exposing state lands to appropriation in this manner. And our first inquiry is whether it has been granted by necessary implication. If so the absence of the express grant becomes unimportant.
It is clear that no such implied grant can be spelled out of any of the statutes of the state enacted prior to 1872. But the legislature of that year apparently recognized the right as an existing one, and by necessary implication it was granted by section 15 of chapter 53 of the laws of that year. That statute was amendatory of the then existing statutes granting the general power of eminent domain to certain public service corporations and prescribing the procedure thereof, and the amendment, among other things, provided, in respect to the notice of hearing that, "in cases where the enterprise shall be located through or upon school or University lands, or any other lands belonging to this state, such notice shall be served upon the secretary of state or his assistant, and the commissioners shall award damages to the state, in like manner as to private persons or corporations."
By this enactment, which is found unchanged in 2606, G.S. 1894, the legislature appreciated the fact that it might in particular instances be necessary to take state lands for some other public use, and for the purpose of protecting its rights in such a case required that the notice of the proceeding be served upon the secretary of state; and by the requirement that the commissioners assess damages to it in the same manner as to persons and corporations, not only recognized the right as of one of probable necessity, but by necessary implication granted the same.
The statute was in effect so construed in In re St. Paul & N.P. Ry. Co. 34 Minn. 227, 25 N.W. 345, where the amended statute was cited in support of the decision that university lands might be condemned for railroad purposes. The court held that since the land there involved was not used for the purposes of the University it was liable "to be appropriated in same manner as lands of private persons." The distinction between used and unused state land was further emphasized in University of Minnesota v St. Paul & N.P. Ry. Co. 36 Minn. 447, 31 N.W. 936. The distinction is in accord with the general doctrine that land already devoted to a public use cannot in proceedings in eminent domain, without express or implied grant, be taken for another and inconsistent public use. So...
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