Indiana State Police Dept. v. Turner

• Decision Date: 28 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. 53A01-9102-CV-42,53A01-9102-CV-42
• Parties: INDIANA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellant-Defendant, v. Michael R. TURNER, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 598

577 N.E.2d 598

INDIANA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellant-Defendant, v. Michael R. TURNER, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 53A01-9102-CV-42.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

Aug. 28, 1991.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., David L. Steiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellant-defendant.

Richard S. Harrison, Karen A. Wyle, Cotner, Andrews, Mann & Chapman, Bloomington, for appellee-plaintiff.

RATLIFF, Chief Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Indiana State Police Department (Department) appeals from a declaratory judgment in favor of Michael R. Turner (Turner) regarding his participation in Department's pension plan. We reverse and remand.

ISSUES

We restate the issues on appeal as:

1. Is an action based on a contract for employment for a police department employee barred by a two-year statute of limitation, where such contracts are deemed to be pursuant to written contract?

2. Does a police department employee have standing to challenge a denial of participation in the police department's pension plan?

3. Are the court's findings of fact contrary to law where the court misclassified Turner's status in seeking relief?

FACTS

IND. CODE Sec. 10-1-1.9-3 defines which Department employees are eligible for participation in the Department's police pension. It defines "eligible employee" as "any regular police employee or regular limited police employee of the department." Id. This language has been consistent within the statute since 1957. ¹ See IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 47-835 (Burns 1957), IND. CODE ANN. Sec. 10-1-2-1 (West 1971).

Until July of 1975, the Department interpreted and applied this statute to include motor carrier inspectors or weighmasters (Inspectors) as participants in the Department's pension, as "regular limited police employees." Inspectors' duties have remained constant at all relevant times. Inspectors wear uniforms, drive marked Department vehicles, issue citations, participate in traffic direction, and assist with traffic accidents. They are authorized to enforce a considerable number of statutes, as well as weight restrictions. In performing these enforcement duties, they may stop and inspect vehicles, issue citations, and detain persons in the same manner as a law enforcement officer. State police officers and Inspectors are the only Department employees subject to mandatory training requirements and minimum age requirements. Inspectors also receive a portion of their training at the Indiana Law In July of 1975, the Department ceased allowing Inspectors who were hired after July 1, 1975 to participate in the police pension; instead, they were diverted to the Public Employee Retirement Fund (PERF). PERF provides lesser sick leave and life insurance benefits than the police pension fund does; Inspectors may obtain disability benefits under a state plan, but cannot obtain the special line-of-duty disability benefits available under the police pension. Although the Inspectors' duties remained the same, the Department began revising its rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures to conform to the change in policy effective July 1, 1975. This process included referring to Inspectors as "civilian employees."

Enforcement Academy, where police officers are trained.

The Department hired Turner as an automotive mechanic in July of 1976. He became a weighmaster trainee in August of 1978, and then an Inspector in April of 1979. He participates in PERF, but has never participated in the police pension.

On July 7, 1987, Turner sought membership in the police pension. The Department denied his request on July 30, 1987. The letter denying Turner's request stated that only police officers could be members of the police pension, and denied that Inspectors were "regular limited police employees" as defined by statute.

Turner filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and the parties agreed to submit the case by stipulation. The trial court awarded Turner a declaratory judgment and ordered other relief. This appeal ensued.

Other relevant facts will be stated in our discussion of the issues.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One

Department first contends that Turner's action was barred by a two-year statute of limitation. We find that the trial court applied the proper statute of limitation and Turner's action is not barred thereby.

The parties each cite a statute of limitation purportedly applicable, but Turner's statutory interpretation is correct. I.C. Sec. 34-1-2-2(6) provides the proper limitation period; this section covers actions relating to written contracts. We find that City of Terre Haute v. Brown (1985), Ind.App., 483 N.E.2d 786, is dispositive. Brown involved firemen suing a city for back pay and an injunction. The court held that when city employees are appointed or enter into performance of their duties pursuant to statute, valid written contracts are created; these contracts are deemed written contracts, and are governed by the 20-year statute of limitations found in I.C. Sec. 34-1-2-2(6). Brown, 483 N.E.2d at 788.

Like the firemen in Brown, Turner was a duly appointed member of the Department, who commenced his duties as an Inspector under the auspices of the Department and pursuant to statute. Similarly, his employment contract is also deemed written for statute of limitation purposes. We find the difference the Department cites in distinguishing the case, that Brown involved a municipal employee while the case at bar involves a state employee, is not relevant when applying the correct limitation period. See City of Indianapolis v. Sherman (1980), Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1202.

Moreover, we find the Department's request for us to follow State v. Puckett (1988), Ind.App., 531 N.E.2d 518, unpersuasive. Puckett is distinguishable since it involved a statute defining only a particular benefit, and not an entire employment classification created by statute. Id. at 525-526. Thus, we find that the applicable statute of limitation has not expired.

Issue Two

The Department also claims that Turner lacks standing to assert a claim for participation in the police pension. We disagree.

Two prerequisites exist for standing to prosecute a declaratory judgment action: The party must have a substantial present interest in the relief sought; and, the party must show that a question has arisen affecting his rights that ought to be decided to safeguard such rights. Health and Hospital Corp. v. Marion County (1984), Ind.App., 470 N.E.2d 1348, 1353. In a declaratory judgment action, the court determines what the specific rights, duties, and obligations of the respective parties are at the time of trial. Keystone Square Shopping Center v. Marsh Supermarkets (1984), Ind.App., 459 N.E.2d 420, 425, trans. denied. In an analysis based on these standards, we find that Turner has standing to bring the action in question.

Turner sought clarification of the Department's policy in defining participants in its police pension. If he prevailed on the merits of his suit, he would have received considerable benefits from the Department's pension program. Turner has shown a stake in the outcome, at the time of trial and presently, which directly affects his right to receive pension benefits as a Department employee. The court's determination of the class of employees allowed to participate in the pension plan substantially affects Turner. Thus, Turner has standing to pursue his claim and meets this threshold requirement.

Issue Three

The Department next asserts that the trial court's judgment is contrary to law and that the court misclassified Turner's status as a Department employee. We find that the trial court erred in its classification of Inspectors' employment status.

Since the trial court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are bound to review them under the following standard: we first must determine whether the evidence supports the findings; we then determine whether the findings support the judgment. Porter County Board of Zoning Appeals v. Bolde (1988), Ind.App., 530 N.E.2d 1212, 1215. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed if we conclude that the special findings support the judgment and are not clearly erroneous. ITT Industrial Credit Co. v. R.T.M. Development Co. (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 201, 203. A judgment is clearly erroneous where a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Porter County, 530 N.E.2d at 1215.

Because the parties submitted this case by stipulation and agreed to forgo a formal trial, the stipulated facts compose the evidence and merge with the findings; thus, the first tier of the Porter County test is met. Our remaining inquiry is whether the stipulated facts the court accepted...