Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Board of School Com'rs of The City of Indianapolis

• Decision Date: 06 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-9604-CV-194,49A02-9604-CV-194
• Citation: 679 N.E.2d 933
• Parties: 118 Ed. Law Rep. 1098 INDIANA STATE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Indianapolis Education Association, and Joyce Macke, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 933

679 N.E.2d 933

118 Ed. Law Rep. 1098

INDIANA STATE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Indianapolis Education Association, and Joyce Macke, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS Appellees-Defendants.

No. 49A02-9604-CV-194.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 6, 1997.

Richard J. Darko, Mary Jane Lapointe, Lowe Gray Steele & Darko, Indianapolis, for Appellants-Plaintiffs.

Michael R. Maine, David K. Herzog, Julie Manning Magid, Baker & Daniels, Indianapolis, for Appellees-Defendants.

Robert D. Macgill, Stanley C. Fickle, Andrew J. Detherage, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, for Amici Curiae David G. Vanderstel, Sheryl D. Vanderstel, Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, and City of Indianapolis.

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Appellants, the Indiana State Teachers Association, the Indianapolis Education Association, and Joyce Macke, the president of the Indianapolis Education Association and a teacher with the Indianapolis Public Schools (collectively, "Teachers Associations"), appeal the trial court's determination of the constitutionality of Article 20-3.1, as added to the Indiana Code by 1995 House Enrolled Act 1646. The trial court rejected the Teachers Associations' claims that: 1) Article 20-3.1 violates Article IV, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution because it was enacted as part of a legislative bill which was not confined to one subject and matters properly connected therewith; and 2) Article 20-3.1 violates Article IV, § 19 of the Indiana Article 20-3.1 violates Article IV, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution because it is not a general and uniform law.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 28, 1995, the Indiana Senate passed Engrossed Senate Bill 256 which provided for the reformation of the Indianapolis Public Schools (IPS). The bill contained limitations on the subject matter of collective bargaining and other provisions that affected IPS teachers. Senate Bill 256 was then sent to the Indiana House of Representatives where it passed on the first and second readings, but was not called for a third reading.

A legislative conference committee, however, appointed to consider differences in the budget bills passed in each house, issued a report which added the contents of former Senate Bill 256 to Engrossed House Bill 1646. The title of House Bill 1646, which now included the contents of former Senate Bill 256, was amended to read "A BILL FOR AN ACT to amend the Indiana Code concerning state and local administration and to make an appropriation." Record at 718. The conference committee report on House Bill 1646 was submitted to the House at 10:22 p.m. on April 29, 1995, the final day of the 1995 legislative session. The conference committee report passed both the House and the Senate minutes before midnight on that day. Governor Evan Bayh signed House Bill 1646, including the contents of former Senate Bill 256, into law on May 11, 1995. See P.L. 340-1995. P.L. 340-1995 added the contents of former Senate Bill 256 to the Indiana Code as Article 20-3.1.

The Teachers Associations subsequently filed suit in the Marion Superior Court, claiming, among other things, that P.L. 340-1995 is not confined to one subject and matters properly connected therewith in violation of Article IV, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution, and that IC 20-3.1 is not a general law of uniform operation throughout the State in violation of Article IV, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution. The court held a trial on the merits of these issues and found no constitutional violation. The Teachers Associations appeal.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

When considering the constitutionality of a statute, we accord it every reasonable presumption of validity. Ledbetter v. Hunter, 652 N.E.2d 543, 545 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). All doubts are resolved against a challenger who must overcome that presumption by "clearly demonstrating the provision to be invalid." State v. Hoovler, 668 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ind.1996).

I. The Single-Subject Requirement

The Teachers Associations claim that P.L. 340-1995 violates Article IV, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution which provides: "An act, except an act for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject and matters properly connected therewith." The purpose of Article IV, § 19 is to establish a check on the exercise of legislative power. Section 19 was included in the Constitution to protect the legislative process against political log-rolling, "where legislators combine two unrelated bills, each without sufficient support to pass on its own, in order to accumulate the requisite number of votes to pass both." Pence v. State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 489 (Ind.1995) (Dickson, J., dissenting); see also Jackson v. State ex rel. South Bend Motor Bus Co., 194 Ind. 248, 252, 142 N.E. 423, 424 (1924) (single-subject requirement designed to prevent "the conjunction, in one act, of two or more subjects having no legal connection, for the purpose of procuring the passage of laws which might not, alone, command legislative sanction, upon the strength of popular measures embraced in the same act.") (quoting Grubbs v. State, 24 Ind. 295, 297 (1865)). In order to effectuate the purpose of Section 19, our courts should enforce the single-subject requirement without hesitation. See Jackson, 194 Ind. at 251-52, 142 N.E. at 424 ("where it is clear that the law offends a constitutional inhibition, then it is the duty of the courts to uphold the Constitution rather than the statute which is in violation thereof.").

Notwithstanding these pronouncements of the importance of the purposes underlying Section 19, our supreme court has taken a laissez-faire approach to determining whether a violation of the single-subject requirement has occurred. See, e.g., Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 530-32, 418 N.E.2d 207, 213-15 (1981) (inclusion of Product Liability Act in bill amending Title 33 of the Indiana Code concerning courts and court officers did not offend single-subject requirement).

The wisdom of taking such an approach was criticized by Justice Dickson in Pence v. State where, in dissent, he stated:

"I favor enforcement of this constitutional imperative and believe that Indiana courts should seriously consider claims that enactments violate this requirement. Particularly in view of the recently renewed commitment of Indiana citizens to the single-subject requirement,[ ¹] courts should henceforth invalidate nonconforming statutory provisions."

Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 489. Justice Dickson noted the court's "reluctance to enforce the single-subject-per-act requirement and our resulting implied invitation to the General Assembly to accord minimal attention to the single-subject requirement in our Constitution." Id. at 490 (referring to Dague, 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207, and Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223 (1866)). Despite Justice Dickson's compelling observations, none of the other justices joined in his dissent. The court's broad approach to analyzing legislative acts for single-subject violations has prevailed, and the implied invitation to the General Assembly remains. See Bayh v. Indiana State Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 674 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ind.1996) ("The single subject provisions of the Constitution ... are designed to promote fair practice in legislating without much judicial intervention.").

By joining the IPS legislation with the budget in P.L. 340-1995, the General Assembly again accepted the supreme court's implied invitation. In doing so, the General Assembly passed, as part of the state's budget, legislation which restricts the collective bargaining rights of public school teachers in Indianapolis. This restriction on the rights of the members of the Teachers Associations was joined with the budget after it failed to pass on its own merits. This is the very logrolling that Section 19 of our Constitution was designed to prevent.

The legal connection between the budget of the state and a restriction on the right of IPS teachers to collectively bargain is tenuous at best. Our supreme court, however, has upheld equally tenuous connections in Dague, supra, and we are bound to follow such precedent. The legislature has traditionally linked together matters of state and local administration. See Indiana Code, Title 5. In accordance with that general scheme P.L. 340-1995 contains several provisions relating to budgetary matters which fall under the category of state administration. The law also contains provisions relating to IPS which fall under the category, however loosely, of local administration. To this extent, P.L. 340-1995 contains a single subject, state and local administration, and does not offend Article IV, § 19 of the Indiana Constitution as interpreted by our supreme court.

II. The Uniform Law Requirement

Article IV, § 23 of the Indiana Constitution provides that "In all the cases enumerated in the preceding section [Article IV, § 22], and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State." ² IC 20-3.1-1-1 provides that:

"This article applies to a common school corporation that:

(1) is located in whole or in part in the most populous township in a county having a population of more than seven hundred thousand (700,000); and

(2) serves the largest geographical territory of any school corporation in the township."

The law currently applies only to Marion County and IPS. The Teachers Associations argue that such an exclusive application renders IC 20-3.1 a special law in violation of Article IV, § 23.

Analyzing a law under Article IV, § 23 requires that we first determine whether the law is general or special. If the law is general, we must go on to determine whether it is uniformly applied throughout the state. If the law is special, we must go on to determine whether it is constitutionally permissible. See Hoovler, 668 N.E.2d at 1233; Indiana...