Indus. Comm. v. Bateman

• Decision Date: 01 March 1933
• Docket Number: 23747
• Citation: 185 N.E. 50,126 Ohio St. 279
• Parties: Industrial Commission Of Ohio v. Bateman.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

185 N.E. 50

126 Ohio St. 279

Industrial Commission Of Ohio v. Bateman.

No. 23747

Supreme Court of Ohio

March 1, 1933

Workmen's compensation -- Relation of employer and employe, or appointment or contract of hire, necessary -- Only injuries in course of employment, while engaged in employer's business, compensable -- Injuries to civil service employe attending reinstatement hearing, not compensable.

1. Under the scheme of our Workmen's Compensation Law an injured workman is not entitled to compensation when, at the time of injury, the relation of employer and employe did not exist, or if the workman was not under an appointment or contract of hire. (Conrad, Admx., v. Y. & O. Coal Co., 107 Ohio St. 387, approved and followed.)

2. In order to avail himself of the provisions of our compensation law the injuries sustained by the employe must have been "occasioned in the course of" his employment. Such injuries must be connected with the operation of the employer's business, either on the premises or within its immediate environs; or, if the injuries are sustained elsewhere, the employe, acting within the scope of his employment, must, at the time of his injury have been engaged in the promotion of his employer's business and in the furtherance of his affairs.

Prior to his injuries the decedent, Edward Bateman, was employed at a weekly wage by the city of Hamilton as a clerk in its service department, being an employe within the classified service. On January 14, 1926, the director of public service of the city notified Bateman that his services were dispensed with after January 15, 1926. He appealed to the civil service commission for reinstatement and was notified to appear before it for the hearing on his appeal on February 22, 1926. On that day, while in attendance in response to such notice he tripped upon a rug in the commission's office; his fall causing him to sustain injuries which resulted in his death in the following September. It appears that the hearing before the civil service commission resulted in Bateman's reinstatement on the ground that his discharge was illegal. It also appears that, in a separate action later brought by Bateman, the latter secured an order in mandamus ordering the city to pay his compensation during a period following his discharge. After Bateman's death his widow, the defendant in error, filed her application with the Industrial Commission asking compensation for the injuries which caused the death of her husband. The commission denied compensation being of the opinion that the decedent's injury was not sustained in the course of his employment.

On appeal to the court of common pleas, and at the close of the entire evidence, each of the parties filed a motion for a directed verdict, agreed that the jury be discharged and that the case be submitted to the trial court as a question of law arising upon the undisputed facts. The trial court found in favor of and rendered judgment for the defendant in error. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the cause is now in this court after its allowance of the commission's motion to certify.

Mr. Gilbert Bettman, attorney general, and Mr. R. R. Zurmehly, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Harry S. Wonnell and Mr. Mark T. Brown, for defendant in error.

JONES J.

The fact that Bateman, in his mandamus proceeding, secured an order for the payment of his wage during the period of his discharge, is no bar to the defense of the Industrial Commission, for the reason that it was not a party to the mandamus suit; and for the further reason that in such mandamus action the trial court had no jurisdiction to pass upon an award of compensation from the insurance fund; its jurisdiction in that respect being appellate after denial of compensation by the commission.

We agree with the statement contained in the brief of counsel for defendant in error that "the only question now before this court is whether or not such injuries causing his death were sustained in the course of his employment." This was the legal question presented to the trial court upon the motions for a directed verdict and is the only question presented to this court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court because it was of opinion "that the injury arose out of and was an incident connected with his employment."

We have heretofore held that the "Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act does not apply to employes * * * when, at the time of the injury, the relationship of employer and employe has ceased to subsist." Conrad Admx., v. Y. & O. Coal Co., 107 Ohio St. 387, 140 N.E. , 482, 36 A.L.R. 1288. "In order to warrant payment of compensation under the workmen's compensation act it is essential that there should have existed at the time of the calamity a contract of employment between the claimant and the alleged employer." 28 Ruling Case Law, 760. This rule of law is not challenged by counsel for the defendant in error, but they contend that, since the decedent had appealed to the civil service commission for reinstatement, he remained under a contract of hire until the civil service commission determined the legality of his discharge. Whether, under such circumstances, the decedent at the time of his injury was an employe under a contract of hire within the purview of Section 1465-61, General Code, quaere, for the defendant in error is confronted with another bridge she must cross before recovery; she must show that the decedent's injury was occasioned in the...