Indus. Comm. v. Davis
| Decision Date | 31 May 1933 |
| Docket Number | 23896 |
| Parties | Industrial Commission Of Ohio v. Davis. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Workmen's compensation -- Employe's cause of action accrues when injured -- Dependent's cause of action accrues when employe dies from injuries -- Such causes of action are separate and independent -- Appeal -- Industrial Commission record in employe's proceeding not competent evidence in dependent's proceeding.
1. The cause of action of an injured employe accrues at the time he receives an injury in the course of his employment, and the cause of action of a dependent of a killed employe accrues at the time of the death of such employe from an injury received in the course of his employment. (Industrial Commission v Kamrath, 118 Ohio St. 1, approved and followed.)
2. Such causes of action are separate and independent, neither being dependent upon nor affected by the determination of the other.
3. The record of the Industrial Commission, showing its finding and order in a proceeding instituted by a claimant for compensation for injuries sustained, is not competent evidence in a subsequent action by the dependents of such former claimant, wherein they seek compensation for his death.
Myrtle Davis filed a claim with the State Industrial Commission for compensation on account of the death of her husband, Curtis Davis, an employe of the Columbus Railway Power & Light Company, his position being that of a conductor on one of its cars. Said company complied with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. The claim was rejected by the Industrial Commission. Thereupon claimant filed her appeal in the court of common pleas of Franklin county.
The petition, following averments that said Curtis Davis on December 25, 1926, when about to set a switch in the tracks over which street cars were operating, was struck by an automobile and received certain specified injuries from which he died April 14, 1928, contained the following averment "This plaintiff says, further, that during his lifetime the said Curtis Davis filed a claim with this defendant asking for compensation on account of disability suffered by him as a result of the injuries above described, and that this defendant during the lifetime of the said Curtis Davis found that the said Curtis Davis was injured in the course of his employment with The Columbus Railway Power and Light Company, as hereinbefore described, and awarded him compensation up to and including the thirteenth day of September, 1927."
On motion of the Industrial Commission the paragraph above quoted was stricken from the petition and upon the trial the court rejected evidence tendered in support of the allegations contained in that paragraph. A verdict in behalf of defendant was returned by the jury, and judgment was accordingly rendered by the court. Upon proceeding in error the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for error in refusing "to admit in evidence the findings and award of the Industrial Commission on the application filed by Curtis Davis and the Industrial Commission's subsequent allowance of compensation and expenses to Curtis Davis." Upon the motion the record was ordered certified to this court for review.
Mr John W. Bricker, attorney general, Mr. R. R. Zurmehly and Mr. Joseph E. Bowman, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Stanley S. Stewart, Mr. Kenneth Little and Mr. Wm. H. Meyers, for defendant in error.
The legal question presented is within a very narrow compass. It is whether the record of the Industrial Commission, showing its finding and order for compensation for injuries sustained by a claimant, may be pleaded and introduced in evidence in a subsequent proceeding by the dependents of such former claimant wherein they seek compensation for his death.
The trial court answered that question in the negative, and rejected the proffered evidence. The Court of Appeals held it was admissible. The theory upon which it was held to be competent seems to be that in each instance the Industrial Commission is the defendant, and having at one time found that the then claimant was injured in the course of his employment, its finding is in some measure binding upon it in the proceeding subsequently instituted by the...
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