Del Indus., Inc. v. Texas Workers' Compensation Ins. Fund

• Decision Date: 16 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 03-97-00349-CV,03-97-00349-CV
• Citation: 973 S.W.2d 743
• Parties: DEL INDUSTRIAL, INC., Appellant, v. TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 743

973 S.W.2d 743

DEL INDUSTRIAL, INC., Appellant, v. TEXAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Appellee.

No. 03-97-00349-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Austin.

July 16, 1998.

Rehearing Overruled Aug. 13, 1998.

Thomas P. Washburn, Hector De Leon, De Leon, Boggins & Icenogle, P.C., Austin, for Appellant.

Mary Barrow Nichols, General Counsel, Jeff R. Boggess, Senior Staff Attorney, Austin, for Appellee.

Before YEAKEL, C.J., and ABOUSSIE and JONES, JJ.

ABOUSSIE, Justice.

This is an action for collection of insurance premiums. The primary issue is whether a company that leases employees from a staff leasing agency is responsible for paying workers' compensation insurance premiums for the leased employees. The lower court imposed liability on appellant, Del Industrial, Inc. ("Del"), for payment of the premiums based on section 91.042(c) of the Staff Leasing Services Act ("the Act"). See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. § 91.042(c) (West 1996). ¹ Because we find the statute does not require the company to pay the premiums, we will reverse and render judgment in favor of Del.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellee, the Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund ("Fund"), is a governmental corporation that operates as a workers' compensation insurance carrier. See Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 5.76-3 (West Supp.1998). Pursuant to a contract, the Fund agreed to provide Del with workers' compensation insurance coverage for Del's employees from March 30, 1994 to March 22, 1995. During this time, Del also leased staff from a licensed staff leasing company, Administrative Resources, Ltd. ² At the end of the policy period, the Fund charged Del an additional $82,047, the cost of premiums for workers' compensation coverage for the leased workers. ³

After unsuccessful attempts to collect these additional premiums, the Fund brought suit against Del to collect the amount. The Fund moved for summary judgment on the issues of Del's liability for the workers' compensation premiums and the amount due. The Fund claimed Del was liable for the premiums under section 91.042(c) of the Act or, alternatively, because Del exercised supervision, direction, and control of the leased employees. Del filed a competing motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Fund had no legal basis for charging Del with the premiums. After a hearing, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Fund on the specific ground that Del was liable for the premiums under the Act and denied Del's cross-motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The trial court's order was silent as to the Fund's alternative

theory of recovery. Further, the trial court did not render summary judgment on the amount of premiums owed. Following a trial to determine the amount of premiums due, the trial court rendered a final judgment which incorporated the language of the partial summary judgment on Del's liability and awarded the Fund a total of $30,215.64 in premiums and interest. Del filed this appeal, raising one issue. In its appeal, Del contends that the Act does not authorize the Fund to charge Del workers' compensation insurance premiums for employees Del leased from a staff leasing company.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A summary judgment is proper only when a movant establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a. In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). Every reasonable inference must be indulged in the nonmovant's favor, with any doubts resolved in its favor. Id. A summary judgment for the defendant disposing of the entire case is proper if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not succeed upon any theories pleaded. See Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex.1983).

When both parties move for summary judgment, the non-prevailing party may appeal both the prevailing party's motion as well as the denial of its own. See Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.1996); Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396, 400 (1958). An appellate court should liberally construe appeals involving cross-motions for summary judgment, and, if the point of error sufficiently alerts the court that appellant is contesting both the granting of appellee's motion and the denial of its own, the court should consider both issues. See Runyan v. Mullins, 864 S.W.2d 785, 787-88 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1993, writ denied). ⁴ In addition, when reviewing cross-motions for summary judgement, the appellate court should consider all the summary judgment proof and determine all questions presented. Commissioners Court v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.1997). The appellate court may affirm the trial court's summary judgment or reverse and render judgment on the non-prevailing party's motion. See Holmes, 924 S.W.2d at 922; Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.1988).

This case is one of statutory construction, and such matters are questions of law for the reviewing court to decide. See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex.1989). The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that a court must look to the intent of the legislature and must construe the statute so as to give effect to that intent. Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex.1994). The court is bound to construe a statute as written and, if possible, ascertain the legislature's intention from the language used in the statute. See Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex.1985).

DISCUSSION

The section of the Act in question reads as follows:

§ 91.042 Workers' Compensation Insurance

(a) A license holder may elect to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage for the license holder's assigned employees through an insurance company as defined under Section 401.011(28) or through self-insurance as provided under Chapter 407.

(b) If a license holder maintains workers' compensation insurance, the license holder shall pay workers' compensation insurance premiums based on the experience rating of the client company for the first two years the client company has a contract with the license holder and as further provided by rule by the Texas Department of Insurance.

(c) For workers' compensation insurance purposes, a license holder and the license (d) If a license holder does not elect to obtain workers' compensation insurance, both the license holder and the client company are subject to Section 406.004 and 406.033. ⁶

holder's client company shall be coemployers. If a license holder elects to obtain workers' compensation insurance, the client company and the license holder are subject to Sections 406.034 and 408.001. ⁵

(e) After the expiration of the two-year period under Subsection (b), if the client company obtains a new workers' compensation insurance policy in the company's own name or adds the company's former assigned workers to an existing policy, the premium for the workers' compensation insurance policy of the company shall be based on the lower of:

(1) the experience modifier of the company before entering into the staff leasing arrangement; or

(2) the experience modifier of the license holder at the time the staff leasing arrangement terminated.

(f) On request, the Texas Department of Insurance shall provide the necessary computations to the prospective workers' compensation insurer of the client company to comply with Subsection (e).

The trial court based its decision regarding Del's liability for the premiums on its reading of one sentence of this section. Quoting the partial summary judgment order, the final judgment states:

The Court finds that, because of the language of Texas Labor Code § 91.042(c) providing that "For workers' compensation insurance purposes, a license holder [staff leasing company] and the license holder's client company shall be coemployers," employees leased by [Del] from a staff leasing company are covered under [Del's] workers' compensation insurance policy issued by the Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund. Therefore, the Court finds as a matter of law the Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund is entitled to premium under its policy issued to [Del] for workers'[sic] provided by a leasing company without statutory workers' compensation insurance coverage.

Likewise, the Fund contends on appeal that the "coemployer" language obligates the client company to extend coverage to leased employees when the staff leasing company does not elect to provide coverage. For numerous reasons, we disagree with the Fund's position.

First, the Fund seeks to interpret the term "coemployers" without considering the entire statutory scheme. Statutory provisions, however, must not be isolated from the surrounding language nor construed apart from their context. See Morrison, 699 S.W.2d at 208; Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex.1975). Further, we must presume that in enacting the statute the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(2) (West 1988). Reading the entirety of the section on workers' compensation insurance together with other provisions of the Act leads us to the conclusion that the staff leasing company and the client company are coemployers only to the extent of the consequences of the staff leasing company's election.

Based on the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the legislature granted the staff leasing company the absolute right to elect whether to obtain coverage for the Further, the legislature has imposed extensive responsibility for the leased employees on the staff leasing company rather than the client company. For instance, the staff leasing company retains the right of direction and control over the employees assigned to a client company. See Labor Code § 91.032(1) (West 1996)....