Industrial Com'n v. Big Six Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1922
• Docket Number: 10491.
• Citation: 211 P. 361,72 Colo. 377
• Parties: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. v. BIG SIX COAL CO. et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

211 P. 361

72 Colo. 377

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. v. BIG SIX COAL CO. et al.

No. 10491.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

December 4, 1922

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Clarence J Morley, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Ollie Cruthis employee, to recover compensation for personal injuries opposed by the Big Six Coal Company, employer, and the Continental Casualty Company, insurance carrier. An award by the Industrial Commission of part of the employee's compensation for total permanent disability to be paid in a lump sum and the balance in monthly payments was set aside by the district court, and the Industrial Commission and employee bring error.

Reversed and remanded, with directions to vacate the order setting aside the award of the Commission and to enter a judgment approving the award.

Victor E. Keyes, Atty. Gen., and John S. Fine Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs in error.

L. Ward Bannister, A. H. Laws, and S. M. January, all of Denver, for defendants in error.

CAMPBELL J.

This is a writ of error to the district court of the city and county of Denver, to review its final judgment setting aside an award of the State Industrial Commission to Ollie Cruthis, in a case there pending, to recover compensation, under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1919 (Laws 1919, p. 700) for an injury which he sustained in the course of his employment by the Big Six Coal Company, one of the defendants in error. The Industrial Commission approved an agreement of the insurance carrier and claimant, whereby he was given $10 each week during his disability. Later a hearing was had by the Commission to determine the extent of the disability, and the claimant was found to be totally and permanently disabled; and, upon such finding, he was awarded $10 each week, continuing thereafter so long as he should live. More than six months after the injury, proceeding under the permissive provisions of section 82, the claimant applied to the Commission for a lump sum compensation. Upon a hearing of his petition, of which the employer and insurance carrier were notified and in which they participated, the Commission found that it was for the best interests of the parties concerned that the petition be granted, and, accordingly, an award was made of $3,000 in cash, and, in addition thereto, $28.57 each month, to continue as long as the claimant's disability is total and permanent, or until otherwise ordered by the Commission, or until his right to compensation is terminated as provided by law. This final award, after a petition for review had been denied, was brought to the district court as authorized by the statute, and the district court set it aside and remanded the case to the Commission, with no specific direction.

From the record it appears that the award was set aside because the Commission did not determine, or did not state in its findings, the period of life expectancy of the claimant, and that there was not sufficient evidence produced upon which such expectancy could be based; the court being of the opinion that no lump sum award could be made, unless and until the Commission had determined, upon sufficient legal evidence, claimant's life expectancy. The claimant and the Industrial Commission are here seeking a review of the judgment of the district court.

With sufficient accuracy the defendants in error have thus stated the three principal questions involved: (1) The Commission's award is erroneous because of the absence of a specific finding of fact as to the duration of the claimant's expectancy; (2) the evidence to sustain the Commission's legal conclusion of expectancy, not its finding of fact thereupon, is wholly insufficient; (3) the commission has no power to require monthly payments in addition to a lump sum award.

There are only three grounds upon which the courts may affirm or set aside an award of the Industrial Commission: (1) That it acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) that the finding or award was procured by fraud; (3) that the findings of fact do not support the award. No fraud is claimed, but the award is said to be invalid upon the other two grounds.

Much of the argument of defendants in error, in support of the judgment of the district court and in its attack upon the award of the Commission, is really directed to the insufficiency of the evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact. While the contention is also urged that such alleged findings of fact as were made do not sustain the award, greater stress is laid upon the lack of evidence. Notwithstanding our previous decisions in these compensation cases that the weight and sufficiency of the evidence are not the subject of inquiry by the courts, parties persist in asking this court, in its review of these controversies, to sit as triers of fact.

In view of the record before us, we are also constrained to add, what we have declared in other cases, that failure and neglect of the Industrial Commission to make adequate and sufficient findings of all material facts upon which its award is based, give rise to unnecessary and prolonged litigation, which, in many of the cases, would be unnecessary if the Commission followed the established practice in this particular. It might well, by analogy, observe the requirements of a court of equity as to findings of fact, and, if it so acted, much of the time of the courts would be saved and much cost of expense of litigants would be avoided.

In its award of the lump sum here attacked, the findings of fact made by the Commission on which such award was made, is in the following language:

'It is further found that the claimant has filed an application for a lump sum settlement for the purpose of purchasing a three-acre tract of land in the town of Westminster, Adams county, Colo. That it is for the best interests of the parties hereto that the lump sum application be granted to the applicant for said purpose. That the amount required therefor is $3,000. That the age of the claimant at the time of his accident was 35 years. That his expectancy of life as determined by the Workmen's Compensation Law of Colorado is sufficient to entitle the payment of the total sum of $15,798.90 as compensation under the terms of the above award. That to produce the sum of $3,000 requires that the sum of $5,264.48 be commuted according to the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Colorado, and said sum when so commuted equals the sum of $3,000, which is to be paid the claimant in one lump sum. That after said sum shall be paid, it will reduce the probable amount to be paid to the claimant herein to the sum of $10,534.42. That said last-named sum is used only for the purpose of computing the lump sum settlement above referred to, and is not to be construed as a finding as to the total amount of compensation that the claimant herein may be entitled to receive. That the balance of compensation then to be paid to the claimant herein should be paid at the rate of $28.57 per calendar month beginning April 15, 1922, and continuing thereafter so long as claimant's disability shall be permanent and total.'

The finding as to what is for the best interests of the parties is sufficiently definite. There is no specific finding of the life expectancy of the claimant. On the contrary, the Commission states, as its conclusion, that his expectancy is sufficient to entitle him to the payment of a certain sum of money, and that to produce such sum requires a certain other sum, which, in turn, is to be commuted according to the terms of the Workman's Compensation Law and that this sum, when commuted equals the amount of the award. It is scarcely necessary to say that such a finding is not a compliance with what the practice demands in such c...