Industrial Commission of Utah v. Evans

• Decision Date: 11 July 1918
• Docket Number: 3237
• Citation: 52 Utah 394,174 P. 825
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH v. EVANS, District Judge

174 P. 825

52 Utah 394

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH v. EVANS, District Judge

No. 3237

Supreme Court of Utah

July 11, 1918

Original proceeding in prohibition by the Industrial Commission of Utah against P. C. Evans, as Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County.

Alternative writ quashed, peremptory writ denied, and proceeding dismissed with directions.

Dan B Shields, Atty. Gen., and O. C. Dalby and H. VanDam, Jr. Ass't Attys. Gen., for plaintiff.

Dey, Hoppaugh & Fabian for defendant.

FRICK, C. J. McCARTY, CORFMAN, THURMAN, and GIDEON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, C. J.

The Industrial Commission of Utah hereinafter called the commission, commenced this proceeding in this court against Hon. P. C. Evans as Judge of the District Court of Salt Lake County to prohibit him from proceeding to try a certain action or proceeding now pending in the District Court of Salt Lake County over which said Evans presides.

Both this proceeding and the proceeding which is sought to be prohibited by this one are based upon chapter 100, Laws Utah 1917, section 306, which is commonly known as the Industrial Commission Act, and which hereinafter, for convenience, will be referred to by that name or merely as the act.

The act is too long to be inserted here. We shall hereinafter refer to such parts, however, as may be deemed necessary to elucidate the questions decided. It is sufficient for the present to state that the act is similar to the act now in force in many states of the Union which are commonly known as Employers' Liability Acts by which compensation to employees in case they are injured in the course of their employment is provided for and made payable out of what is commonly designated a state insurance fund. Under the act of this state, however, compensation may be secured by the employer in three ways: (1) By contributing directly to the state insurance fund; (2) by insuring with a proper insurance company, hereinafter called the insurance carrier; and (3) by what is styled self-insurance; that is, by depositing security with the commission to secure the payment of compensation that may be allowed under the act.

The duty to secure in advance the compensation provided for by the act by one of the foregoing methods has by this court been held to be compulsory. Industrial Commission v. Daly Min. Co., 51 Utah 602, 172 P. 301, to which case we also refer for a more specific statement respecting the provisions relating to the insurance feature contained in the act.

Recurring, now, to the application in this proceeding. It, in substance, appears therefrom that a certain proceeding is now pending, in the district court aforesaid, which is entitled Mammoth Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah et al.; that said proceeding is one in certiorari, under our statute, to review and annul certain proceedings and orders made by the commission in favor of one Round, an employee of said Mammoth Mining Company, hereinafter called company, wherein he was awarded compensation for personal injuries which he claimed he had received, while "in the course of employment," and by reason of which he was entitled to the compensation provided for in the act for the character of injuries received by him. It also appears that the company is what is known as a self-insurer. That is that it has complied with the act by securing the compensation provided therein by depositing security with the commission. Mr. Roundy made application to the commission under the act for compensation, and the company, it seems, appeared and contested his right to be awarded compensation under the act upon the ground that he was not injured "in the course of employment" as specified in the act, and hence that the commission had no power or authority to award compensation under the act. The commission, however, decided that Roundy was injured "in the course of employment" as specified in the act, and made an order requiring the company to pay him the sum of $ 12 per week for a period of 150 weeks, payments to be made at intervals of four weeks. After said order was made the commission, however, vacated the same and entered another order, whereby it required the company to pay said Roundy the sum of $ 1,701.04 as compensation for his injuries, the same to be paid forthwith. The company, in its application in the district court, alleged that both the first order for the payment of $ 12 per week as aforesaid and the order for the payment of $ 1,701.04 are void and of no effect: (1) Because neither order was supported by any evidence whatever that the alleged injury of Mr. Roundy was received "in the course of employment," but that, upon the contrary, the evidence conclusively showed that the injury was not thus received; (2) because the commission had exceeded its power and jurisdiction in making the first order; (3) because the order changing the payment from $ 12 per week to the gross sum of $ 1,701.04 was made ex parte and without any notice to the company, and without any evidence whatever to support the same, and the commission, for that reason, as well as for the reasons first stated, had exceeded its jurisdiction and power to make such an order; (4) because the company, under the act, has no remedy by appeal; and (5) because, if it be held that the act gives it no remedy to review the proceedings and orders of the commission by appeal or otherwise, the act is unconstitutional and void upon six grounds which are specifically stated in the application. We have stated the substance of the application in the briefest terms possible.

The Attorney General of the state appeared on behalf of the commission in the district court, and demurred to the application of the company upon the following grounds:

(1) "That the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action or proceedings;" (2) "that the court has no jurisdiction over the said defendants, or either of them;" (3) that the application is ambiguous, etc.; and (4) that the application is deficient in substance.

A hearing was had upon the demurrer, and the district court overruled the same, and was about to proceed to a hearing upon the merits of the application when the proceeding in this court was commenced, as before stated. This court, pursuant to the application, issued an alternative writ of prohibition.

Counsel for the company have appeared to the writ on behalf of the district court, and have interposed a motion to quash the alternative writ upon the ground that the facts stated in the application are insufficient to authorize the granting of the relief prayed for therein or any relief, and upon various other grounds which we will now proceed to consider so far as deemed material to the controversy.

The legal questions involved in this proceeding are novel in this jurisdiction. They have, however, been very ably argued by both the Attorney General and by counsel for the company who appeared for the district court. The argument of the Attorney General, stated in general terms, is to the effect that although the fund out of which compensation is made to employees coming within the act is derived from three sources, namely: (1) From direct contributions to the state insurance fund by employers; (2) from money paid by insurance carriers, who, for a consideration paid to them, insure the compensation provided by the act; and (3) from moneys paid by self-insurers--that nevertheless, all the funds derived from all those sources, in contemplation of law, constitute but one fund from which compensation is to be made to all employees coming within the purview of the act. That argument, to some extent at least, is based upon our holding in Industrial Commission v. Daly Mining Company, supra, that every employer coming within the act must secure the payment of the compensation provided for by the act in advance. In view of the foregoing the Attorney General further argues that an application for compensation by an employee is not a proceeding between either an employer, or one who is a so-called self-insurer, or an insurance carrier and an employee as claimant, but that it is essentially a proceeding between an employee who claims compensation on the one hand and the commission upon the other, or merely a proceeding against the insurance fund, to which the commission is made a party because no award or allowance for compensation under the act can be made in favor of an employee and against said fund except by the commission upon an application to it duly made. In that connection it is further contended that, inasmuch as the insurance feature of the act is compulsory and the proceeding for compensation is against the commission for an award against the insurance fund, therefore neither the employer nor the insurance carrier is a necessary party to the proceeding; and, in view that the act does not in terms provide for an appeal or for a review of the acts or orders of the commission in making an award for compensation, neither the employer who contributes directly to the fund, nor one who is a so-called self-insurer, nor an insurance carrier insuring compensation, has the right to review the proceedings or orders of the commission in allowing compensation under the act, by appeal or otherwise. Moreover, it is insisted that neither the employer, whether he contributes directly to the insurance fund or whether he is a so-called self-insurer, nor the insurance carrier who insures compensation, has such an interest in the matter as to give either a standing in court. The latter contention is more particularly based upon the hypothesis that in complying with the act the employer is discharged from all liability as against an employee who is injured in the course of his employment. It is also contended...