Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Indus. Acc. Bd.

Citation540 S.W.2d 668
Decision Date21 July 1976
Docket NumberNo. B--5535,B--5535
PartiesINDUSTRIAL FOUNDATION OF THE SOUTH, Petitioner, v. TEXAS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD et al., Respondents.
CourtSupreme Court of Texas

Dixon & Petrovich, George J. Petrovich, Jr., Fort Worth, J. C. Hinsley, Austin, for petitioner.

Frank W. Elliott, Austin, Kronzer, Abraham & Watkins, W. James Kronzer, Houston, for respondents.

DOUGHTY, Justice.

This case requires that we determine whether Texas' Open Records Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252--17a (Supp.1974--1975) compels the Texas Industrial Accident Board to disclose to the Industrial Foundation of the South certain information concerning claims for workmen's compensation benefits. We hold that the information requested, with some exceptions to be noted, is 'public information' as defined by the Open Records Act and must be disclosed to the requesting party.

Texas' Open Records Act ('the Act') became effective on June 14, 1973. Eight days thereafter, the Industrial Foundation of the South ('the Foundation'), a nonprofit corporation comprised of approximately 282 member companies who employ workmen in the southwestern part of the United States, requested the Industrial Accident Board ('the Board') to furnish them the following items of information from every claim for workmen's compensation filed with the Board: the file number, the claimant's name and social security number, the name of claimant's employer, the nature of the injury, and the name of claimants attorney, if any. On June 29, 1973, the Board, in accordance with Section 7(a) of the Act, requested an opinion from the Attorney General to determine whether the information requested was 'public information' as defined by Section 3(a). On November 1, 1973, the Attorney General issued Open Records Decision No. 8, which, although expressing concern as to the practical difficulties of supplying such a voluminous quantity of data, declared that no exception of Section 3(a) would justify withholding access to the requested information.

Subsequent to the Attorney General's decision the Foundation again requested the Board to furnish the items of information; again the Board refused. Soon thereafter, the Foundation brought this suit pursuant to Section 8 of the Act, in the District Court of Travis County, against the Board, its members and its executive director ('defendants') seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to make the requested information available for its inspection.

As part of their discovery in preparation for this suit, the defendants served interrogatories on the Foundation which asked for detailed information regarding the organization, membership and activities of the Foundation. The defendants also asked the purpose for which the Foundation sought the information; whether such information had ever been used by a member of the Foundation as the basis for discharging or refusing to hire an employee; and the procedure used for furnishing information obtained by the Foundation to its members.

The Foundation moved to suppress all of these interrogatories on the ground that Section 5(b) of the Act precludes the Agency from inquiring into the purpose for which the information is requested. The trial court granted the Foundation's motion to suppress all the interrogatories except 2. A., B., and C., which asked the identity and position of the person answering the interrogatories, and 12, which asked the purpose for which the information was sought. In answer to Interrogatory No. 12 the Foundation replied:

The purpose of the information requested by Plaintiff's attorney is to be used to check out or determine the accuracy and truthfulness of a prospective employee's application for employment with a member company of the Industrial Foundation of the South. The requested information is compiled by the Plaintiff for pre-employment purposes only. No one other than a member company of the Industrial Foundation of the South can have the requested information.

All parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Foundation, holding that all the information requested is public information subject to disclosure under the Act, except for claims which involve 'injury to the genitalia of the body.' The trial court ordered that mandamus issue directing the defendants to make the requested information available for inspection and copying by the Foundation. Defendants appealed this judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals.

The Court of Civil Appeals held (526 S.W.2d 211) that the trial court erred in suppressing defendants' interrogatories. The Court stated that, if one of the Foundation's purposes for seeking the information was illegal discrimination against workmen filing claims, 1 then the Foundation would not be entitled to mandamus, because the remedy is equitable in nature and those seeking it must come into court with clean hands. Thus the Court concluded that, by refusing to allow defendants to inquire into the Foundation's motives, the trial court had denied defendants the right to prepare a valid defense. The Court also held that the information requested was not excepted from the operation of the Act as 'information deemed confidential by law, either Constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision,' (Section 3(a)(1)); and that the Act applies to claims filed before its effective date as well as to those filed afterward. The case comes to us on application by both parties. We shall first consider the points of error urged by the Foundation.

I. The Foundation's Application

The Foundation contends that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the trial court erroneously suppressed the Board's interrogatories. While denying that it intends to use the information which it seeks for any illegal or discriminatory purpose, the Foundation argues that the Act itself prohibits any consideration of the motives or purposes for which the information is sought in determining whether the information is public and open to inspection.

The purpose of the Open Records Act is declared in Section 1 as follows:

Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government which holds to the principle that government is the servant of the people, and not the master of them, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that all persons are, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. To that end, the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed with the view of carrying out the above declaration of public policy.

Section 3 requires that a governmental body make all 'public information . . . available To the public during normal business hours . . ..' 2 Section 3(a) defines 'public information' as '(a)ll information collected, assembled, or maintained by governmental bodies pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business . . ., with the following exceptions Only: . . .'; there follow 16 exceptions, after which Section 3(b) provides: 'This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, Except as specifically stated in this section.'

Section 5(a) denominates the chief administrative officer of the governmental body as the 'custodian' of its public records, and Section 5(b) provides:

Neither the custodian nor his agent who controls the use of public records shall make Any inquiry of any person who applies for inspection or copying of public records Beyond the purpose of establishing proper identification and the public records being requested; . . .

Finally, Section 14 provides, in part:

(a) This Act does not prohibit any governmental body from voluntarily making part or all of its records available to the public, unless expressly prohibited by law; provided that such records shall then be available to Any person.

(b) This Act does not authorize the withholding of information or limit the availability of public records to the public, except as expressly so provided.

(d) This Act shall be liberally construed in favor of the granting of any request for information.

The procedure for determining whether information is public is set out in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Section 7 provides that a governmental body which has received a request for information may, within 10 days of the request, seek a decision from the Attorney General to determine whether the information is covered by the Act. If the Attorney General determines that the information is public and must be disclosed, but the governmental body still refuses to disclose it, Section 8 provides that 'the person requesting the information or the attorney general may seek a writ of mandamus compelling the governmental body to make the information available for public inspection.'

The Court of Civil Appeals has held that a court, relying upon its equitable powers inherent in the remedy of mandamus, may refuse to issue a writ of mandamus to compel disclosure even though the information sought is public information and not excluded by any exception, if the purpose for which the information is sought is illegal or in violation of a policy of the State. 526 S.W.2d at 216.

It is true that, although mandamus is a legal remedy, it is governed, to some extent at least, by equitable principles. Callahan v. Giles, 137 Tex. 571, 155 S.W.2d 793 (1941). In some instances the equitable doctrine of clean hands has been...

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