Ingalls v. Oberg

• Citation: 72 N.W. 841,70 Minn. 102
• Parties: INGALLS v OBERG.
• Decision Date: 11 November 1897
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

70 Minn. 102

72 N.W. 841

INGALLSvOBERG.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 11, 1897.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Held, that there was no error in the court's refusing the defendant leave to amend his answer when the plaintiff rested.

2. The following rules applied:

First. In reviewing the action of the trial court in denying a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action, an appellate court will consider all the evidence in the case, and affirm the action of the trial court if sufficient evidence was admitted to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff, although not introduced until after the motion.

Second. A single general exception to the refusal of the court to charge two or more propositions, one of which is erroneous, is insufficient.

Third. An assignment of error that the court erred in granting a new trial, where the motion was made on two or more grounds, is too general to be availing.

Appeal from district court, Chisago county; F. M. Crosby, Judge.

Action by Cordelia Ingalls against C. E. Oberg. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial the defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Frank B. Dorothy and L. K. Stannard, for appellant.

P. H. Stolberg, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This action was brought in May, 1895, under chapter 84 of the General Statutes of 1894, to recover possession of demised premises from a tenant holding over after the expiration of his term. The plaintiff alleged a lease for the term of one year to (ending) April 1, 1895. The defendant admitted that he was in possession under a lease from the plaintiff, but alleged that the term had not yet expired, and would not expire until the fall of the season of 1895. Hence, under the pleadings, the only issue was when the term of the lease expired. It appeared from the evidence that defendant first went into possession under a verbal lease for one year, and was to pay as rent a share of the annual crops. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether this term of one year commenced in the fall of 1888, or in the spring of 1889; the defendant asserting the former, and the plaintiff the latter. The plaintiff testified that there was a renewal of this lease for another year every subsequent spring up to and including 1894. But it appeared that the business was all transacted for plaintiff by her husband, who died shortly before March 1, 1895; and in her cross-examination she admitted that no new arrangement was made in the springs of 1893 and 1894,-at least, that she had no personal knowledge of any such having been made. The defendant testified that his original term commenced in the fall, and not in the spring, and that “we [meaning himself and the plaintiff, or her husband] had talked it over every fall every year”; that on March 6, 1895, he went to see the plaintiff, to ascertain whether she wished him to stay on the farm the coming season; and that he and plaintiff then and there entered into a new lease for the season of 1895, ending in the fall of that year. He thus planted his right to possession squarely and exclusively on this new...