Ingersoll v. Martin

• Decision Date: 02 March 1882
• Parties: W. D. INGERSOLL v. LEWIS MARTIN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

58 Md. 67

W. D. INGERSOLL v. LEWIS MARTIN.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 2, 1882

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

Exception.--At the trial the plaintiff offered the following prayer:

That if the jury shall find that the defendant being indebted to the plaintiff on the 19th day of January, 1880, in the sum of $840, executed the promissory note of that date, for the sum of $255.44, and that on the 22nd day of July, 1880, when said note matured, executed the two promissory notes upon which this suit has been brought, in renewal of the same, and delivered them to the plaintiff, that then the plaintiff is entitled to recover.

And the defendant offered the three following prayers:

1. That if the jury find that the notes sued upon are notes given by the defendant to the plaintiff, in renewal of an original note from the defendant to the plaintiff, bearing date of January 19th, 1880; and if the jury further find, that since said original note was given, the plaintiff executed to the defendant a release under seal, whereby the plaintiff did release, acquit, exonerate and discharge the defendant from all claims, suits or demands, which could or might be brought against him, for or on account of any indebtedness then existing between them; if the jury further find, that the parties to this suit are immediate parties to said note, the verdict should be for the defendant.

2. If the jury find that the original note (of January 19th, 1880,) in this case is of even date with the release, they may consider the testimony in the case, with a view of establishing whether or not in fact the release was executed after the note was given.

3. If the jury find that the consideration of the notes sued upon or of the original note, was an indebtedness previously released under seal, they must find for defendant.

The Court, (GILMOR, J.,) granted the plaintiff's prayer, and refused the prayers of the defendant. The defendant excepted and the verdict and judgment being rendered against him appealed.

The cause was submitted to BARTOL, C.J., STONE, GRASON, MILLER, ALVEY, ROBINSON, IRVING and RITCHIE, J.

E. Shriver Reese, for the appellant.

Considerable looseness attended the earlier decisions on the general subject of moral or equitable considerations, and in the apparent absence of any fixed rule, each case seems to have been decided upon the individual ideas entertained by the particular Judges upon the general subject of moral obligation or duty. From the rate at which some of the cases were progressing, the law would scarcely have stopped short of the rule of ethics that in every promise there is the necessary moral obligation that the promisor should do that which he promises. It was first held that a mere moral obligation to pay a demand or perform a duty, was sufficient to uphold an express promise, although no legal liability existed at the time the promise was made, the honesty and rectitude of the thing being a consideration. Considerable doubt was thrown upon this doctrine by an able note to Wennall vs. Adney, 3 B. & P., 249, which seems to have been the first occasion of a reaction. This was followed by several cases, such as Littlefield vs. Shee, 2 B. & Ad., 811, when the opinion was expressed that the former doctrine as to moral considerations was to be received "with many qualifications and restricted to much narrower limits." The rule afterwads adopted, and which undoubtedly embraces the present law on the subject, is as follows: "An express promise can only revive a precedent good consideration, which could have been enforced at law, through the medium of an implied promise, had it not been suspended by some positive rule of law; but it can give no original right of action, if the obligation upon which it is founded could never have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal maxim or statutory provision." This is the rule given in the note to Wennall vs. Adney, before cited, and its accuracy has since then been fully recognized, and upheld both abroad and in the several States. Eastwood vs. Kenyon, 11 A. & E., 438; Beaumont vs. Reeve, 8 Q. B., 483; Cook vs. Bradley, 7 Conn., 57; Smith vs. Ware, 13 John., 257; Mills vs. Wyman, 3 Pick., 207; Hawley vs. Farrar, 1 Vt., 420; Ehle vs. Judson, 25 Wend., 97; McPherson vs. Rees, 2 Penn., 521; 1 Parsons on Contracts, (6 th Ed.,) 431; Story on Prom. Notes, sec. 185; Story on Contracts, sec. 590, (5 th Ed.)

It is not at a variance with the above rule to hold that a promise to pay a debt barred by limitations, discharged by bankruptcy, and the like is binding. The present case however falls directly within the operation of the rule, for the obligation upon which the promise rests could never have been enforced through the medium of an implied promise. In all the later decisions where an equitable or moral consideration has been held sufficient to support a subsequent promise, it will be seen that there has been something more than a mere moral obligation, and that the promise has been enforced only because some positive provision of the law had intervened to prevent a legal recovery.

In Groff vs. Rohrer, 35 Md., 337, an equity case, the Court say: "The doctrine of meritorious considerations originates in the distinction between the three classes of considerations on which promises may be based, viz., a valuable consideration, the performance of a moral duty and a mere voluntary bounty. The first of these classes alone entitles the promisee to enforce his claim against an unwilling promisor."

In Nightingale vs. Barney, 4 Green, ( Io.,) 106, and in Ex parte Cornwall, 4 Bank. Reg., 134, it was expressly decided that a mere moral obligation is not sufficient to support a promise to pay, even though embodied in a promissory note. The question of moral considerations is elaborately treated in 1 Chitty on Contracts, (11 th Am. Ed.,) 52, et seq., to which especial reference is made.

Narrowing the question down to the particular moral obligation that may be deemed to accompany a promise to pay a debt which has been voluntarily released by the creditor, a number of cases have been found, though none of them in this State, where this particular point has been passed upon and decided in favor of the promisor. Warren vs. Whitney, 24 Maine, 561; Shepard vs. Rhodes, 7 R. I., 474; Montgomery vs. Lampton, 3 Met., ( Ky.,) 519; Snevely vs. Read, 9 Watts, 396; Stearns vs. Tappin, 5 Duer, (N. Y.,) 294; Valentine vs. Foster, 1 Met., 520; Stafford vs. Bacon, 1 Hill, 532.

J. Alexander Preston, for the appellee.

A note made for a debt voluntarily released is valid; because a legal and equitable obligation to pay is a valid consideration; and the defendant himself testifies that he promised "to endeavor to pay him up, if he (I) could." 2 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, sec. 182, p. 155; Stafford vs. Bacon, 25 Wend., 384; Ellicott vs. Peterson, 4 Md., 476; Yates vs. Hollingsworth, 5 H. & J., 216; Valentine vs. Foster, 1 Metcalf, 520.

The release did not operate to relieve the appellant from the payment of the notes. Lyall vs. Edwards, 6 Hurl. & Nor., 336; Rich vs. Lord, 18 Pickering, 322.

ALVEY J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This action was brought to recover the amount of two promissory notes, dated the 22nd of July, 1880, and made by the appellant, payable to the appellee or order. The pleas were non assumpsit, payment, and "that after the alleged claims accrued, and before suit, the plaintiff by deed released the defendant therefrom." Issues were joined.

It appears that on January 19th, 1880, the appellant was indebted to the appellee in the sum of $840. And being so indebted, and unable to pay the amount in full, he proposed to the appellee to pay part of the amount in cash, provided he was fully released from the payment of the residue. This proposition was acceded to by the appellee, and thereupon a release of that date was executed under hand and seal of the appellee, reciting that the appellant was then indebted to the appellee in the sum of $840, and was unable to pay the same in full, and had offered to pay the appellee the sum of $336, on condition that the appellee would release him from all liability on account of the said sum of $840; and that such proposition had been accepted by the appellee. The release then proceeds to declare, that in consideration of the premises, and of the sum of $336, the receipt of which was acknowledged, the appellee released, exonerated and discharged the appellant, and his personal representatives, from all claims, suits or demands, which could or might be brought against him or them, for or on account of the said sum of $840, or any other indebtedness existing at the date of the release,--thereby declaring that he had accepted the said sum of $336, in payment of all claims against the appellant. This release was delivered to the appellant, and was produced by him at the trial.

Of the same date as this release, that is, the 19th of January 1880, the appellant made his promissory note to the appellee or order, at six months, for $255.44, payable at the National Farmers and Planters Bank of Baltimore. The making of this note and the release would seem to be parts of one...