Ingham v. Tchakarova (In re Tchakarova)

• Decision Date: 14 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 345739,345739
• Parties: IN RE Svetlana TCHAKAROVA. Meghan Ingham, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Svetlana Tchakarova, also known as Lana Chuck, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

328 Mich.App. 172

936 N.W.2d 863

IN RE Svetlana TCHAKAROVA.Meghan Ingham, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.Svetlana Tchakarova, also known as Lana Chuck, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 345739

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 8, 2019, at Lansing.

Decided May 14, 2019, at 9:10 a.m.

Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Fawn Montgomery, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for petitioner.

Susan A. Longsworth, Ann Arbor, for respondent.

Before: Swartzle, P.J., and M. J. Kelly and Tukel, JJ.

M. J. Kelly, J. Respondent, ST, appeals by right the probate court order granting the petition for involuntary mental health treatment and ordering respondent to undergo mental health treatment for up to 90 days, with up to 60 days of hospitalization. See MCL 330.1472a(1).¹ For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

On September 6, 2018, petitioner, a social worker at an Ann Arbor hospital, filed a petition seeking mental health treatment for respondent. The petition alleged that, as a result of mental illness, (1) respondent "can reasonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure [herself] or others, and has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are substantially supportive of this expectation"; (2) respondent "is unable to attend to those basic physical needs that must be attended to in order to avoid serious harm in the near future, and has demonstrated that inability by failing to attend to those basic physical needs"; and (3) respondent’s "judgment is so impaired by that mental illness that [she] is unable to understand [her] need for treatment, and whose impaired judgment, on the basis of competent clinical opinion, presents a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to [herself] or presents a substantial risk of physical harm to others in the near future." In support of the allegations, petitioner attached clinical certificates from a physician and a psychiatrist who observed respondent at the hospital. Both doctors diagnosed respondent with bipolar disorder and determined that she displayed a likelihood of injuring herself and that she did not understand the need for treatment. One of the doctors recommended a course of treatment consisting of up to 60 days of hospitalization and a maximum of 90 days of treatment with permission to use injectable medication and communicate with respondent’s family and other treatment providers.

The probate court ordered Washtenaw County Community Mental Health (CMH) to assess alternatives to hospitalization. Following its evaluation, CMH recommended respondent be hospitalized for up to 60 days, followed by "alternative treatment."

A hearing on the petition was held on September 12, 2018. Dr. Scott Mariouw, a psychiatrist, testified that he and a psychiatric resident met with respondent on September 6, 2018, the day after she was admitted to the hospital. Dr. Mariouw met with her every day since then for follow-up. Dr. Mariouw diagnosed respondent with schizoaffective disorder

, bipolar type, which is a substantial disorder of both thought and mood. He explained that respondent exhibited delusions and disorganized thoughts and behaviors that impaired her ability to function in society. Respondent’s husband had provided Dr. Mariouw with documentation of respondent’s original diagnosis of bipolar disorder in 1991 and with photographs of numerous car crashes respondent was involved in because of her illness. Respondent had suffered a traumatic brain injury (TBI) in a car accident in 1993, and the TBI likely made respondent’s prior symptoms worse and more difficult to treat.

Dr. Mariouw noted that respondent had been ticketed for reckless driving and speeding on September 1, 2018, and had been arrested on September 4, 2018, for trespassing as a result of her delusions related to stalking professors on college campuses, which showed impairment of judgment. Dr. Mariouw believed that respondent could intentionally or unintentionally seriously injure herself or someone else in the near future because the reckless driving and the stalking showed that she might provoke or hurt someone else. Dr. Mariouw opined that respondent’s judgment was so impaired that she did not understand that she needed treatment and did not believe she had a mental illness. He also stated that respondent had left the county or the country in the past to avoid court-ordered treatment. Dr. Mariouw did not believe that respondent had made progress since her hospitalization on September 5, 2018. And he confirmed that respondent was not taking medication at the time of the hearing.

Respondent also testified, stating that she had a mental illness "[a]s much as somebody can prove it." She did not believe she needed to be in the hospital, explaining that "for twenty-eight years, I have been detailed [sic] in mental hospital." She elaborated that the doctors rob her husband, "don’t give my injection," and allowed her husband to "pay my expenses to escape the country." Respondent explained that "[d]octors prove doctors wrong and judges wrong and don’t give me a shot and allow me to escape the country." She stated that "[t]he system is not so good," and the doctors were obligated by the system to "claim [she was] insane." Then, as her lawyer was summarizing his closing argument, respondent added that her medications do not stop her violence, and she indicated that her medications, in fact, caused her to be violent, and she stated, in vague terms, that she "hit the government official, which is [a] felony," but was excused because of her "mental sickness."

Following the hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was a "person requiring treatment" under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (c).

II. MOOTNESS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Petitioner argued that if this appeal was not decided on or before February 12, 2019, respondent’s appeal of the September 12, 2018 involuntary commitment order would be moot and the case should be dismissed without reaching its merits. Whether an issue is moot is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Doe 1 , 300 Mich. App. 245, 254, 833 N.W.2d 331 (2013).

B. ANALYSIS

The question of mootness is a threshold issue that a court must address before it reaches the substantive issues of a case. In re MCI Telecom. Complaint , 460 Mich. 396, 434-435 n. 13, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). This is because "Michigan courts exist to decide actual cases and controversies ...." Cooley , 300 Mich. App. at 254, 833 N.W.2d 331. "A matter is moot if this Court’s ruling ‘cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy.’ " Id ., quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury , 290 Mich. App. 355, 386, 803 N.W.2d 698 (2010).

In this case, petitioner cursorily suggests that the matter is moot because the probate court order expired before the resolution of respondent’s appeal.² Petitioner appears to contend that because the order has expired, our decision would not have any practical legal effect on the existing controversy even if this Court were to determine that the order was improperly entered. At first glance, this argument seems logical because if respondent has already received 90 days of mental-health treatment, including hospitalization for up to 60 days, nothing this Court says will alter that fact. Nevertheless, there are collateral legal consequences flowing from that order. For instance, because of her involuntary commitment, respondent is ineligible to possess a firearm. The Gun Control Act prohibits numerous categories of people from gun ownership. 18 USC 922(g). Relevant to this appeal, § 922(g)(4) prohibits anyone "who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution" from possessing a firearm. Federal regulations make clear that "committed to a mental institution" only applies to persons who are involuntarily committed by an appropriate lawful authority following due process safeguards. See 27 CFR 478.11 (defining the phrase "committed to a mental institution"). And the phrase "adjudicated as a mental defective," requires a determination by a lawful authority that a person, as a result of mental illness, among other conditions, (1) is a danger to himself or herself or (2) "[l]acks the mental capacity to contract or manage his or her own affairs." 27 CFR 478.11. Accordingly, even though the order in this case has expired, collateral legal consequences remain in the form of restrictions on the right to possess a firearm, so the issue is not moot. See Mead v. Batchlor , 435 Mich. 480, 486, 460 N.W.2d 493 (1990) (noting that an issue is not moot if it "may have collateral legal consequences" for an individual), abrogated on other grounds Turner v. Rogers , 564 U.S. 431, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011). See also TM v. MZ , 501 Mich. 312, 319-320, 916 N.W.2d 473 (2018) (holding that the mere expiration of a personal protection order (PPO) did not render a challenge to the propriety of the order moot when there remained a legal consequence stemming from the entry of the PPO).

Moreover, even if a claim is moot, as a practical matter "this Court may consider a legal issue that is one of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial review." Cooley , 300 Mich. App. at 254, 833 N.W.2d 331 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the nature of the probate order all but guaranteed that no meaningful judicial review of the order could ever be conducted before the order expired. An issue is likely to evade judicial review if the time frames of the case make it unlikely that appellate review can be obtained before the case reaches a final resolution. See Socialist Workers Party v. Secretary of State , 412 Mich. 571, 582 n. 11, 317 N.W.2d 1 (1982) ; In re Midland Publishing Co., Inc. , 420 Mich. 148, 152 n. 2, 362 N.W.2d 580 (1984). The order was for a maximum...