Ingraham Co. v. LOCAL 260, INTER. U. OF E., R. & M. WKRS.

Decision Date10 March 1959
Docket NumberCiv. No. 7629.
Citation171 F. Supp. 103
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesINGRAHAM COMPANY v. LOCAL 260, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFL-CIO.

Beach, Calder & Barnes, Bristol, Conn., for plaintiff.

Albert L. Goldman, Boston, Mass., for defendant.

ANDERSON, District Judge.

On June 17, 1957 the plaintiff, The Ingraham Company of Bristol, Connecticut, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Local 260, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, representing plaintiff's employees. Article XIII provided for grievance procedure and arbitration. In 1958, during the life of the agreement, a dispute arose about the work which might be performed by a supervisor. As a final step in the grievance procedure arbitrators were appointed and on November 4, 1958 the following questions were submitted to them for determination:

"Under the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement may a supervisor perform bargaining unit work? If so, under what circumstances? If not, what should be the remedy?"

On or about December 10, 1958 the arbitrators made an award, which was in favor of the Union. The Company objected to the award on the ground that the arbitrators had exceeded their jurisdiction and had included in the scope of their decision matters not actually submitted to them for decision. It applied to the Superior Court for Hartford County, State of Connecticut, for an order correcting or modifying the award. The Company has expressed its willingness to comply with that portion of the award concerning the reinstatement of the grievant and restoration of his rights and pay but has refused to comply with the remainder of the award which states that under the parties' collective bargaining agreement, supervisory personnel may not perform bargaining unit work except in emergencies and except in the printing shop, garage and tumbling department. The Union removed the case to this court on the premise that in this case the Union is the representative of employees in an industry affecting interstate commerce, and that the subject matter of the suit is a violation of the collective bargaining agreement by the Company. The Union asserts that, therefore, a federal question is presented in the complaint under § 2(7) and § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(7) and § 185 (a). The case is now before this court on the Company's motion to remand. The matter at issue is whether the case involves a federal question which gives the defendant the right to have the case heard and determined in the federal court.

If there were no federal question or if the federal question appeared only incidentally in the case, or was raised for the first time by the removal petition, the case would have to be sent back to the state court. Gully v. First National Bank, 1936, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70. But none of these circumstances is established in this case.

The petition for removal alleges that the contract and the parties are concerned with an industry affecting interstate commerce and this appears not to be disputed. This allegation may first be set out in the petition and need not have been alleged in the prior pleadings. Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1951, 98 F.Supp. 278. The Company takes the position that the issues of the case in no way involve a violation of the collective bargaining agreement, that it has simply made an application to modify the arbitrators' award under certain provisions of the Connecticut Arbitration Act, Connecticut General Statutes, §§ 52-419 and 52-420 (Rev.ed.1958) and that there is no federal question involved in this case at all. The pertinent provisions of the Connecticut Arbitration Act and the federal arbitration act, 9 U.S.C. § 11, are practically identical. Although, because of the similarity in the state and federal arbitration statutes, the application may be interpreted to state a claim for relief under either, only federal law applies to this particular controversy because under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress has pre-empted the field of suits for violation of contracts between these kinds of parties to collective bargaining agreements affecting interstate commerce. In reaching this conclusion the court must reject the company's claim that the issues here do not involve a claimed violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Not only does the wording of the questions submitted to the arbitrators make this plain, but in its application to correct the arbitrators' award the plaintiff has alleged that the complained of parts of the award "prejudice the applicant's rights under the collective bargaining agreement". Plainly the issues raised by the application call for an interpretation and application of particular provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrators' award made the interpretation and application. The Union claims that under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement the Company is required to comply with all of the award; the Company, on the other hand, asserts that it is required to comply with only a part of it and refuses to comply with the rest. Whether the Company's position constitutes a breach of the collective bargaining agreement or not is an important issue in the case....

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  • International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. General Elec. Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 26 Septiembre 1961
    ...and more properly should, have been instituted in the United States District Court for the district of Connecticut. Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, D.C., 171 F.Supp. 103, 106; Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., D.C., 172 F.Supp. 870, 874, affirmed 2 Cir., 279 F.2d 115. The plaintiff had a right, ......
  • Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 11 Octubre 1988
    ...v. Luden's, Inc., 427 F.Supp. 991 (E.D.Pa.1977); Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F.Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.1959); Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, 171 F.Supp. 103 (D.Conn.1959). In all such cases, the petition to compel arbitration is in federal court on its own terms by virtue of a federal stat......
  • Giangrande v. Shearson Lehman/EF Hutton, Civ. A. No. 89-2858-T.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 15 Septiembre 1992
    ...v. Luden's, Inc., 427 F.Supp. 991 (E.D.Pa.1977); Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F.Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.1959); Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, 171 F.Supp. 103 (D.Conn.1959). In all such cases, the petition to compel arbitration is in federal court on its own terms by virtue of a federal stat......
  • Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 1 Agosto 1978
    ...as well as procedural significance" (Riess v. Murchison (9th Cir. 1967) 384 F.2d 727, 735; see also Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, Intern. U. of E., R. & M. Wkrs. (D.Conn.1957) 171 F.Supp. 103; Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 19, 136 Cal.Rptr. 378), we a......
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