Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters

• Decision Date: 01 August 1978
• Citation: 83 Cal.App.3d 430,147 Cal.Rptr. 835
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2928 SAFEWAY STORES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS AND AUTO TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL NO. 70 OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 42698.

Page 835

147 Cal.Rptr. 835

83 Cal.App.3d 430, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2928

SAFEWAY STORES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS AND AUTO TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL NO. 70 OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 42698.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Aug. 1, 1978.

Brundage, Beeson, Tayer & Kovach, Edward M. Kovach, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, Kathleen M. Kelly, San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

CHRISTIAN, Associate Justice.

Brotherhood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Local 70 of Alameda County appeals from a judgment ¹ vacating an award of a labor arbitrator.

Claudell Roberts, who was employed by respondent Safeway Stores as a driver, failed to complete certain work assigned to him. Safeway suspended Roberts pending an investigation, and appellant union immediately asserted a grievance in behalf of Roberts concerning the suspension. After investigation Safeway nevertheless announced that Roberts would be given a disciplinary suspension of 60 days. Imposition of the suspension was withheld pending further discussions; such discussions resulted in a reduction of the disciplinary suspension to 15 working days.

Safeway accordingly notified Roberts that he was to return to work. The letter of notification was mailed on a Friday and Roberts did not receive it until late Monday morning, May 17, several hours after the start of his shift at 7:30 a. m. Upon receiving the letter, Roberts called the warehouse, and was directed to report to work the following morning, Tuesday, May 18.

Roberts did not, however, appear at work on Tuesday; instead, he called the shop steward in the afternoon and said that he was not coming to work that day. Late Thursday morning, May 20, Roberts called the warehouse dispatcher and informed her that he would report for work the next day. The dispatcher accordingly scheduled a delivery for Roberts on Friday, May 21, but he did not appear at work. Roberts telephoned in the afternoon and said he would not be in, and in response to a question from the dispatcher, said he did not know whether he would be in on Monday. Roberts did not come to work on Monday, May 24, but called in the afternoon to say that he would not be coming in. On Tuesday, May 25, he again failed to appear but called in the afternoon to say that he would not be in that day. During this telephone conversation, Roberts informed the dispatcher that he had been on vacation the previous week.

Safeway then discharged Roberts, stating in its letter of termination that: "A certified letter (# 997448) was sent to you on May 14, 1976, directing you to return to work from disciplinary layoff on Monday, May 17, 1976. (P) As a result of your failure to report within 7 days of such recall, we are terminating your employment as of Tuesday, May 25, 1976."

The discharge was protested; at a grievance hearing held pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, Roberts for the first time asserted that he had not reported for work from May 18 through May 26 because he had been ill. The challenge to Roberts' discharge was not resolved informally, and the dispute was submitted to arbitration as provided by the collective bargaining agreement. The parties stipulated that the issues which they were submitting to the arbitrator were as follows: "Whether or not the grievant was discharged for just cause? If not, what is the appropriate remedy?" After a hearing the arbitrator ruled as follows: "The grievant was not discharged for just cause within the meaning of the agreement. The appropriate remedy is reinstatement to his position with backpay from the date he was able to return to work to the date the Company offers him reinstatement."

On Safeway's petition the court vacated this award, and the present appeal followed.

Since this case involves a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting interstate commerce, the action to vacate the arbitration award could have been brought in a federal court pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C. § 185(a)). ² (See Meat & Allied Food Wkrs. v. Packerland Pkg. Co. (E.D.Wis.1976) 411 F.Supp. 1280, 1282 (suit to confirm and enforce arbitration award); Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corporation (E.D.Pa.1975) 399 F.Supp. 1184, 1187 (suit to vacate arbitrator's award); United Steelworkers v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. (9th Cir. 1963) 324 F.2d 479, 481, fn. 2 (action to enforce arbitration award); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., etc. v. Sanford (Tex.Civ.App.1976) 540 S.W.2d 478 (action to vacate arbitration award).) In adjudicating an action which could have been brought in the federal courts under section 301(a), the state court must apply federal substantive law. (Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co. (1962) 369 U.S. 95, 102-103, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593; Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42 (1971) 4 Cal.3d 888, 891-892, 95 Cal.Rptr. 53, 484 P.2d 1397; Butchers' Union Local 229 v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 925, 930-931, 59 Cal.Rptr. 713, 428 P.2d 849; Butchers Union v. Farmers Markets (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 905, 910, 136 Cal.Rptr. 894.) Additionally, state procedural law may not be applied in such cases if it would impede the uniform application of the federal statute essential to effectuate its purpose. (Lehto v. Underground Constr. Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 933, 943, 138 Cal.Rptr. 419 (holding that the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1288 in that case would deprive appellant of his substantive rights under section 301); Butchers Union v. Farmers Markets, Supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 905 at p. 911, 136 Cal.Rptr. 894; Laufman v. Hall-Mack Co. (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 87, 89, 29 Cal.Rptr. 829.)

Recognizing that California's arbitration statutes (Code Civ.Proc., § 1280 et seq.), especially those governing the scope of judicial review of an arbitrator's award and the grounds for vacation of an award (Code Civ.Proc., § 1286.2), have "considerable substantive as well as procedural significance" (Riess v. Murchison (9th Cir. 1967) 384 F.2d 727, 735; see also Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, Intern. U. of E., R. & M. Wkrs. (D.Conn.1957) 171 F.Supp. 103; Main v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 19, 136 Cal.Rptr. 378), we apply federal law. ³

The role of the court in reviewing the validity of an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement is an extremely narrow one. (Amalgamated Meat Cut., etc. v. Cross Bros. M. P., Inc. (3rd Cir. 1975) 518 F.2d 1113, 1121; Aro, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists (E.D.Tenn.1976) 414 F.Supp. 173, 174; Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corporation, supra, 399 F.Supp. 1184, 1188.) The findings of the arbitrator on questions of law as well as questions of fact are final and conclusive. Neither the merits of the controversy nor the sufficiency of the evidence to support the arbitrator's award are matters for judicial review. (Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp. (1960) 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424; Bettencourt v. Boston Edison Co. (1st Cir. 1977) 560 F.2d 1045, 1049; Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corporation, supra, 399 F.Supp. 1184, 1188.) "(A)n award will not be set aside merely because the arbitrator erred in finding the facts or applying the law." (Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corporation,supra, 399 F.Supp. at p. 1188.) Erroneous reasoning by the arbitrator will not invalidate an otherwise proper award. "A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award. Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." (Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., supra, 363 U.S. 593, 598, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424.) "(I)t is the award, rather than the specific reasoning employed that a court must review." (Lucas v. Philco-Ford Corporation, supra, 399 F.Supp. 1184, 1188.)

The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. "A court must affirm an arbitrator's award if it 'can in any rational way be derived from the agreement,' Amalgamated Meat Cutters etc. v. Cross Bros., 518 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1975) and can only reverse if 'there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of the shop.' Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3rd Cir. 1969)." (C. P. Equipment Co. v. Intern. Ass'n of Machinists (W.D.Pa.1976) 415 F.Supp. 881, 882.)

Here, the court concluded that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers in determining that section 3(C) of the collective bargaining agreement did not apply. Section 3(C) provides in pertinent part that: "Any employee who has been Laid off and recalled to work and who fails to report for work within seven (7) calendar days after the mailing of notice to report . . . shall be considered to have voluntarily quit unless unable to so report because of proven illness or injury or because of unforeseen emergencies." (Emphasis added.) The arbitrator reasoned that the language of section 3(C), ("Any employee who has been laid off and recalled to work and who fails to report for work within (7) calendar days"), refers to "an employee laid off indefinitely for lack of work who is eventually recalled when the volume of available work and his seniority warrant. In contrast, a disciplinary layoff is for a definite period, fixed in advance, and ordinarily it makes no more sense to speak of 'recalling' an employee from a disciplinary layoff than to say that he is recalled from vacation. In both cases he is to be absent for a certain time, at the end of which he is obliged to report for work."

The construction of the subject provision was a question of law for the arbitrator; and the fact that a different construction was...