Ingraham v. Champion Intern., 89-159
| Decision Date | 23 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-159,89-159 |
| Parties | Keith INGRAHAM, Claimant and Petitioner, v. CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL, a Self-insured Plan I Employer, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Thomas C. Bulman argued, Bulman Law Associates, Missoula, for claimant and petitioner.
Bradley J. Luck argued, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, James Scheier argued, Agency Legal Services, Helena, for defendant and respondent.
John Bothe, Bothe & Lauridsen, Columbia Falls, for amicus curiae.
Petitioner Keith Ingraham has filed his petition for declaratory judgment on original proceedings in this Court requesting that parts of Secs. 39-71-741(1), 39-71-741(2), and 39-71-741(3), MCA, be declared unconstitutional.
On April 3, 1989, this Court ordered respondents Champion International, the Division of Workers' Compensation, and the Attorney General for the State of Montana to file written responses to the petition. Champion International has filed herein its brief and response, and the Attorney General has responded in brief in his own behalf and on behalf of the Division of Workers' Compensation. We have in addition received an amicus brief from John H. Bothe, an attorney in Columbia Falls, Montana, appearing as a friend of the court in support of the petition for declaratory judgment.
Under the facts of this case, not disputed, Keith Ingraham is an employee of Champion International. Champion is enrolled under Plan I of the Montana Workers' Compensation Act and is self-insured. Subsequent to December 18, 1987, Ingraham had reported that he had suffered an industrial injury on such date in the course and scope of his employment when a board struck him in the chest. Champion accepted liability for the injury and benefits were initiated. At the time briefs were filed herein, Ingraham continued to receive temporary total disability benefits on a bi-weekly basis. Champion claims that issues exist in the claim concerning the relationship of some of Ingraham's physical problems and the alleged disability from the industrial injury. Ingraham claims that though he is now receiving total temporary disability benefits, that he will probably have a permanent partial disability as defined in Sec. 39-71-116(14), MCA. The Attorney General concedes the standing of Ingraham to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes. Champion does not challenge his standing.
Once standing is established, we determine whether there are necessary factors sufficient for this Court to accept original jurisdiction. Speaking in the context of an original action for declaratory judgment, this Court has stated:
Once standing to bring the action is established, the question shifts to whether the action meets the necessary factors for this Court to accept original jurisdiction. This Court has found that an assumption of original jurisdiction is proper when: (1) constitutional issues of major state wide importance are involved; (2) the case involves pure legal questions of statutory and constitutional construction; and (3) urgency and emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process inadequate. (Citations omitted.) Moreover, this Court clearly stated the Court has original jurisdiction to accept declaratory judgment proceedings "where the issues have impact of major importance on a statewide basis, or upon a major segment of the state, and where the purpose of the declaratory judgment proceedings will serve the office of a writ provided by law ..." Grossman v. State, Depart. of Natural Resources (1984), 209 Mont. 427, 436, 682 P.2d 1319, 1324.
Butte-Silver Bow Local Govern. v. State (Mont.1989), 768 P.2d 327, 329, 46 St.Rep. 87, 89.
The issues raised by the petitioner Ingraham, and addressed by the respondent and the Attorney General in their replies, as well as by amicus, show without a doubt that the requirements for the acceptance of original jurisdiction are fully present in this case. We therefore accept original jurisdiction.
In 1987, the legislature embarked on a comprehensive revision of the laws relating to Workers' Compensation culminating in the adoption of Chapter 464, Laws of Montana (1987), approved by the Governor on April 4, 1987. Included in the legislation were amendments to then-existing Sec. 39-71-741, MCA. As amended, the subsections of Sec. 39-71-741, MCA, under attack in this case are as follows:
Compromise settlements, lump-sum payments, and lump-sum advance payments. (1)(a) Benefits may be converted in whole to a lump sum:
(i) if a claimant and an insurer dispute the initial compensability of an injury; and
(ii) if the claimant and insurer agree to a settlement.
(b) The agreement is subject to division approval. The division may disapprove an agreement under this section only if there is not a reasonable dispute over compensability.
(c) Upon approval, the agreement constitutes a compromise and release settlement and may not be reopened by the division or by any court.
(d) The parties' failure to reach an agreement is not a dispute over which a mediator or the workers' compensation court has jurisdiction.
(2)(a) If an insurer has accepted initial liability for an injury, permanent total and permanent partial wage supplement benefits may be converted in whole to a lump-sum payment.
(b) The conversion may be made only upon agreement between a claimant and an insurer.
(c) The agreement is subject to division approval. The division may approve an agreement if:
(i) there is a reasonable dispute concerning the amount of the insurer's future liability or benefits; or
(ii) the amount of the insurer's projected liability is reasonably certain and the settlement amount is not substantially less than the present value of the insurer's liability.
(d) The parties' failure to reach agreement is not a dispute over which a mediator or the workers' compensation court has jurisdiction.
(e) Upon approval, the agreement constitutes a compromise and release settlement and may not be reopened by the division or by any court.
(3)(a) Permanent partial wage supplement benefits may be converted in part to a lump-sum advance.
(b) The conversion may be made only upon agreement between a claimant and an insurer.
(c) The agreement is subject to division approval. The division may approve an agreement if the parties demonstrate that the claimant has financial need that:
(i) relates to the necessities of life or relates to an accumulation of debt incurred prior to injury; and
(ii) arises subsequent to the date of injury or arises because of reduced income as a result of the injury.
(d) The parties' failure to reach an agreement is not a dispute over which a mediator or the workers' compensation court has jurisdiction.
. . . . .
Ingraham has mounted a number of issues respecting the constitutionality of the foregoing subsections. Without reaching the merits of the other issues, we choose two as dispositive in this case. They are:
1. Do the subsections contain unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority?
2. Do the subsections violate the administration of justice clause of the Montana Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 16 (1972)?
We must be cognizant, as Champion contends in brief, that in analyzing constitutional challenges, this Court has certain boundaries surrounding the power of the Court to determine constitutionality. Among those is the principal of avoiding constitutional questions whenever possible, State ex rel. Hammond v. Hager (1972), 160 Mont. 391, 400, 503 P.2d 52, 57; and an act of the legislature will not be declared invalid because it is repugnant to some provision of the constitution, unless its invalidity is made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt, Shea v. North-Butte Mining Company (1919), 55 Mont. 522, 530, 179 P 499, 501. The constitutionality of a legislative enactment is prima facie presumed, and every intendment in its favor will be made unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt. T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial (1982), 196 Mont. 287, 292, 641 P.2d 1368, 1370.
Permanent partial disability benefits for injured workers are provided in Sec. 39-71-703, MCA. The benefits available are impairment awards and wage supplements. A worker entitled to an impairment award may be paid bi-weekly or in a lump sum, at the discretion of the worker. Lump sums paid for impairments are not subject to the requirements of Sec. 39-71-741, MCA. A worker entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in the form of wage supplements is limited under the statute. Wage supplement benefits terminate at the expiration of 500 weeks minus impairment award weeks. Weekly compensation benefits may not exceed $149.50, at least until June 30, 1991. It is only a wage supplement award under the permanent partial disability statute which is subject to the provisions of Sec. 39-71-741, MCA.
Ingraham claims that he is a likely candidate for permanent partial wage supplement benefits. His request for a lump-sum payment is therefore subject to subdivision (2) or (3) of Sec. 39-71-741, MCA, as set out above.
Before the 1987 amendment to Sec. 39-71-741, MCA, an injured worker entitled to any bi-weekly payments under the Workers' Compensation laws could apply to the division (the predecessor of the department) for a lump-sum payment, with the concurrence of the insurer. But if the insurer did not agree, and a controversy arose between the claimant and the insurer regarding the conversion of bi-weekly payments into a lump sum, the controversy was considered a dispute within the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation judge. Section 39-71-741, MCA (1985). Under that statute as now amended, no application for a lump-sum conversion may be made to the department unless the conversion is agreed upon by the claimant and the insurer. If they fail to agree, there is no dispute over which a mediator or the Workers' Compensation...
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