Ingraham v. State, 97-241
| Decision Date | 24 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-241,97-241 |
| Citation | 945 P.2d 19,284 Mont. 481 |
| Parties | Gregory Lloyd INGRAHAM, Petitioner, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Gregory Lloyd Ingraham (Ingraham) is incarcerated at the Montana State Prison as a result of his conviction on July 19, 1996, of the offenses of negligent homicide, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-104(1), MCA; criminal endangerment, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-207(1), MCA; and criminal trespass to property, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-6-203(1), MCA. He had consumed alcohol prior to the acts giving rise to the convictions. Ingraham presently is before this Court on his application for writ of habeas corpus, requesting review of the denial by the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, of his motion to continue bond pending appeal.
The sole issue before us is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Ingraham's motion to continue bond pending appeal.
The procedural steps via which Ingraham's request is before this Court have been detailed in a number of previous orders by the Court and by Justice Terry N. Trieweiler. Those orders, entered in this cause number and in cause numbers 97-076 and 97-271, recount in detail Ingraham's efforts--vis-a-vis habeas corpus and appeal--to obtain review of the District Court's denial of his motion to continue bond pending appeal; we need not recount those details here. Suffice it to say that, after months of procedural entanglements, the matter is now before this Court for review pursuant to Ingraham's application for writ of habeas corpus.
Ingraham had been admitted to bail pending trial after being charged with the three offenses referenced above on October 17, 1995. The District Court continued his bond pending sentencing after the July 19, 1996, jury verdicts finding him guilty of the two felony and one misdemeanor offenses. The District Court sentenced Ingraham in open court on November 18, 1996, and remanded him to the custody of the Lake County Sheriff for transport to the Montana State Prison. The court subsequently entered a written judgment and commitment.
Immediately after sentencing, Ingraham moved the District Court for continuation of bond pending appeal. The District Court heard oral argument on the motion on December 3, 1996, and Ingraham and the State of Montana (State) filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thereafter, the District Court entered its findings of fact conclusions of law and order denying the motion to continue bond pending appeal based on its determination that it was unable to find that, if released, Ingraham was not likely to pose a danger to the safety of any person or the community.
The availability of bail pending both trial and appeal is governed by statute in Montana. With regard to bail pending appeal, § 46-9-107, MCA, provides:
The court shall order the detention of a defendant found guilty of an offense who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence or a revocation hearing or who has filed an appeal unless the court finds that, if released, the defendant is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any person or the community.
In other words, a convicted criminal defendant is not to be admitted to bail unless the trial court finds that he or she is not likely to either flee or pose a danger. We review a district court's decision denying an application for bail pending appeal for abuse of discretion. Moore v. McCormick (1993), 260 Mont. 305, 306, 858 P.2d 1254, 1255.
In this case, the District Court entered findings of fact and, on the basis of those findings, determined that it was unable to find that, if released, Ingraham was not likely to pose a danger to the safety of any person or the community. Ingraham contends that the court's ultimate determination is an abuse of discretion because it is not supported by the evidence and findings as a whole. We observe at the outset that none of the District Court's purely factual findings are challenged as unsupported by the record. Ingraham challenges only the weight given to, or the inferences drawn from certain of those findings. Specifically, he contends that the District Court's focus on matters predating alcohol treatment Ingraham received at the Menninger Clinic (Menninger) after his convictions and its failure to give more weight to a report by Dr. Richard Irons (Dr. Irons) from Menninger constituted abuses of discretion.
Before addressing the specific contentions advanced by Ingraham, it is appropriate to review undisputed findings of fact relating to the District Court's denial of his motion to continue bail pending appeal. Ingraham was involved in a fatal vehicle accident, prior to which he had been drinking, in 1993; no charges were brought against him as a result of the accident. In July of 1995, he was involved in an alcohol-related domestic violence incident which resulted in a criminal charge to which he subsequently pled guilty. As a result of the charge, Ingraham spent a number of days in the Talbott Marsh Treatment Center (Talbott Marsh) in Georgia in early August. On August 9, 1995, Talbott Marsh recommended that he abstain from alcohol and seek treatment from Menninger.
In October of 1995, Ingraham was charged in the instant case with the offenses of negligent homicide, criminal endangerment and criminal trespass to property arising out of a fatal vehicle accident prior to which he had been drinking. He had not followed the Marsh Talbott recommendations that he abstain from alcohol and seek treatment at Menninger prior to the accident. He was released on bond on condition that he not drink alcohol.
During the several weeks following his release on bond pending trial, Ingraham consumed alcohol daily while staying with friends. In February of 1996, he apparently drank prior to picking up a date and drove in a manner that frightened her. He continued to drink wine throughout the evening and the date felt he had had a sufficient quantity of alcohol to necessitate her operating his vehicle when they left the restaurant where they had dinner. In April of 1996, two Shopko pharmacy employees noticed the odor of alcohol on Ingraham's breath when he picked up prescriptions there.
Ingraham's trial in the instant case occurred in July of 1996. He was found guilty on July 19, 1996, and bond was continued, on the same conditions, pending sentencing.
In August, the State received police reports from the Missoula Police Department documenting incidents of Ingraham drinking while subject to bond requirements. During the initial interview for preparation of the presentence investigation report required by statute, Ingraham told the probation officer that, since the accident, his only consumption of alcohol was one beer the following day. During a later interview, he was confronted with the statements of his dinner date and admitted that he had consumed wine during that date in February of 1996.
Ingraham was treated at Menninger for alcohol dependency and bipolar affective disorder, type II, from September 9 through November 1, 1996. In a report to Ingraham's counsel for purposes of sentencing, Menninger's Dr. Irons reported that, during Ingraham's time there, he came to develop what the treatment team believed was genuine remorse for his lack of responsibility in operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Based on its experience with him, the team did not see him as a danger to the public "if he is not under the influence of alcohol while driving a motor vehicle, and compliant with psychotropic medications." Dr. Irons also believed Ingraham would comply with measures that could be put in place to assure abstinence from alcohol and other mood-altering substances.
On the face of it, the abovementioned facts are sufficient to support the District Court's determination that it could not find that, if released on bond, Ingraham was not likely to pose a danger to any person or to the community. The facts demonstrate serious incidents involving alcohol consumption by Ingraham prior to this case; a failure to abstain from alcohol and seek treatment even after being advised to do so by Talbott Marsh; an alcohol-related fatal vehicle accident which resulted in the charges on which this case is based; a number of violations of the bond condition that he not consume alcohol; and his initial falsehood to the probation officer writing the presentence report that he had not consumed any alcohol since the day after the accident.
Against this backdrop, Ingraham contends that his treatment at...
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