Ingram v. AAA Cooper Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | 1:14-cv-142 |
| Citation | 551 B.R. 915 |
| Parties | Mark Ingram, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kellie Ingram, Plaintiff, v. AAA Cooper Transportation, Inc., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
HONORABLE J. RANDAL HALL
At issue in this Order are positions taken by Plaintiffs Mark Ingram and Kellie Ingram in two proceedings. The first proceeding is Plaintiff's bankruptcy case, which was pending from January 2008 through May 2013 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina. The second is the present litigation, in which Plaintiffs seek to recover on Mark Ingram's loss of consortium claim and on Kellie Ingram's personal injury claims.1
Presently before the Court is Defendant's “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment” based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. (Doc. 26). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are estopped from asserting their claims in the present litigation because of their failure to disclose the existence of the claims as assets in their prior bankruptcy case. (Def.'s Br., Doc. 26-1 at 4). Under Georgia law, judicial estoppel is a matter for summary judgment, and the Court considers Defendant's motion as such. Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, et al. , 212 Ga.App. 454, 442 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1994)
. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The material facts are not in dispute and establish the following.
In January 2008, Plaintiffs Kellie and Mark Ingram filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina. . As part of their initial petition, Plaintiff's filed schedules of their real and personal property. (Id. at 12–16). Subsequently, in April and May 2008, Plaintiffs amended their asset schedules. (Id. Exs. B-C). On June 5, 2008, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Plaintiffs' Chapter 13 payment plan. (Id. Ex. D). Post-confirmation, on June 19, 2009, Plaintiffs again amended their asset schedules, and the Bankruptcy Court likewise amended its confirmation order to reflect the change in assets.
While the bankruptcy case remained pending, on June 5, 2012, Kellie Ingram was involved in an automobile accident with an employee of Defendant AAA Cooper Transportation. (Affidavit of Mark Ingram, Doc. 31 at 23). That accident is the subject of the present litigation. Plaintiffs never amended their asset schedules in the bankruptcy proceeding to reflect the potential claim against Defendant.
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs' bankruptcy proceeded apace. On April 30, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court discharged Mark and Kellie Ingram. (Doc. 26, Ex. I). According to the bankruptcy trustee's report, Plaintiffs dispersed $54,176.00 to their creditors, while $55,151.62 in debts was discharged without payment. (Id. Ex. H). On May 9, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court closed Plaintiffs' case.
In May 2014, Plaintiffs filed the present litigation in the State Court of Richmond County, Georgia against Defendant asserting Plaintiff Kellie Ingram's claims for personal injuries and Plaintiff Mark Ingram's loss of consortium claim. (Doc. 1, Ex. 1). On June 23, Defendant removed the case to this Court. (Doc. 1).
During the deposition of Mark Ingram, Defendant learned of Plaintiffs' prior bankruptcy and that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant were not among Plaintiffs' sworn assets. (Doc. 37, Ex. 1 at 2). Defendant then informed Plaintiffs' counsel of its intent to file a motion for summary judgment asserting judicial estoppel for taking an inconsistent position as to the existence of these claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. (Doc. 26, Ex. L).
On March 13, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the bankruptcy case and amend their schedule of assets to include Mark Ingram's loss of consortium claim and the claims for personnel injuries held by the Estate of Kellie Ingram. (Doc. 26, Ex. K). Before the Bankruptcy Court ruled on Plaintiffs' motion, Defendant filed its “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support on the grounds of judicial estoppel” in this case. (Doc. 26). The Bankruptcy Court subsequently denied Mark Ingram's motion to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding, reasoning that, because 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)
and § 1329(c) limit creditors' ability to receive payments from debtors to five years, Plaintiffs' creditors stood to gain nothing from reopening the proceedings. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 7-8).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
. Facts are “material” if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)
, and must draw “all justifiable inferences in [its] favor.” U.S. v. Four Parcels of Real Prop. , 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
The moving party has the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, the basis for the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)
. How to carry this burden depends on who bears the burden of proof at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta , 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). When the non-movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant may carry the initial burden in one of two ways: by negating an essential element of the non-movant's case or by showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary to the non-movant's case. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. , 929 F.2d 604, 606–08 (11th Cir.1991) ( Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) and Celotex , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 ). Before the Court can evaluate the non-movant's response in opposition, it must first consider whether the movant has met its initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones v. City of Columbus , 120 F.3d 248, 254 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam). A mere conclusory statement that the non-movant cannot meet the burden at trial is insufficient. Clark , 929 F.2d at 608.
If—and only if—the movant carries its initial burden, the non-movant may avoid summary judgment only by “demonstrat[ing] that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” Id.
When the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant must tailor its response to the method by which the movant carried its initial burden. If the movant presents evidence affirmatively negating a material fact, the non-movant “must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated.” Fitzpatrick , 2 F.3d at 1116. If the movant shows an absence of evidence on a material fact, the non-movant must either show that the record contains evidence that was “overlooked or ignored” by the movant or “come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency.” Id. at 1117. The non-movant cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. See Morris v. Ross , 663 F.2d 1032, 1033–34 (11th Cir.1981). Rather, the non-movant must respond with affidavits or as otherwise provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
In this action, the Clerk of the Court gave Plaintiffs notice of Defendant's motion for summary judgment and informed them of the summary judgment rules, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and the consequences of default. (Doc. 27.) The notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright , 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir.1985)
(per curiam), therefore, are satisfied and the motion is ripe for review.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel because they failed to disclose the potential claims as assets during their Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. Plaintiffs counter that, under Georgia law, a party is not judicially estopped if they move to reopen a bankruptcy proceeding and amend an asset disclosure. Having done so, Plaintiffs contend judicial estoppel does not apply, notwithstanding that their motion to reopen and amend was ultimately unsuccessful.
The Court begins by discussing the bankruptcy laws that are relevant to Defendant's judicial estoppel motion. This includes a discussion of bankruptcy law generally and also a more particular examination of Plaintiffs' motion to reopen and the Bankruptcy Court's denial of that motion. With that analysis in hand, the Court turns to the judicial estoppel question.
The Court begins with a general overview of the bankruptcy laws relevant to this case. Unlike Chapter 7, which serves to liquidate a debtor's assets, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code serves a reorganization purpose. In In re Waldron , 536 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir.2008)
, the Eleventh Circuit explained how 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a) and § 1327(b) interact to form estate property and debtor property. Upon petitioning for bankruptcy, § 1306(a) vests the petitioner's property in the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 1241. Then, upon confirmation of the petitioner's plan, § 1327(b) “returns some property of the estate to the debtor ... ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan.’ ” Id. at 1242 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b)). Crucially,...
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