Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff

• Decision Date: 04 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03-342.,03-342.
• Citation: 133 S.W.3d 382,355 Ark. 129
• Parties: Larry INGRAM v. The CITY OF PINE BLUFF; Pine Bluff Planning Commission; Dale Dixon, Dutch King, and Jerry Taylor, Individually and in their Official Capacities.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

133 S.W.3d 382

Larry INGRAM v. The CITY OF PINE BLUFF; Pine Bluff Planning Commission; Dale Dixon, Dutch King, and Jerry Taylor, Individually and in their Official Capacities.

No. 03-342.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

December 4, 2003.

Cross, Gunter, Witherspoon & Galchus, P.C., by: M. Stephen Bingham and Annamary C. Dougherty, Little Rock, for appellant.

Patricia J. Hays, Little Rock, for appellees.

W.H. "DUB" ARNOLD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Larry Ingram appeals from a December 16, 2002 order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings of appellees, The City of Pine Bluff, the Pine Bluff Planning Commission and individual appellees Dale Dixon, current Pine Bluff Mayor Dutch King, and former Mayor Jerry Taylor. Appellant's complaint below listed five claims on which he based his prayer for relief. The judgment on the pleadings was granted because the trial court determined it was without jurisdiction to hear the case due to the appellant's failure to comply with Inferior Court Rule 9 in filing a timely appeal from the City Council's decision. We affirm the order as to the City of Pine Bluff and the Pine Bluff Planning Commission, and we reverse as to the individual appellees Dixon, King, and Taylor.

In March, 1997, Ingram received a notice that his rental property would be considered for demolition at the April 7, 1997 meeting of the Pine Bluff City Council. Appellant had his agent, Bill Price, contact Dale Dixon, a City Councilman who was also the head of the Pine Bluff Planning Commission. Mr. Dixon advised that he would have Ingram's property removed from consideration and that Mr. Ingram did not need to appear at the City Council meeting. Neither Ingram nor his agent attended the meeting, but Dixon made no attempt to remove appellant's property from consideration for demolition. The City Council passed a resolution to raze the property in question. The resolution gave Ingram ten (10) days in which to raze the building. Neither the City nor Dixon advised Ingram or his agent that the resolution had passed. Ingram did nothing because he neither attended the City Council meeting nor watched it on television. Appellant claims that he had no idea that the resolution had passed.

In August of 1997, approximately four (4) months after the passage of the resolution, the City demolished the property in question. Ingram approached Dixon, and he was told to attend meetings of the City Council and City Planning Commission. He was asked to present proof substantiating his loss, but he was never compensated for that loss. In early 1999, Ingram initiated a lawsuit in federal court against the defendants. The defendants successfully moved for dismissal on the ground that appellant's claims were not ripe for federal adjudication because he had not exhausted all of his remedies in state court. The Appellant then filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. The defendants included the City of Pine Bluff, the Pine Bluff Planning Commission, and various city officials, both individually, and in their official capacities.

The circuit court complaint was for declaratory and injunctive relief and for damages. The complaint asserted causes of action consisting of five counts: 1) for a declaration that the appellees' actions were under color of law and caused Ingram's deprivation of property without due process or just compensation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act; 2) for wrongfully seizing his property without substantive or procedural due process protected by the Arkansas Constitution; 3) for injunctive relief to ensure that all interested parties receive proper notice of demolition proceedings; 4) for fraud due to misrepresentations on the part of Dale Dixon, an individual defendant and a member of the Pine Bluff City Council and head of the Pine Bluff Planning Commission; and 5) for breach of contract due to Ingram's detrimental reliance on promises and representations made to him by Dixon. The appellees moved to dismiss appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim, but that motion was denied.

The matter was set for trial beginning November 12, 2002. Prior to trial, Judge H.A. Taylor indicated that he would not be able to preside due to ill health. As a result, Special Judge Floyd Lofton was appointed to the case in late October 2002.

On October 30, 2002, the appellees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The appellees contended that Mr. Ingram should have filed his appeal within 30 days of the adoption of the City's resolution pursuant to Inferior Court Rule 9. Since that had not occurred, the appellees asserted that the circuit court was without jurisdiction over appellant's claims.

The trial court scheduled a hearing for the morning of the trial on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Following argument, the trial court granted the motion. Orders were entered on December 17, 2002, holding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction and denying appellant's motion for reconsideration.

On January 2, 2003, Ingram timely filed his notice of appeal. He appeals on two points: 1) The trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and 2) Defendants should have been estopped from contesting the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Ingram's first point on appeal is that because the case had been pending for over three years, and the trial was scheduled to begin in less than two weeks, appellees were not entitled to a judgment on the pleadings. Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(c) governs motions on the pleadings and provides that:

(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

The appellees, however, contend that they did not intend to delay trial but rather to prevent one from occurring at all due to the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is well settled that, "[t]he defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is never waived and may be raised at any time." Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). State v. Dawson, 343 Ark. 683, 38 S.W.3d 319 (2001).

In granting the motion on the pleadings, the trial court relied on Inferior Court Rule 9, which governs appeals from inferior courts to circuit court. Inferior Court Rule 9 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Time for Taking Appeal. All appeals in civil cases from inferior courts to circuit court must be filed in the office of the clerk of the particular circuit court having jurisdiction of the appeal within thirty (30) days from the date of the entry of the judgment.

Rule 9 applies to city council and planning commission resolutions via Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Repl 1998) which states:

In addition to any remedy provided by law, appeals from final action taken by the administrative and quasi-judicial agencies concerned in the administration of this subchapter may be taken to the circuit court of the appropriate county where they shall be tried de novo according to the same procedure which applies to appeals in civil actions from decisions of inferior courts, including the right of trial by jury.

It is well settled that the filing requirements of Rule 9 are mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to comply prevents the circuit court from acquiring subject-matter jurisdiction. Douglas v. City of Cabot, 347 Ark. 1, 59 S.W.3d 430 (2001); Murray v. State, 344 Ark. 7, 37 S.W.3d 641 (2001); State v. Dawson, 343 Ark. 683, 38 S.W.3d 319 (2001); Pike Ave. Devel. Co. v. Pulaski County, 343 Ark. 338, 37 S.W.3d 177 (2001); Night Clubs, Inc. v. Fort Smith Planning Commission, 336 Ark. 130, 984 S.W.2d 418 (1999); Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of Little Rock v. Cheek, 328 Ark. 18, 942 S.W.2d 821(1997). Moreover, Rule 9 demands strict, not merely substantial, compliance. J & M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark. 126, 60 S.W.3d 481 (2001). Ingram waited over two years to file an appeal of the City's decision to the circuit court. His appeal was well outside the thirty-day requirement and was thus untimely because these had to do with action by the city council. The circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over counts one, two, and three. Therefore, the circuit court correctly granted the motion on the pleadings as to those counts.

Ingram argues that he could not have complied with Rule 9 even if he had wanted to because he was denied due process in that the City never gave him notice of its decision to demolish his house after the April 7, 1997 meeting. It is undisputed that Ingram received notice of the April 7, 1997 meeting a month earlier, but neither he nor his property manager, Bill Price, attended the meeting. Furthermore, it is also undisputed the meetings of the Pine Bluff City Council are televised once per week for two weeks. The City waited 120 days before demolishing...