Ingram v. City of Columbus
| Decision Date | 28 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-4303,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,97-4303 |
| Citation | 185 F.3d 579 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 1999) BETTY INGRAM, RAY WOMACK, DEBORAH WOMACK, AND PATRICIA COLLINS,, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, OFFICER E. MORE, OFFICER WINDON, OFFICER S. LAZAR, OFFICER R. DUNLAP, OFFICER D. PULVERMACHER, AND OFFICER JOHN DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS POLICE OFFICERS FOR THE CITY OF COLUMBUS, Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. No. 95-00910--George C. Smith, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
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[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Zach Zunshine (briefed), Columbus, OH, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Glenn B. Redick (briefed), Diane M. Meftah (briefed), Columbus City Attorney's Office, Columbus, OH, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Kennedy, Daughtrey, and Clay, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAUGHTREY, J., joined. KENNEDY, J. (pp. 598-602), delivered a separate opinion Concurring in part and Dissenting in part.
Plaintiffs Betty Ingram, Ray Womack, Deborah Womack and Patricia Collins appeal the judgment of the district court entered on October 15, 1997, granting the motion for summary judgment of Defendants City of Columbus and individual officers of the Columbus Police Department, in this case arising under Ohio law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and alleging numerous common law and Fourth Amendment violations. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court.
On September 21, 1994, several police officers employed by Columbus, Ohio were working as members of the SCAT Team South, a city street crime attack unit, in response to citizen complaints to the Columbus police department about illegal drug activity in the area between Morrison and Stoddart Avenues in Columbus. The officers planned to conduct a narcotics "buy-bust"1 in the first alley north of Main Street in Columbus. Sergeant Ronald Dunlap drove an unmarked city vehicle through the area while one or two officers dressed in SCAT uniforms observed Sgt. Dunlap's activities from concealed positions in the immediate vicinity. Arrest officers dressed in plain clothes were also patrolling the area at the time.
As the SCAT team watched, an individual named Anthony Carroll approached Sgt. Dunlap's car and offered to sell Sgt. Dunlap one unit dose of crack cocaine. Carroll got into Sgt. Dunlap's car and directed Sgt. Dunlap to drive and park on Rich Street, just west of Berkeley. Sgt. Dunlap gave Carroll two city-issued $10 bills with pre-recorded serial numbers. Carroll walked to a residence on Berkeley just north of Rich Street, and then walked south on Berkeley for a short distance, during which time he was out of Sgt. Dunlap's view. A few minutes later, Carroll returned to the vehicle and told Sgt. Dunlap that some unknown persons had taken the money from him without giving him the drugs in return. When Carroll said he was leaving, Sgt. Dunlap told him he was under arrest for offering to sell cocaine. Upon hearing that he was under arrest, Carroll fled on foot, running to the north through private yards and to the east across Berkeley. Sgt. Dunlap and three officers pursued Carroll on foot, while other officers followed Carroll in their vehicles. Carroll rushed into Plaintiffs' residence at 395 Stoddart Avenue, ran into the basement, and crawled under a bed.2
A number of armed officers followed Carroll into 395 Stoddart through the front door, which was not locked at the time, without first knocking. The officers who entered were in plain clothes but did not identify themselves as officers and did not announce their purpose. By entering through the front door, the officers entered first into the living room, where they encountered Betty Ingram, a fifty-three year old diabetic, her daughter Leona Womack, and Leona Womack's two-year old son Tim and five-year old daughter Tanisha.3 When the officers entered, Betty Ingram and the children were napping, while Leona Womack was watching television. Additionally, at the time the officers entered, Betty Ingram's son, Ray Womack, was napping in the basement, and her daughters Patricia Collins and Deborah Womack, who is hearing and speech impaired, were upstairs. Betty Ingram and Leona Womack did not attempt to resist the officers' entry into their home.4
The officers found Ray Womack in the basement, awakened and handcuffed him, and brought him up to the living room. They placed Ray Womack face down on the floor, and had their guns drawn and pointed at him. Betty Ingram asked the officers to let Ray Womack go, explained that he had done nothing wrong and asked them not to kill her son. Patricia Collins, who had come downstairs, asked the officers what was going on. Using expletives, the officers told the women to shut up. Deborah Womack also came downstairs into the living room. These women did not interfere with the officers. One of the officers hit Betty Ingram in the face, knocking her down. Betty Ingram called for the assistance of her neighbor, Mrs. Davis.
At some point, the officers realized that Ray Womack was not the suspect they had chased. They searched the house again, found Carroll hiding in the basement, and arrested him. When the officers brought Carroll up from the basement, they uncuffed Ray Womack, and instead handcuffed Betty Ingram and Deborah Womack. When Patricia Collins asked why the officers were taking Betty Ingram to jail, the officers again, using expletives, told her to shut up. One of the officers hit Patricia Collins in the head. The officers also arrested Patricia Collins. As Betty Ingram sat on her couch in handcuffs, one of the officers shook her violently and banged her head against the couch.
The officers proceeded to remove Carroll from 395 Stoddart without any interference from Plaintiffs or Leona Womack.5 The officers did not file charges against Ray and Deborah Womack. The officers took Betty Ingram and Patricia Collins to the police station, and charged them with obstructing official business. The two spent approximately twelve hours in jail before the police released them on bond. Upon their release, Ingram and Collins visited the Emergency Room at the Park Medical Center in Columbus, where they were diagnosed as having contusion of the scalp and minor contusion of the scalp, respectively. Charges against the two women were eventually terminated by way of bond forfeiture of $100 each.
Plaintiffs filed suit against the City of Columbus and several of its police officers in the district court on September 15, 1995, alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 28, 1997. The district court issued an Opinion and Order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendants on October 15, 1997. Plaintiffs filed timely notice of appeal to this Court on November 8, 1997.
This Court reviews de novo a district court's order granting summary judgment. See Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In reviewing the record, we are to believe the evidence of the non-movant, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (6th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, on summary judgment, neither the district court nor this Court may make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). If the record taken as a whole may lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-movant, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the individual Defendants committed numerous violations of the Fourth Amendment entitling them to relief under § 1983. Plaintiffs also raised state law claims of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest, and for humiliation, indignity, and severe emotional distress. Plaintiffs further alleged in their complaint that the City of Columbus engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to investigate instances of police misconduct and of failing to properly supervise, train and discipline its police officers. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue only that (1) Defendants entered their home in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by seizing them without probable cause; (3) Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force in effectuating those seizures; and (4) Defendants caused them to suffer humiliation; indignity and severe emotional distress. While Defendants claimed qualified immunity below, the district court did not address it, and therefore Defendants' claim of qualified immunity is not before us on appeal. Moreover, on appeal, Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's dismissal of their § 1983 claim against the Columbus Police Department, or of their other state law claims. We therefore do not address Defendants' claim of qualified immunity, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claim of municipal liability, or Plaintiffs' state law claims of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and false arrest, see, e.g., Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1069 n.6 (6th Cir. 1998), and turn instead to the constitutional and state law claims that remain before this Court.
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