Lyons v. City of Xenia
Decision Date | 04 August 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 03-3282.,03-3282. |
Citation | 417 F.3d 565 |
Parties | Cheryl D. LYONS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF XENIA, et al., Defendants, Christine Keith, Officer; Matthew Foubert, Officer, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Lynnette P. Ballato, Subashi, Wildermuth & Ballato, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellants. Michael C. Thompson, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Lynnette P. Ballato, Subashi, Wildermuth & Ballato, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellants. Michael C. Thompson, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: GIBBONS and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; TARNOW, District Judge.*
GIBBONS, J. (p. 580), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
SUTTON, J. (pp. 580-584), delivered a separate concurring opinion, in which GIBBONS, J., joined.
TARNOW, D.J. (pp. 584-590), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
This case returns to us from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Court's recent opinion in Brosseau v. Haugen, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004). We previously held that Officer Christine Keith was entitled to qualified immunity from Cheryl Lyons' false-arrest claim; Officer Matthew Foubert was entitled to qualified immunity from Lyons' claim that he used excessive force in handcuffing her; and Officer Foubert was not entitled to qualified immunity from Lyons' claim that he used excessive force in tackling her in response to a distressed call for backup support from Officer Keith. See Lyons v. City of Xenia, 90 Fed.Appx. 835 (6th Cir. Jan.27, 2004). Officer Foubert sought review of that part of our opinion denying him qualified immunity from Lyons' excessive-force tackling claim, and the Supreme Court vacated our judgment for reconsideration in light of Brosseau. See Foubert v. Lyons, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 808, 160 L.Ed.2d 596 (2004). After considering the Supreme Court's treatment of similar qualified-immunity issues in Brosseau, we now extend qualified immunity to Officer Foubert for Lyons' excessive-force tackling claim. We leave undisturbed those parts of our prior opinion granting Officer Keith qualified immunity from Lyons' false-arrest claim and Officer Foubert qualified immunity from Lyons' excessive-force handcuffing claim.
On the evening of August 18, 1998, Officer Christine Keith received a call to investigate an assault allegedly committed by Aiesha Ward, a sixteen-year old girl, and her friend Sara Dodd. Officer Keith initially went to the Dodd residence to obtain information from Sara's mother. Aiesha was also present at the Dodd residence. After obtaining the information necessary to issue a citation for Sara, Officer Keith told Aiesha that she wanted to speak with her mother and would follow Aiesha to her residence.
Upon arriving home, Aiesha told her mother, Cheryl Lyons, that a police officer was with her, at which time Officer Keith informed Lyons that Aiesha had assaulted another girl. After several exchanges with Lyons, Officer Keith turned to Aiesha and asked for her name and address. Lyons interrupted and told her daughter to stop answering questions because Lyons needed more information. Officer Keith responded that if she could not finish questioning Aiesha, Aiesha would have to come "downtown" with her, to which Lyons answered that Keith "was not taking her daughter anywhere." Lyons claims that during this interchange she told Keith to leave, but that Keith refused, citing her need for information. Lyons next told the officer to take a seat because she needed to take her blood pressure medicine.
When Lyons walked into the kitchen to get her medicine, Officer Keith followed her. At that point, the verbal confrontation between the two women grew more heated as Officer Keith repeated her requests for information regarding Aiesha. Responding to what she perceived as Officer Keith's "badgering," Lyons became angry and cursed at the officer. Officer Keith claims that in response to Lyons' obscenities, she advised Lyons to calm down and cooperate.
At some point during this verbal exchange, Lyons noticed Officer Keith tightening her right fist down at her side. Keith allegedly took an "aggressive" step toward Lyons, closing the space between the women from three feet to two. Lyons then told the officer: Keith gives a different rendering of this remark, claiming that Lyons warned her that if she had not been wearing a badge, she would have "slap[ped] the `sh[-]' out of" her. According to Keith, Lyons continued to scream obscenities and "got up in [her] face," at which point Keith advised her to back down. Lyons admits that both of them were "screaming."
Both women agree that Lyons made some sort of hand gesture at this point. According to Lyons, she raised her index finger at the officer, demanding, "[d]amnit, didn't you just hear what I said?" (referring apparently to wanting the opportunity to take her medicine before answering questions). Officer Keith describes the incident as Lyons "rais[ing] her hand towards" Officer Keith's face.
Officer Keith grabbed Lyons' wrist after the finger-pointing/hand-raising episode. In response, Lyons immediately pulled her wrist away. Although Officer Keith claims to have told Lyons she was under arrest, Lyons denies hearing this, claiming that she did not think she was being arrested. It is undisputed that Lyons pulled her wrist away from Officer Keith's grasp and either attempted to, or did, walk away.
According to Lyons, after she pulled her wrist away, she walked into the front room and Officer Keith followed her there. Lyons denies having any additional physical contact with Officer Keith aside from when Keith grabbed her wrist. By contrast, Officer Keith claims that after Lyons pulled her wrist back, the two women struggled as Keith attempted to handcuff Lyons, and Lyons ultimately punched her in the left eye during the struggle. Lyons denies hitting Officer Keith.
At some point during this struggle, all agree, Officer Keith radioed for backup. The call went to Officer Foubert who says he heard Officer Keith "yelling for help" with a distressed tone in her voice, as well as commotion in the background. Lyons claims that a few moments after Officer Keith made the call, Officer Foubert came running into the house through the front door at full speed. In what Lyons and Aiesha describe as a football tackle, Officer Foubert knocked Lyons to the ground. Lyons claims that her left knee hit the ground and that she was lying on her stomach, with Officer Foubert, a 5'11", 240 lb. man, on top of her midsection. She told the officer that she could not breathe. According to Lyons, Officer Foubert then "threw" Lyons on her right side, and handcuffed her arms behind her back.
Officer Foubert gives a different version of the events. As he entered the house, he saw the two women struggling with each other on the floor, side-by-side. By that time, Officer Keith had already placed a handcuff on one of Lyons' arms. Officer Foubert pulled Lyons away from Keith by picking her up, then leaned her over a chair, using a "balance displacement technique." It is undisputed that the two officers picked Lyons up under the arms following the tackle/balance displacement technique, and they assisted her out to Keith's cruiser. Keith transported Lyons to the station without further mishap, where she was charged with obstructing official business, assault and resisting arrest.
Lyons was tried before a jury, which acquitted her on all three charges. Following the acquittal, she filed suit against the City of Xenia, Chief of Police Eric Prindle, and Officers Keith and Foubert, raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law. Because Lyons acknowledged in a pleading that all of her claims against the City of Xenia and Chief Prindle, as well as her claims brought under state law against all four defendants, were meritless, the district court entered summary judgment on these claims.
With respect to the claims remaining against Officers Foubert and Keith, Lyons alleged that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause and by using excessive force in the course of making the arrest. Reasoning that no evidence linked Officer Foubert to the false-arrest claim or Officer Keith to the excessive-force claim, the district court granted the officers' summary judgment motions on these claims. The district court, however, rejected Officer Keith's argument that as a matter of law she had probable cause to arrest Lyons and rejected Officer Foubert's argument that as a matter of law he did not use excessive force in arresting Lyons. The district court likewise rejected the officers' qualified immunity defenses. If believed, the court concluded, Lyons' presentation of the evidence would show that the officers violated clearly established constitutional rights.
After the district judge denied qualified immunity on those three claims, the officers appealed. On January 27, 2004, we reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for all claims save Lyons' excessive-force tackling claim against Officer Foubert. Officer Foubert appealed the denial of qualified immunity on the remaining claim to the Supreme Court, which vacated our judgment on December 13, 2004, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brosseau.
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision, we asked the parties to provide supplemental briefs about the impact of Brosseau on this case and specifically asked them whether they would prefer the district court to address the issue in the first instance. Neither party requested that we initially remand the case to the district court.
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