Ingram v. Clover Leaf Lumber Co.
Decision Date | 16 December 1932 |
Parties | J. W. Ingram v. Clover Leaf Lumber Company, a Corporation, and S. M. Masters, Appellants |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Albert D Nortoni, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Ely & Ely and P. S. Terry for appellants.
(1) The court erred in appointing a receiver for the Clover Leaf Piling Company, for the court did not soundly exercise its discretionary power in appointing a receiver; for the order it not supported by evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the property would deteriorate, that defendants were insolvent or that plaintiff would prevail on the merits. (a) In order to authorize the appointment of a receiver proof must be clearly made that the concurrent conditions exist as follows: 1. The deterioration or waste of the property, 2. The insolvency of the defendant, and 3, a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits and none of the three requirements were shown here. Bushman v. Bushman, 279 S.W. 125; 1 Clark on Receivers (2 Ed.) sec. 59; Price v. Bankers Trust Co. of St. Louis, 178 S.W. 745; Huigens v. Crilly, 179 N.W. 10; Hannervig v. Lougheed, 167 N.Y.S. 788. (2) The court has no power or jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to take charge of the assets of the defendant Clover Leaf Lumber Company, on the ground that a partnership existed between it and plaintiff, for the reason that Clover Leaf Lumber Company had no authority to enter into partnerships and was prohibited from entering into partnerships by law. Franz v. William Barr Dry Goods Co., 111 S.W. 638; Aurora State Bank v. Oliver, 62 Mo.App. 390; Denny v. Guyton, 40 S.W.2d 569; Jackson v Hooper, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 658; Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal Co., 281 F. 265. (a) Under any circumstances the conduct of the parties and the condition of the business does not warrant the appointment of a temporary receiver. Sedberry v. Gwyn, 222 S.W. 783; Columbus Packing Co. v. State ex rel., 140 N.E. 376; Duke v. Allen, 85 So. 286; Smith v. Smith, 160 N.W. 756.
J. Henry Caruthers for respondent.
(1) Under its chancery jurisdiction and by legislative enactment the circuit court has power to appoint receivers. Sec. 998, R. S. 1929; Abramsky v. Abramsky, 261 Mo. 126; State ex rel. Hampe v. Ittner, 304 Mo. 151; Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Mo. Motor Bus Co., 233 S.W. 168; 1 Clark on Receivers, sec. 53, p. 63. (2) Partnership is the relation existing between persons, who have so contracted that the profits of some business enterprise conducted by any or all of them for them all, enure to all as co-owners, and are shared accordingly. It is merely one species of joint ownership. George on Partnership, p. 2. (3) The circuit court has original jurisdiction in all matters of equity, and has inherent power, independent of any statute authorizing it, to appoint a receiver in the settlement of partnership affairs. Sec. 998, R. S. 1929; Cox v. Volkart, 86 Mo. 511. (a) Ordinarily a receiver of the effects of a partnership will not be appointed unless the bill prays for a dissolution and shows a proper case for the same, for it will destroy the trade. The ordinary equitable actions allowed between partners are, viz., (1) an action for accounting, (2) an action for accounting, dissolution and injunction. 2 Clark on Receivers, sec. 911, p. 1334. (b) A decree appointing a receiver of a partnership in a preliminary hearing should not pass upon the rights of the parties more than is absolutely necessary for the purpose of determining the necessity of the appointment of a receiver. 2 Clark on Receivers, sec. 911, p. 1335. (4) The circuit court has both chancery and statutory power to appoint a receiver to keep and preserve all property and protect any business or business interest entrusted to it, pending any legal or equitable proceeding concerning the same. Sec. 998, R. S. 1929; General Excavator Co. v. Emory, 40 S.W.2d 492; Stark v. Grimes, 88 Mo.App. 413; Cantwell v. Lead Co., 197 Mo. 42.
This is an action in equity seeking the dissolution of an alleged partnership, an accounting between the alleged partners, an injunction restraining defendants from collecting or disbursing partnership funds, and the appointment of a receiver to take immediate charge of the assets of said alleged partnership, and for such other and further relief as to the court might seem just and proper. The court appointed a receiver as prayed in the petition. A motion was filed to vacate and set aside the order appointing the receiver which was overruled, and defendants have appealed.
Plaintiff's verified petition reads as follows:
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