Ingram v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 14 December 2021
• Docket Number: Record No. 1131-20-3
• Citation: 74 Va.App. 59,866 S.E.2d 55
• Parties: Chelsey Danielle INGRAM, s/k/a Chelsea Danielle Ingram v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

74 Va.App. 59

866 S.E.2d 55

Chelsey Danielle INGRAM, s/k/a Chelsea Danielle Ingram

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 1131-20-3

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

DECEMBER 14, 2021

Tyler M. Jerrell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges Humphreys, AtLee and Raphael

OPINION BY JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS

At a bench trial conducted by the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County on September 22, 2020, appellant, Chelsey Danielle Ingram, was convicted of thirteen counts of animal cruelty, in violation of Code § 3.2-6570(A), and one count of dumping trash on the highway, in violation of Code § 33.2-802. On appeal, Ms. Ingram challenges the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her of animal cruelty.

BACKGROUND

In reviewing a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, "granting to it all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom." Thomas v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 560, 574, 850 S.E.2d 400 (2020) (quoting Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527, 532, 507 S.E.2d 102 (1998) ). We apply the same standard in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 512, ––––, 863 S.E.2d 19 (2021).

On February 12, 2020, Rockbridge County Sheriff's Office Deputy Ryan Knick and Sergeant Terry Martin responded to a dispatch alerting them to reports of a dog running at large near 944 Longhollow Road ("the home") and a second dog that was struck and killed by a vehicle in the same area. When the officers arrived at the location, they confirmed the above reports and approached the home in an attempt to contact the owner of the animals.

The home has two paths of approach: a long driveway that feeds into the public road and a set of wooden stairs about twenty yards up the road. The stairs led the officers up a small embankment, through the side yard of the house, past a door which had its upper panel removed on the first floor next to stairs leading up to a large front deck, and ultimately to the second-story front door of the home. The officers went up the stairs and knocked at the door on the deck; the officers heard dogs barking inside, but no one answered the door. The officers left the front door, descended the stairs, and then noticed a dog perched up on an object and peering over a missing window frame in the first-floor door.¹

Deputy Knick approached the first-floor door and observed the dog perched on an old toilet. The first floor was "filthy, [with] urine, feces, and tons of garbage all over the place." Also, inside the home, close to the base of the door, was a dead dog. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Knick testified that he could see the dead dog by looking down from his location "a couple inches from [the door]." In response to multiple questions from Ms. Ingram's attorney asking Deputy Knick whether he had to "peek over" or "stick [his] head in" to see the dog, Deputy Knick maintained that he could see the dog from outside of the door without placing his head through the window frame.

From his location under the deck, Deputy Knick also heard dogs barking in an area outside the home and could see animals near a tree line about "forty to fifty yards" from the home. Deputy Knick crossed the front yard of the home, through a part of the yard that was not "manicured," and then reached a "patch of woods that wasn't too growed up [sic] that time of year." On top of the hill, Deputy Knick saw four dogs in various states of health, but three of the four dogs were visibly malnourished. The hill was not enclosed, nor were there any buildings on the hill. At this point, Deputy Knick relayed the information regarding the dogs to Deputy Daniel Trout who obtained a search warrant for the home. The material facts stated in support of the probable cause for the warrant were as follows:

Sgt. Martin along with Deputy Knick located two deceased dogs located at the residence of 944 Longhollow Rd, Rockbridge County, VA. Two additional dogs were located in the curtilage of the residence and were found to be malnourished. Additional animals could be heard inside the said residence. This affiant believes a search of the residence and curtilage for the requested items would provide evidence to assist in prosecution for the said VA code [ Code § 3.2-6570. Cruelty to animals]. As well to check the welfare of the animals inside.

Deputy Trout was not on the scene and simply relayed the information that Sergeant Martin and Deputy Knick provided him. A magistrate authorized the search warrant, and Deputy Knick and Sergeant Martin executed the warrant and seized ten live dogs and one deceased dog.

The home belonged to Bill Sensabaugh. Mr. Sensabaugh was renting the house to Ms. Ingram and Matthew Trussell. Following interviews, Ms. Ingram told officers that she had entered into an agreement with Mr. Sensabaugh to care for his two dogs in exchange for him paying for the food. When Mr. Sensabaugh did not pay her, she simply did not feed them. All told, fourteen dogs were found at the residence: two deceased dogs, two dogs that belonged to Mr. Sensabaugh, and ten dogs that had belonged to Ms. Ingram and Mr. Trussell. For purposes of clarity, law enforcement officers identified the dogs with numbers. Dog 1 and the body of Dog 14 were found on the first floor and seized by the deputies. Dogs 4, 5, 6, and 8 were found on the hill and seized. Six dogs were found inside the residence: Dogs 2 and 9 shared a crate that was covered in feces and urine. Dogs 3 and 7 also shared a crate in similar conditions. The dogs in the crates were seized by the deputies. Dog 13 belonged to Mr. Sensabaugh and was found locked in a bathroom. Dog 12 also belonged to Mr. Sensabaugh and was found locked in a room with urine and feces and looked malnourished. Mr. Sensabaugh's dogs were returned to him. The dog running at large, Dog 10, was seized. The deputies instructed Mr. Trussell to bury Dog 11, the dog struck by the car.

The ten live dogs and the deceased Dog 14 were taken to the SPCA. Dog 14 was accidently disposed of prior to trial. When the dogs were examined by the SPCA, all but Dog 9 had worms. While in the care of the SPCA, most of the dogs rapidly gained substantial weight. SPCA staff testified that when the dogs were given food that they were "ravenous" and ate like "they had not seen food ... in some time."

Prior to trial, Ms. Ingram filed a motion to suppress arguing that Deputy Knick violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a search of the curtilage of the home. On September 22, 2020, the day of trial, the circuit court also heard Ms. Ingram's suppression motion. The circuit court ruled that "looking across the door, whether it was with the human eye or a camera at that point looking ahead into a window, an open window, a closed window ... was an unlawful search of the house and the curtilage," but denied the motion on the grounds that the officers were entitled to rely on the warrant to seize the evidence under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. At trial, the circuit court sustained Ms. Ingram's motion to strike the felony charge relating to the death of Dog 14. Ms. Ingram was found guilty of all misdemeanor animal cruelty charges and sentenced to 200 days, with 180 days suspended on three of the charges, and fined $100, with $50 suspended, for each of the ten remaining charges. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

I. The Motion to Suppress

Ms. Ingram assigns error to the circuit court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence. Ms. Ingram argues that Deputy Knick violated the Fourth Amendment by engaging in a warrantless search of her home and residence when he "entered the curtilage without any express or implied permission and gathered evidence." Specifically, Ms. Ingram argues that Deputy Knick violated the Fourth Amendment by "exceeding the scope of the invitation of the driveway and the stairs, by poking your head [sic] through the window, by walking around the house through the curtilage to get to the dogs up the hill." Ms. Ingram further argues that if Deputy Knick obtained evidence by violating the Fourth Amendment, then under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the illegal search taints future evidence that is the product of the illegal search, including the warrant authorizing the search of the home. Ms. Ingram also contends that the circuit court should not have applied the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because no reasonably well-trained officer would have believed that the search was legal. However, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that Deputy Knick did not violate the Fourth Amendment and accordingly affirm the circuit court's denial of Ms. Ingram's motion to suppress under the right result for a different reason doctrine. See Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 579-82, 701 S.E.2d 431 (2010).

As noted above, the standard of review on factual determinations underlying a denial of a motion to suppress is highly deferential and here leans heavily in favor of the Commonwealth. Thomas, 72 Va. App. at 574, 850 S.E.2d 400. While we review the circuit court's determinations of historical fact in this deferential light, we review the circuit court's legal conclusions based on those facts de novo. See Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 621, 816 S.E.2d 587 (2018). "We also presume—even in the absence of specific factual findings—that the trial court resolved all factual ambiguities or inconsistencies ... in favor of the prevailing party." Hill v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 808, 832 S.E.2d 33 (2019).

Among the protections enshrined in the Fourth Amendment is the right of an individual to "retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,...