Giles v. Com., Record No. 1374-97-3.
Decision Date | 01 December 1998 |
Docket Number | Record No. 1374-97-3. |
Citation | 28 Va. App. 527,507 S.E.2d 102 |
Parties | Ronald GILES, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
A. Gene Hart, Jr. (A. Gene Hart, Jr., P.C., on briefs), Harrisonburg, for appellant.
Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: COLEMAN, BUMGARDNER and LEMONS, JJ.
Ronald Giles, Jr. was convicted by a jury of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Giles's motion to suppress his confession. Giles contends police officers obtained his confession in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's conviction.
Giles was arrested for armed robbery of a motel. After Giles's arrest, Investigator Knott, intending to interrogate Giles, advised him of his Miranda rights. Giles asked to speak with an attorney, whereupon Knott terminated the interview. Immediately thereafter, Knott took Giles into an adjoining room and turned him over to Officer Royer for booking. Officer Knott said to Royer, "He's ready to go," and Knott then left the building.
As the booking began, Officer Royer asked Giles if he had spoken with the investigator about the charges; Giles responded: "Yes, but I don't understand, I'm confused." Royer explained to Giles that he had an arrest warrant for robbery and was being "booked" for robbery. Giles expressed further confusion and exclaimed, "Robbery?" At that point, Officer Royer asked Giles if he wanted Investigator Knott to "come back over and talk to [him]." Royer further stated: Giles responded, "Yeah, I'll talk to them."
Approximately ten minutes after Officer Knott left, he was summoned to return to the station. Upon return, Knott again advised Giles of his Miranda rights, including his right to counsel, and obtained from Giles a signed written waiver. Thereafter, Giles made incriminating statements that were introduced at trial.
86 S.Ct. 1602). The prophylactic Miranda protections apply to all interrogations where the degree of restraint is equivalent to arrest or a station house confinement. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)).
Among the prophylactic measures Miranda grants an accused is the right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470-79,
[T]he Lawyer is the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of legal rights of [the accused] in his dealings with the police and the courts. For this reason, the Court fashioned in Miranda the rigid rule that an accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681, 108 S.Ct. 2093. Only if the accused initiates further "communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police," and only if those communications result in the accused changing his or her mind and freely and voluntarily waiving the right to counsel, may the police resume interrogation without violating the Edwards rule. See id. at 682, 108 S.Ct. 2093.
We have recognized and applied a three-part analysis to evaluate the admissibility of a statement under the Edwards rule. See Quinn, 25 Va.App. at 712,
492 S.E.2d at 475. First, the trial court must determine whether the accused "unequivocally" invoked his or her right to counsel. Second, the trial court must determine whether the accused, rather than the authorities, initiated further discussions or meetings with the police. Third, if the accused did initiate further discussions or conversations with police, the trial court must then ascertain whether the accused knowingly and intelligently waived the previously invoked right to counsel. See id.; Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).
Because the Commonwealth concedes that Giles properly invoked his right to counsel, the first element of the Edwards inquiry is not at issue. Therefore, we determine de novo whether, under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Giles initiated the discussion which resulted in this confession and whether after the initiation he freely and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
First, Giles argues that the police failed to terminate the interrogation after he asserted his right to counsel. Giles contends the police have a duty to inform other officers of an accused's invocation of his right to counsel, that the Edwards rule requires they ascertain, prior to interrogation, whether the accused has invoked his or her Miranda rights, and that an officer's ignorance does not relieve the officer from the duty to comply with the Edwards rule. See Quinn, 25 Va.App. at 716-17,
The evidence shows that Investigator Knott...
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