Ingram v. Pettit

• Citation: 340 So.2d 922
• Decision Date: 09 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 46679,46679
• Parties: Margaret W. INGRAM, Petitioner, v. Robert Leslie PETTIT, Jr., and the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, an Insurance Corporation, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 922

340 So.2d 922

Margaret W. INGRAM, Petitioner, v. Robert Leslie PETTIT, Jr., and the Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, an Insurance Corporation, Respondents.

No. 46679.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 9, 1976.

David R. Lewis, of Blalock, Holbrook, Lewis, Paul & Isaac, Jacksonville, for petitioner.

John C. Taylor, Jr., Marion R. Shepard and John E. Mathews, Jr., of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for respondents.

ON REHEARING GRANTED

ENGLAND, Justice.

Margaret Ingram was injured as a result of a rear end collision to her car, for which she sued Robert Pettit for compensatory and punitive damages. The trial judge removed the issue of punitive damages from the jury by granting Pettit a summary judgment. This judgment was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal, ¹ after which Ingram properly invoked our jurisdiction to review that decision. ²

The sole issue presented for our review is whether a jury should be allowed to consider an award of punitive damages where negligence is coupled with intoxication. The record in this case indicates that Ingram's car was hit by Pettit from the rear while standing at an intersection in a well-lit area. Pettit's car had not been moving at an excessive rate of speed, and it had not been seen to swerve or veer outside the marked lines of traffic. In fact, except for conflicting evidence as to whether Pettit applied his brakes before his vehicle struck Ingram's, there was no indication that the operation of Pettit's car up to the time of the accident was other than normal. This accident is before us solely because Pettit submitted to a breathalizer test which showed his blood alcohol content to be .26% On a scale where the legal presumption of intoxication arises at .10%. ³

Ingram claims that a jury should be allowed to consider an award of punitive damages, suggesting that a person who voluntarily intoxicates himself and then drives an automobile on the public highways of this state should be exposed to financial punishment. Her argument is based primarily upon decisions in other jurisdictions which have found voluntary intoxication to provide the willfulness necessary for an award of punitive damages. ⁴ Pettit contests this notion, suggesting that the cases relied upon by Ingram involve persons whose automobiles were being driven in a manifestly careless manner prior to the liability-generating accident. He suggests further that the law of this state permits an award of punitive damages only where there is willful conduct tantamount to criminal negligence. ⁵

It has long been established that the availability of punitive damages is reserved to those kinds of cases where private injuries partake of public wrongs. ⁶ The intentional infliction of harm, or a recklessness which is the result of an intentional act, authorize punishment which may deter future harm to the public by the particular party involved and by others acting similarly. Cases in this category may be likened, in general terms, to culpable negligence in criminal proceedings. The higher burden of proof in a criminal suit, however, prevents the comparison of results in similar factual situations as a means of resolving civil disputes. For this reason, Pettit's reliance upon Smith v. State, 65 So.2d 303 (Fla.1953), is misplaced.

Our jurisprudence reflects a history of difficulty in dividing negligence into degrees. ⁷ The distinctions articulated in labeling particular conduct as 'simple negligence', 'culpable negligence', 'gross negligence', and 'willful and wanton misconduct' are best viewed as statements of public policy. These semantic refinements also serve a useful purpose in advising jurors of the factors to be considered in those situations where the lines are indistinct. ⁸ We would deceive ourselves, however, if we viewed these distinctions as finite legal categories and permitted the characterization alone to cloud the policies they were created to foster. Our guide is not to be found in the grammar, but rather in the policy of the state in regard to highway accidents. From that perspective, we see that the courts and the Legislature have evolved the notion that drunk drivers menace the public safety and are to be discouraged by punishment. The state's policy is supported by adequate current, factual data. ⁹ In line with that policy, therefore, we hold that juries may award punitive damages where voluntary intoxication is involved in an automotive accident in Florida without regard to external proof of carelessness or abnormal driving, provided always the traditional elements for punitive liability are proved, including proximate causation and an underlying award of compensatory damages. We do not hold that intoxication coupled with negligence will always justify an award of punitive damages. We affirmatively hold that the voluntary act of driving 'while intoxicated' evinces, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude for a jury to be asked to provide an award of punitive damages if it determines liability exists for compensatory damages. In this context the term 'while intoxicated' means the same as it does in criminal proceedings. It is not synonymous with 'while under the influence of intoxicating liquors.' Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360 (1926). The term 'intoxicated' is stronger than and includes the term 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor.' Taylor v. State, 46 So.2d 725 (Fla.1950). As used in this opinion, the term 'intoxicated' is identical to the degree of intoxication required in Section 860.01, Florida Statutes (1975), pertaining to automobile manslaughter. ¹⁰

Florida courts have recognized that an automobile on the highway is a dangerous instrumentality. ¹¹ Its dangerous propensities are heightened when operated by a person who is, by definition, incapable of exercising vigilance and caution.

Judicial attempts to protect Florida citizens from drunk driving dangers have paralleled like efforts in the Legislature. Our Legislature has enacted progressively more harsh criminal laws directed at drunkenness. ¹² Today it is illegal to drive an automobile in the State of Florida if blood alcohol content is .10% Or more, regardless of proof as to the driver's carelessness. ¹³ Drinking to the point of intoxication is a voluntary act. Driving in an intoxicated condition is an intentional act which creates known risks to the public. We believe that the potentiality of an adverse award of punitive damages is a suitable corollary to those criminal laws designed to discourage this reckless disregard for the public safety.

The decision of the district court is quashed and the trial court is directed to submit the issue of punitive damages to a jury.

OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

SUNDBERG, J., dissents with an opinion.

SUNDBERG, Justice (dissenting).

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. Today the majority has discarded literally hundreds of years of jurisprudence developed in the law of torts. Not only are the painstakingly developed concepts of 'simple negligence', 'gross negligence', 'culpable negligence', 'willful and wanton misconduct' spurned, but the bedrock concept of liability predicated on fault which has evolved carefully in the law of torts is dismissed. In cases where an accident involving an intoxicated driver is concerned, the injured party need only prove the accident, provide evidence of intoxication and, thereupon, the driver will be subject to assessment of punitive damages. This is strict liability, not only for compensatory damages, but for exemplary damages. The intoxicated driver becomes an insurer, to the full extent of punitive damages, irrespective of any showing that his conduct in the Operation of the automobile fell below that standard of care which is expected of a reasonable, prudent man under similar circumstances. To quote, '. . . we hold that juries may award punitive damages where voluntary intoxication is involved in an automotive accident in Florida Without regard to external proof of carelessness or abnormal driving . . .' (emphasis supplied).

This extraordinary position is justified by the assertion that the Legislature has enacted progressively harsher criminal penalties for drunken driving. Such a trend by the Legislature, as pointed out in footnote 12 to the opinion, is obvious. It is the Legislature's prerogative, even duty, to respond on behalf of the public in Florida to known dangers inherent in operating an automobile while intoxicated, through the enactment of penal laws. Notwithstanding the concept that punitive damages in tort law are premised upon the idea of punishment as an example to others, the guiding principle in this area of law always has been that liability should be predicated upon fault. In an active and vibrant society accidents are bound to occur. The philosophical decision was long ago made, and I believe rightly, that to make one the insurer of any injury to another caused by him would inhibit the development and progress of that society. (A sure way to do nothing wrong is to do nothing at all.) Hence, there developed the principle that one should respond in damages for injury to another only in those instances where his or her conduct fails to measure up to the conduct expected of a reasonable, prudent person acting under similar circumstances. True, this concept has been tempered over the years with the advent of workmen's compensation and like programs for the benefit of employees who enjoy a disparate bargaining and economic position and most recently, to a limited extent, in the instance of no-fault insurance laws. But in each instance this has been accomplished through acts of the Legislature.

The majority opinion extends the strict liabiliy concept to the recovery of punitive damages, but says that the traditional elements such as proximate causation and an underlying award of compensatory...