Ingram v. Rinehart

• Decision Date: 30 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. WD 61140.,WD 61140.
• Citation: 108 S.W.3d 783
• Parties: Renee M. INGRAM and Greg Ingram and Kelly C. Krohn and Matthew Krohn, Respondents, v. Michael P. RINEHART, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 783

108 S.W.3d 783

Renee M. INGRAM and Greg Ingram and Kelly C. Krohn and Matthew Krohn, Respondents, v. Michael P. RINEHART, Appellant.

No. WD 61140.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

June 30, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ryan Karaim, John Gerard Schultz, Kansas City, for Appellant.

Terry M. Evans, Smithville, Louis Carl Accurso, Kansas City, for Respondent.

RONALD R. HOLLIGER, Presiding Judge.

Renee Ingram and Kelly Krohn brought suit against appellant Michael Rinehart for serious injuries they sustained in an automobile accident. They also sought punitive damages against Rinehart due to his intoxication at the time of the accident. A third person riding in Rinehart's vehicle was also injured in the accident but was not involved in this litigation.

At a jury trial, Rinehart admitted to liability and in the amount of Ingram and Krohn's medical expenses and economic damages. Accordingly, the only issues left for the jury to resolve were the plaintiffs' non-economic damages and whether to award punitive damages against Rinehart. The jury returned substantial verdicts in favor of both Ingram and Krohn but denied their punitive damages claim.

Rinehart now appeals, raising several points. He first contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the jury to hear evidence regarding his affirmative defense of settlement. For his second and third points, Rinehart argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony and other evidence of his intoxication at the time of the accident, suggesting that such evidence was irrelevant because he admitted liability. His fourth point on appeal contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his request for a mistrial regarding certain testimony by Ingram, despite the fact that Rinehart failed to raise a timely objection to that testimony. For his fifth point, Rinehart contends that the trial court erred by refusing to exclude the testimony of one of plaintiffs' expert witnesses on grounds of surprise, arising from the fact that the expert undertook a brief examination of Krohn on the morning that medical expert was to testify at trial. Lastly, Rinehart argues that the trial court erred in excluding his testimony regarding the injuries he sustained in the accident.

Finding that the trial court committed no reversible error in the proceedings below, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Rinehart was covered by an insurance policy issued by Shelter Mutual Insurance Company that contained a personal injury liability limit of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per incident. When Ingram and Krohn filed suit, Rinehart filed a "Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement" alleging that a pre-suit settlement agreement had been reached by the parties. The plaintiffs responded to the motion and accompanying suggestions and affidavits. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order finding that there was no clear evidence that the parties had a settlement agreement and, therefore, denying the motion.

The present issue raised by Rinehart is error in refusing to permit evidence of the alleged settlement agreement before the jury to support his affirmative defense. Rinehart does not appeal the trial court's order denying the motion to enforce settlement. Ultimately, it was Rinehart's intent to submit the affirmative defense to the jury. The offer of proof made when the court sustained Ingram and Krohn's objection was the same set of affidavits that was attached to the Motion to Enforce Settlement. The legal file prepared by the parties does not contain the original answer to the petition by Rinehart, although we infer from subsequent events that it did not include a defense of settlement. An amended answer was filed during the trial asserting affirmative defenses of "release, acceptance, payment and settlement" and that, based on those defenses, the action should be dismissed. The plaintiffs raised no objection to the late filing of the answer, and the timeliness of its presentation plays no role in our disposition.

The parties' arguments concerning the alleged settlement agreement revolve around a series of letters and phone conversations between Shelter's claims representative and counsel for plaintiffs Krohn and Ingram. Rinehart claims that Ingram and Krohn agreed to settle the two claims for $66,667.67 (two-thirds of the policy limits). Ingram and Krohn denied that there was any final settlement agreement. The verdicts at trial were substantially in excess of the policy limits.

On January 28, 1999, counsel for Krohn wrote Shelter, making a settlement demand of $50,000. Shelter's claim department replied, in a letter dated February 15, 1999, that they would be willing to settle all claims for the policy limits, provided all parties agreed on the division of that amount.

According to the affidavit of Charles Nitz, Shelter's claims representative, he claims to have had a conversation with Krohn's counsel on May 3, 1999, in which counsel advised that Krohn and Ingram would be willing to settle their claims for two-thirds of the policy limits. On May 4, 1999, Krohn's counsel (who was also representing Ingram at this point) sent another letter, which stated, in part: "I understand you are looking into obtaining authority to settle Renee [Ingram] and [Kelly Krohn's] claims for two-thirds of the policy limits. Once you notify us of that fact, we will contact the medical care providers with respect to their liens." Rinehart contends that this letter was written to confirm the May 3 telephone conversation.

Krohn and Ingram's counsel sent another letter to Shelter on June 17, 1999, in which he reiterated the $50,000 demand on behalf of Krohn and made a new demand on behalf of Ingram for $50,000. It appears that this demand was sent to trigger the prejudgment interest provisions of Section 408.040, RSMo. The Nitz affidavit also states that he spoke with Krohn and Ingram's counsel on July 14, 1999, at which time Nitz was advised that the plaintiffs were still willing to settle for two-thirds of the policy limits. The affidavit further states that he sent a letter on August 3, 1999, accepting that offer. That letter, however, stated (emphasis added):

We are now in a position to make an offer of two-thirds of our policy limits on your two above clients. Our policy limits, as I have previously discussed with you, are 50,000/100,000 policy limits. Two-thirds of this coverage is $66,666.67. We will be willing to make that offer at this time for a full and final release of all parties, including waivers of subrogation on the under insured motorist claims and hospital liens. As soon as you can make arrangements for those waivers and liens, please contact me regarding how you want me to proceed or any help you need with getting those waivers on subrogation and hospital liens.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding Krohn $876,468.51 in compensatory damages and awarding Ingram $2,961,192.55 in compensatory damages. The jury, however, did not award punitive damages against Rinehart. The trial court entered its judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict. Rinehart now appeals.

Exclusion of Evidence of the Alleged Settlement

In the first of six points on appeal, Rinehart contends that the trial court erred in excluding all evidence of the settlement agreement allegedly reached between Shelter and plaintiffs' counsel. He argues that such evidence was relevant to his affirmative defense of settlement. Krohn and Ingram respond that the question was not a jury issue and that the issue was resolved through the trial court's ruling on Rinehart's motion to enforce settlement agreement.

Trial courts are vested with broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence. Tennison v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Mo. App.1992). Generally, we will find error and reverse the trial court only upon a showing that the trial court abused that discretion. Egelhoff v. Holt, 875 S.W.2d 543, 549-50 (Mo. banc 1994). The excluded evidence would certainly be relevant for the jury to hear if Rinehart's affirmative defense was properly a jury issue as Rinehart claims. Ingram and Krohn argue, however, that whether a settlement had been reached was purely an issue for the court.

Rinehart's position implicitly seems to assume that an affirmative defense based on disputed facts is, necessarily, an issue for the jury. That conclusion is too broad. Affirmative defenses may be legal or equitable and may be joined together in one answer. See Rule 55.10. Rinehart cites only Tinucci v. R.V. Evans Co., 989 S.W.2d 181 (Mo.App. E.D.1998) in support of this point on appeal. There, the court reversed a summary judgment concerning a settlement agreement holding that "Where the evidence regarding a contract is conflicting or is capable of more than one inference, the question raised is one of fact for the trier of fact to determine." Id. at 184. Rinehart's mistake in extrapolating this statement to equate "trier of fact" with a jury is oversimplistic and ignores both the nature of the proceeding and the context of the appeal in Tinucci. The question of whether there was a fact issue was important because Tinucci involved a grant of summary judgment. More importantly, Rinehart ignores that Tinucci was a suit in equity for specific performance of a settlement agreement. Id. at 182. Tinucci stands for the proposition that even in an action in equity, the presence of a disputed issue of fact precludes issuance of a summary judgment, and the case must proceed to a trial on the merits under Rule 73.01 with the equity court acting as the trier of fact to resolve the dispute. It does not stand, as urged by Rinehart, for the proposition that the defense of settlement is, necessarily and always, an issue fact for the jury.

Ingram and Krohn point out that an agreement to settle a lawsuit may be enforced by motion, citing Leffler...