Ingram v. State

• Decision Date: 24 August 2012
• Docket Number: CR–10–0485.
• Citation: 103 So.3d 86
• Parties: Robert Shawn INGRAM v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

103 So.3d 86

Robert Shawn INGRAM

v.STATE of Alabama.

CR–10–0485.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 24, 2012.

Richard Stephen Jaffe, Birmingham; and John H. Blume, Ithaca, New York, for appellant.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Beth Jackson Hughes, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

KELLUM, Judge.

Robert Shawn Ingram appeals the circuit court's summary dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief.

In 1995, Ingram was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during the course of a kidnapping in the first degree or an attempt thereof, see § 13A–5–40(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. By a vote of 11–1, the jury recommended that Ingram be sentenced to death for his conviction. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Ingram to death. This Court affirmed Ingram's conviction and sentence on appeal, Ingram v. State, 779 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (“Ingram I ”), and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed this Court's judgment. Ex parte Ingram, 779 So.2d 1283 (Ala.2000) (“Ingram II ”). This Court issued a certificate of judgment on September 26, 2000. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on February 26, 2001. Ingram v. Alabama, 531 U.S. 1193, 121 S.Ct. 1194, 149 L.Ed.2d 109 (2001).

On February 1, 2002, Ingram filed a Rule 32 petition challenging his conviction and sentence on numerous grounds. In his prayer for relief, Ingram requested, among other things, that he be allowed discovery, that he be provided funds for expert and investigative expenses, and that he be permitted time to amend his petition. He also filed a separate motion for permission to proceed ex parte on any request for funds. On March 18, 2002, the State filed an answer and a motion for a partial summary dismissal. On April 18, 2002, Ingram filed an amended petition (hereinafter “first amended petition”), in which he reasserted the same claims raised in his original petition, raised an additional claim, and again requested that he be allowed discovery, that he be provided funds for expert and investigative expenses, and that he be permitted time to further amend his petition. The State filed an answer and a motion for the summary dismissal of the first amended petition on July 26, 2002. On June 8, 2004, the circuit court adopted verbatim a proposed order that had been submitted by the State on May 20, 2004, summarily dismissing the first amended petition in its entirety. Ingram filed a notice of appeal on July 16, 2004. This Court affirmed the summary dismissal on appeal. Ingram v. State, 51 So.3d 1094 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (“Ingram III ”).

Ingram petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review; that Court granted his petition and reversed this Court's judgment. Ex parte Ingram, 51 So.3d 1119 (Ala.2010) (“Ingram IV ”). Noting that the circuit judge who ruled on Ingram's Rule 32 petition was not the judge who had presided over Ingram's trial, the Supreme Court determined that the circuit court's wholesale adoption of the State's proposed order constituted reversible error because the order contained patently erroneous statements, including statements that the circuit judge ruling on the petition had presided over Ingram's trial, which he had not; that the circuit judge had personally observed the performance of Ingram's trial counsel, which he had not; and that the circuit judge was basing his decision, in part, on events within his own personal knowledge of the trial of the case, of which he had no knowledge. Recognizing the general rule “that, where a trial court does in fact adopt [a] proposed order as its own, deference is owed to that order in the same measure as any other order of the trial court,” the Supreme Court found that the “unusual” circumstances of the case rendered the general rule inapplicable. Ingram IV, 51 So.3d at 1122–23. The Supreme Court then held that “the nature of the errors present in the June 8 order ... undermines any confidence that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are the product of the trial judge's independent judgment and that the June 8 order reflects the findings and conclusions of that judge.” 51 So.3d at 1125.

Because “[i]t is axiomatic that an order granting or denying relief under Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., must be an order of the trial court ... [i.e.,] must be a manifestation of the findings and conclusions of the court,” Ingram IV, 51 So.3d at 1122, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed this Court's affirmance of the circuit court's summary dismissal of Ingram's first amended petition and remanded the case to this Court for us “to remand it to the trial court to consider Ingram's pending motions and his [first amended] Rule 32 petition.” 51 So.3d at 1125. On remand from the Alabama Supreme Court, this Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case “for proceedings that are consistent with the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion.” Ingram v. State, 51 So.3d 1126, 1126 (Ala.Crim.App.2010) (“Ingram V ”). This Court issued a certificate of judgment on May 28, 2010.

After remand, the circuit court scheduled a status conference for July 19, 2010. Ingram's counsel filed a motion to continue, and the circuit court continued the conference to October 15, 2010. On October 7, 2010, the State filed a proposed order summarily dismissing Ingram's first amended petition, denying his requests for discovery and funds, and denying his motion for permission to proceed ex parte on requests for funds. The circuit court conducted the status conference on October 15, 2010. At the conference, Ingram's counsel indicated that she wanted to file a second amended petition and that she needed time to conduct discovery. Counsel then indicated that the second amended petition had already been drafted and that, if the circuit court denied her time to conduct discovery, she would file the second amended petition “now.” (R. 12.) The State objected to any amendments to the petition, arguing that allowing Ingram to file a second amended petition would be outside the scope of the Alabama Supreme Court's remand instructions and would violate Rule 32.7(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., which permits amendments only “prior to the entry of judgment,” because judgment on Ingram's first amended petition had been entered on June 8, 2004. Ingram argued, on the other hand, that the June 8, 2004, judgment on the first amended petition had been reversed and, thus, that an amendment would be permissible regardless of any instructions. The circuit court requested that the parties submit briefs on the issue whether the court had the authority to allow Ingram to file a second amended petition. After further discussion, Ingram's counsel then indicated that she had not received the State's October 7, 2010, proposed order until the day of the status conference and asked if the court wanted a response to the proposed order. The court indicated that it “would be premature” for Ingram's counsel to respond to the proposed order or to submit any additional filings, presumably including a second amended petition, until the court determined whether it had the authority to permit Ingram to file an amended petition. (R. 21.)

On October 28, 2010, the State filed a brief with the circuit court, reiterating the arguments it had made at the status conference. On November 19, 2010, Ingram's counsel filed a reply to the State's October 28, 2010, brief, also reiterating the arguments she had made at the status conference. On December 1, 2010, the circuit court adopted the proposed order submitted by the State summarily dismissing Ingram's first amended petition in its entirety and denying all of Ingram's pending motions, including Ingram's request to file a second amended petition. In denying Ingram's request to file a second amended petition, the circuit court specifically found that it had no authority on remand to allow Ingram to file a second amended petition because to do so would be beyond the scope of the Alabama Supreme Court's remand instructions and because Rule 32.7(b) prohibits amendments to petitions after entry of judgment and judgment had been entered on Ingram's first amended petition on June 8, 2004. Ingram filed a timely motion to reconsider on December 21, 2010, arguing, among other things, that the circuit court erred in finding that it had no authority to allow him to file a second amended petition. With the motion to reconsider, Ingram also filed his second amended petition. The motion to reconsider was denied by operation of law 30 days after the circuit court's December 1, 2010, summary dismissal, or on January 3, 2011.¹ See Loggins v. State, 910 So.2d 146 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (recognizing motion to reconsider as a valid postjudgment motion in the context of a Rule 32 petition, but noting that such a motion does not extend the circuit court's jurisdiction beyond 30 days after the denial or dismissal of the Rule 32 petition). Ingram filed a timely notice of appeal on January 3, 2011.

On appeal, Ingram raises numerous issues. However, because of our disposition of this case, we need address only one. Ingram contends that the circuit court erred in denying his request to file a second amended petition. He reiterates the arguments he made to the circuit court, both in his brief and in his motion to reconsider the summary dismissal of his first amended petition, that the court had the authority to allow the amendment after the June 8, 2004, order summarily dismissing his first amended petition had been reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Ingram relies on the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Apicella, 87 So.3d 1150 (Ala.2011), to support his arguments. Based on Ex parte Apicella, Ingram concludes, the circuit court erred in finding that it had no authority to allow Ingram to file a second amended petition.

The State does not specifically address Ingram's arguments on appeal. Indeed, the State...