Ingram v. State
| Decision Date | 20 May 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 1--873A152,1--873A152 |
| Citation | 160 Ind.App. 188,310 N.E.2d 903 |
| Parties | Leslie Allen INGRAM, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Robert F. Wisehart, Wisehart & Wisehart, Middletown, for defendant-appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Glenn A. Grampp, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant-appellant Ingram brings this appeal from an order of the Henry Superior Court, sitting as a juvenile court, waiving juvenile jurisdiction over Ingram to the criminal court. We reverse for the reason that the juvenile court failed to obtain original jurisdiction over ingram.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Summers v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320, examined the procedural steps necessary before juvenile jurisdiction can be waived to the criminal court. The initial requirement is that jurisdiction over the juvenile be obtained by the juvenile court, for without that the juvenile court has nothing to waive. The Summers court stated:
'Jurisdiction shall be obtained in the following manner.
'A person subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under this action may be brought before it by either of the following means and no other:
(a) By petition praying that the person be adjudged delinquent * * *.' Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9--3207 (1966 Supp.)
The steps necessary to the juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction are set forth as follows:
Ind.Ann.Stat. § 9--3208 (1966 Supp.)
It has been held that § 9--3208, supra, is implementive of § 9--3207, supra, and that it was the intent of the legislature in such cases that if the judge of the juvenile court believed that formal jurisdiction should be acquired, the judge should authorize a petition to be filed.' 248 Ind. at 556, 230 N.E.2d at 323.
The court went on to say that original jurisdiction could only be obtained in the manner set forth above.
In the instant case the required preliminary hearing was held to determine whether a petition should be filed. The trial judge at that hearing stated that the affidavit signed by the Indiana State Trooper set out sufficient facts to justify the filing of a petition for delinquency. This affidavit merely specified the offense and the circumstances surrounding it. The Juvenile Act, however, at IC 1971, 31--5--7--8 (Burns Code Ed.), section 9--3208 in the above quote, makes it clear that evidence of the circumstances of an offense is only one of the factors to be considered by the court in determining whether formal jurisdiction should be acquired. In addition thereto, the...
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Murphy v. State
...N.E.2d 729, the cause was reversed because no preliminary hearing was held prior to the filing of the petition. In Ingram v. State, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 188, 310 N.E.2d 903, the cause was reversed because the court, in its preliminary hearing, relied solely upon the affidavit of a state troo......
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...hand, we also recognize that two cases have applied this portion of the statute as a jurisdictional requirement. See Ingram v. State (1974), 160 Ind.App. 188, 310 N.E.2d 903; Seay v. State (1975), Ind.App., 337 N.E.2d 489, Reh. denied Ind.App. 340 N.E.2d 369. The record before us does not c......