Ingram v. White Settlement, No. 2-07-306-CV (Tex. App. 5/1/2008)
| Decision Date | 01 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-07-306-CV.,2-07-306-CV. |
| Parties | PAMELA INGRAM, Appellant, v. WHITE SETTLEMENT, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 67th District Court of Tarrant County.
Panel B: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MCCOY, JJ.
In two issues, Appellant Pamela Ingram ("Ingram") argues that the trial court erred (1) by granting a directed verdict in favor of Appellee White Settlement Independent School District ("WSISD") and (2) by granting WSISD's pretrial plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm.
Ingram was employed for sixteen years at WSISD's central office until June 21, 2004. There is a dispute as to why she was let go. WSISD told Ingram she was terminated due to central office restructuring. However, Ingram was the only employee let go and, therefore, believed it was due to her medical condition.
WSISD contended that Ingram chose to ignore the real reason she was let go. In the summer of 2004, Ingram's supervisor, Mr. Welch, became the executive director of a multimillion dollar ($172 million) bond program. Neither Mr. Welch, nor the superintendent of WSISD, Susan Simpson, thought Ingram had the necessary skills to assist Mr. Welch in this new program; therefore, she was let go. Ingram agreed that the duties of Mr. Welch's new secretary after the restructuring were "different" than her duties and that WSISD's reason for termination was a valid one, if that was what happened.
However, Ingram alleged that she was terminated due to a prolonged medical condition. Ingram claimed that she was attacked verbally for taking time off and that her supervisor became increasingly "hostile" toward her. Furthermore, Ingram stated that on the day she was terminated her supervisor told her "now she could go home and take care of her health." She also asserted that in her post-termination interview, she was told that WSISD terminated her for "missing too much time" and for performing personal business on company time.
Ingram's pertinent medical problems began in December 2002, when she began having medical problems that were eventually diagnosed as arthritis. Over the next year and a half, she saw four doctors, underwent numerous tests, had two MRI's, received a series of epidural injections in her back, took different medications (including steroid injections), and was prescribed ten weeks of physical therapy. During 2003, she had to take time off for her numerous doctor visits, and she would occasionally take an extended lunch break, arrive late, or leave early due to the pain and medication regimen.
Ingram described her condition as a severe burning pain that radiated in her shoulder and arm causing numbness in her hip. Both she and her husband testified that the pain prevented her from performing normal household duties. Furthermore, Ingram contends that she was absent during the workday "for minutes to an hour" because she was incapacitated by her condition or for treatment. However, WSISD asserted that Ingram told her doctor in May 2003 that she could do a number of things with little or no difficulty, including performing her job, jogging two miles, and participating in sports. Although she was involved in a ten-week therapy course in September 2003, some nine months before she was let go, her condition had improved by about 25% at the time of her termination.
Ingram stated that she only used four and a half days of sick leave in 2003 and that she used her accumulated comp time or made up the work for any other time missed. WSISD stated that she was not absent from work much, and in 2004, her absences decreased; in fact she used only three and a half days of vacation time, comp time, or both.
After being terminated, Ingram filed a grievance under WSISD's grievance policy alleging unlawful termination due to age discrimination, violation of her right to sick leave granted by State law, and violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). She appealed to the Board of Trustees where her grievances were eventually denied. In 2006, Ingram brought suit under four separate claims; only two of which are on appeal. Ingram alleged in one of her causes of action that WSISD had failed to notify her of her right to take intermittent leave under the FMLA (the interference claim), in response to which WSISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Ingram's interference claim, holding in its March 5, 2007 order that Ingram had "failed to exhaust her administrative remedies against" WSISD and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The remaining causes of action were tried, but the trial court granted a directed verdict as to her remaining claims, including her retaliation allegation under the FMLA (the protection claim). Specifically, WSISD moved for a directed verdict on this claim on two grounds, the first of which being that there was "no evidence that the plaintiff had a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of her position." The trial court granted the directed verdict, apparently on that ground, stating as follows:
There is no FMLA violation under the facts of the case. At no time has there been any evidence that she had an inability to work due to a serious health condition. . . . It's got to be due to that serious health condition. Just because they take off, I don't disagree that she took. I don't disagree with that at all. But at no time, in fact, the evidence is opposite even from her own mouth that she was able at all times to work. And in all the other cases that are cited, people couldn't work because of the disabilities. They couldn't work because of whatever condition. In this situation, she stated, I, at all times, could work. She took off for physical therapy but she said I can work. And because of that, there was no FMLA. The FMLA doesn't apply. There is no leave. Therefore, I grant the directed verdict. And with that, this case is now complete.
This appeal followed only as to the FMLA interference and retaliation claims.
In her first issue, Ingram complains that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on her FMLA protection claim based on the idea that she had no period of incapacity. This claim involved her assertion of retaliation by WSISD against her for invoking her FMLA rights.
A directed verdict is proper only under limited circumstances: (1) when the evidence conclusively establishes the right of the movant to judgment or negates the right of the opponent or (2) when the evidence is insufficient to raise a material fact issue. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000); Ray v. McFarland, 97 S.W.3d 728, 729-30 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). In reviewing a directed verdict, we must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).
If the question to be decided is whether the losing party at trial raised a material fact issue, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict was instructed and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences; we give the losing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences created by the evidence. Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 234 (Tex. 2004). If we determine that any conflicting evidence of probative value raises a material fact issue on any theory of recovery, then the directed verdict is improper because such an issue is for the jury to resolve. Szczepanik v. First S. Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1994).
The motion must specifically state what grounds merit the directed verdict. TEX. R. CIV. P. 268. However, the failure to specify a ground in the motion is not fatal if there are no fact issues raised by the evidence and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, L.L.P., 97 S.W.3d 179, 195 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Page, 553 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Tex. 1977)). We can consider any reason the directed verdict should have been granted, even if not stated in the party's motion. Ibarra v. Nat'l Constr. Rentals, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.). We must affirm a directed verdict even though the trial court's rationale was erroneous if the directed verdict can be supported on another basis. Cano v. N. Tex. Nephrology Assocs., P.A., 99 S.W.3d 330, 339 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
In cases such as this, the initial burden is on Ingram to provide evidence of each element of her retaliation claim. The elements of an FMLA retaliation claim are that the employee availed herself of an FMLA protected right, that she was adversely affected by an employment decision, and that there was a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse employment action. Boriski v. City of College Station, 65 F. Supp. 2d 493, 502 (S.D. Tex. 1999); see also Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999); Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 161 (1st Cir. 1998). Next, WSISD must demonstrate a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for its employment action against Ingram. See Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 320. Assuming the second step has been met, Ingram must then show that the reason offered by WSISD was a mere pretext for the prohibited retaliation adverse employment action. See id.; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747-48 (1993) (...
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