Inhabitants of Leeds v. Me. Crushed Rock & Gravel Co.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1928
• Citation: 141 A. 73
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF LEEDS v. MAINE CRUSHED ROCK & GRAVEL CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

141 A. 73

INHABITANTS OF LEEDS

v. MAINE CRUSHED ROCK & GRAVEL CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 8, 1928.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Androscoggin County, at Law.

Action by the Inhabitants of Leeds against the Maine Crushed Rock & Gravel Company. On exceptions to ruling of the presiding justice that the action could not be maintained. Exceptions overruled.

Argued before WILSON, C. J., and PHILBROOK, DUNN, BARNES, BASSETT, and PATTANGALL, JJ.

Tascus Atwood, of Auburn, for plaintiff.

Frederick J. Laughlin, of Portland, and Harry Manser, of Auburn, for defendant.

BASSETT, J. Action of debt by tax collector of the town of Leeds to collect a tax assessed on personal property described as "machinery" and employed by the defendant, a Maine corporation located at and with its principal place of business at Portland, in its gravel and sand pit in the town of Leeds. Case comes up on exceptions to the ruling of the presiding justice that the action could not be maintained.

It is admitted that the usual statutory requirements for assessing a tax and bringing a suit were complied with. The only question is, Was the property taxable in Leeds?

The "machinery" included these chattels, a steam shovel, narrow gauge locomotive, two stone crushers, two conveyers, six dump carts, hoist and attachments, screen and attachments, dynamos, and one Ford ton truck. The process of getting out sand and gravel is this. The material is excavated in the pit by the steam shovel, loaded into small yard cars, hauled to a hopper, from which it is taken up by a small car and dumped on a grating, where rocks exceeding 2 1/2 inches in size are projected to a crusher. This "oversize," as it is called, is there crushed to 2 1/2 inches, and, upon an occasional order for stock smaller than that, there is recrushing to the smaller size. Not over 25 per cent, of all the rock material excavated is crushed. The remainder passes through the screen into bins, into which the crushed rock is also conveyed, and thence is passed into railroad cars of the Maine Central Railroad on a spur track connecting with the main line and shipped to customers on orders received at the Portland office. The sand excavated is screened, washed, and finally loaded into Maine Central cars and shipped on similar orders to destination.

The general provision of the statute for the taxation of personal property is that it "shall be assessed to the owner in the town where he is an inhabitant on the first day of each April." R. S. 1916, c. 10, § 13, as amended by chapter 82 of the Public Laws of 1919.

Section 14, which follows, provides certain exceptions, among which are:

"I. All personal property employed in trade, in the erection of buildings or vessels, or in the mechanic arts, shall be taxed in the town where so employed on the first day of each April; provided, that the owner, his servant, subcontractor or agent, so employing it, occupies any store, storehouse, shop, mill, wharf, landing place or shipyard therein for the purpose of such employment."

"III. Machinery employed in any branch of manufacture, goods manufactured or unmanufactured, and real estate belonging to any corporation, except when otherwise expressly provided, shall be assessed to such corporation in the town or place where they are situated or employed."

The plaintiff claimed that the chattels were taxable under paragraph III as "machinery employed in any branch of manufacture," and under paragraph I as "personal property employed in trade" by an owner who occupied a "landing place." The presiding justice ruled they were not taxable under III nor under I, "the assessment being specifically upon this machinery."

We think the chattels were not taxable under either paragraph.

Arguments of counsel and the ruling of the presiding justice were first and chiefly concerned to determine whether the property came within the description of paragraph III and secondarily within the description of paragraph I.

This case does not raise the question, which one of two towns has the right to tax under one or the other paragraph (Inhabitants of Boothbay v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 109 Me. 236, 83 A. 663), but whether a given town had any right to tax at all under either paragraph. Two towns might contend for the right to tax property which might be within the description of more than one paragraph. The proper way to determine under which paragraph of the enumerated exceptions property is to be taxed was set forth by the court in Boothbay v. Du Pont de Nemours Co., supra, as follows:

"It was the intention of the Legislature to provide by the enumerated cases in section 13 [section 14 of present statutes] for the taxation of personal property not taxable under section 12 [section 13 of present statutes]. To determine under which paragraph of the enumerated cases in section 13 property shall be taxed, it should be ascertained if the property, its condition, and situation are such as are described in paragraph I of said section. If not, are they such as are described in paragraph II, and so on until the property is described in one of the paragraphs of section 13? When it is included within one of the paragraphs of section 13, it is taxable as therein stated, and all similar property similarly situated must be taxed under that paragraph, and cannot be taxed under any other. It being the intention of the Legislature by each paragraph to provide for the taxation of the property therein mentioned, it follows that, when the property is included within the cases mentioned in one of the paragraphs, it shall be taxed under that section and cannot be taxed under any other."

We therefore turn first to paragraph I.

The word "machinery," which is expressly found in paragraph III, does not determine that the property was assessed under that paragraph. Machinery may be actually articles of "trade" of the owner. It was "personal property" as appears here.

But the chattels were not "employed in trade." The property taxed here was not the stone and gravel which was sold, but machinery for putting it into condition to be sold. If it could be said that the machinery thereby was "employed in trade," it would not be, under paragraph I, as regards taxation, in any different position from the sand and gravel. Our court has repeatedly held (Inhabitants of New Limerick v. Watson, 98 Me. 379, 57 A. 79; McCann v. Inhabitants of Town of Minot, 107 Me. 393, 78 A. 465; Morton v. Wilson, 115 Me. 70, 97 A. 219; Machias Lumber Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Machias, 122 Me. 304, 119 A. 805) that employment in trade under this pargraph means trade in the town where it is when prepared for market. Where the evidence, as here, does not disclose any local market or any intent or expectation to sell locally, and that the things, when prepared for market, are to be sold, not where prepared, but in the town where the owner's main business is located, the property is not "employed in trade" in the town where it is when prepared.

It is not necessary to decide whether these chattels were employed "in the mechanic arts" for, if they were, the owner did not occupy any "mill" or "landing place" in Leeds within the...