Inhabitants of Millis v. Frink
| Decision Date | 28 January 1913 |
| Citation | 213 Mass. 350,100 N.E. 626 |
| Parties | INHABITANTS OF MILLIS v. FRINK. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H. T. Richardson, of Boston, for plaintiff.
Daniel B. Beard, of Boston, and Geo. T. Perry, of Somerville, for defendant.
When this case came on for trial the plaintiff and defendants rested on the auditor's report. The presiding justice ordered a verdict for the defendant, to which ruling the plaintiff town took an exception. Certain rulings were asked for by the plaintiff, and these were refused and an exception to that was taken. The case is here on a report under a stipulation that if the ruling directing a verdict was right judgment should be entered thereon.
The facts, found by the auditor, on which the case was submitted were in substance as follows: The action was brought under R L. c. 81, § 9, to recover from the defendant as a pauper expenses incurred by it for her support during the 6 years from 1905 to 1910, inclusive. During that time the defendant owned a small house worth (so the auditor found) 'probably much less than $1,000,' and mortgaged for $450. In this house she lived with her husband, a son and grandson, who was a minor. The defendant during the six years in question was quite feeble and unable to do any work other than light housework, 'and was ill more or less.' Her husband during the 6 years was 'in feeble health both mentally and physically,' 'was ill more or less, and part of the time was obliged to have a nurse.' The son, 'now' (i. e., in December, 1911) 32 or 33 years of age, 'is feeble-minded.' He worked during the 6 years when he could secure employment and that was about half the time, and when he earned enough he paid his mother for his board. How much he paid and when, the auditor was not able to determine. The grandson 'during the early part of the time' was in school and did not earn anything. 'For the past 3 or 4 years' he has been at work 'and has paid the defendant board.' How much was so paid the auditor could not determine. During the 6 years the overseers of the poor of the plaintiff town had standing orders, one with a grocer and the other with a milkman, to supply 'the Frink family' with groceries to an amount not exceeding $2 a week and a quart of milk a day; in addition, when the family was found to be in need of wood or coal, an order was given to furnish them with as much as was necessary. These supplies amounted to $815.03. In addition to the supplies thus furnished by the overseers of the plaintiff town, other supplies consisting of meat, milk, wood and coal were bought by the defendant and paid for by her with money received from her son and grandson. All the supplies furnished by the overseers amounting, as already stated, to $815.03, were charged to the defendant's husband. The plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant one-fourth of these supplies on the assumption that she ate and used one-fourth of them.
In addition to the defendant's share of these supplies the plaintiff sought to recover one-fourth of the two following sums: (1) Ten dollars furnished the defendant to pay the interest on her mortgage in the year 1905; (2) $59.33, which without solicitation on her part the overseers of the poor expended in paying the taxes on the defendant's house during the four years (1906-1909, inclusive), and in addition the whole of the sum of $5.63, paid in 1910 for an insurance policy on the defendant's house. The auditor found that the taxes were paid by the overseers without the defendant's knowledge, and were paid by them 'because in their opinion it was cheaper for the board to pay the taxes assessed on the defendant's real estate than to have the estate sold and the overseers of the poor then be obliged to procure board for the defendant and the rest of the household elsewhere.' Similar findings were made as to their payment of mortgage interest and of the insurance premium.
The defendant's husband died in August, 1910, and within a reasonable time thereafter the defendant paid the grocer for supplies which she bought after that date, and notified the town that she did not wish to receive any further supplies from it. The auditor found that during the period covered by this action the defendant was a pauper, but that since her husband's death she has not been and is not now a pauper.
R. L c. 81, § 9, under which this...
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