Inhabitants of Palmer v. Inhabitants of Hampden

• Decision Date: 10 January 1903
• Citation: 182 Mass. 511,65 N.E. 817
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF PALMER v. INHABITANTS OF HAMPDEN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

182 Mass. 511

65 N.E. 817

INHABITANTS OF PALMER v. INHABITANTS OF HAMPDEN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

January 10, 1903

COUNSEL

T. W. Kenefick and E. E. Hobson, for plaintiff.

D. E Webster and C. S. Ballard, for defendant.

OPINION

LATHROP, J.

1. The first point presented is whether at the time of the relief furnished to the pauper she had her settlement in the town of Hampden. It is admitted that in April, 1894, she had a settlement in that town. This settlement, by force of the statute (Pub. St. c. 83, § 5), continued until she acquired a new settlement elsewhere in this state. The question then is whether, on the evidence, the judge was warranted in finding that no other settlement had been acquired by her. The pauper left Hampden in April, 1894, and went to Palmer, intending to make that place her home in the future, with Mrs. Shaw, a cousin. After going to Mrs. Shaw's, she made visits and worked in other towns. About Thanksgiving, 1897, Mrs. Shaw leased her house in Palmer, and bought a farm in Brimfield and moved upon it with her husband and family, with the intention of living there the rest of her life; but, after residing eight or nine months in Brimfield, Mrs. Shaw returned to Palmer to reside. The pauper testified that when she learned of Mrs. Shaw's purpose to leave Palmer she was working in Hampden, and she went to Mrs. Shaw's and got what things she wanted to keep, and told Mrs. Shaw she could burn the rest; that when Mrs. Shaw moved to Brimfield she, the pauper, never expected to go back to Palmer, though that seemed more like home to her than any other town. While Mrs. Shaw was in Brimfield, the pauper worked in Hampden and in Monson. In January, 1900, while working in Hampden, she became ill, and went to Mrs. Shaw's in Palmer, where she has since resided, being unable to work; and since October, 1900, the pauper has been aided by Palmer to the extent of $2 a week, paid to Mrs. Shaw for her board and care. While the judge made the first finding of fact in favor of the plaintiff, he declined to make other findings asked for by the plaintiff; but he made further findings of fact which we have in substance set forth, and also found that the pauper never gained a settlement in Palmer; and found for the plaintiff. We are of opinion that, so far as the question of settlement is concerned, we cannot say that the judge was wrong. Settlements may be acquired in various ways, as pointed out in Pub. St. c. 83, § 1. The only provision which has any bearing upon this case is clause 6 of this section, which provides: 'Any woman of the age of twenty-one years, who resides in any place within this state for five years together shall thereby gain a settlement in such place.'

It is urged, however, that the word 'resides' in the clause under consideration is equivalent to having a domicile, and that the first finding of the judge is equivalent to a finding that the pauper acquired a domicile in Palmer. Stoughton v. City of Cambridge, 165 Mass. 251, 43 N.E 106. And the argument is that, having once acquired a domicile there, she retained it until she acquired one elsewhere. The defendant asked the judge 'to find as a fact that when Mary A. Walker removed from Hampden to the town of Palmer it was with the intention of making Palmer her home in the future, and that she continued to regard the town of Palmer as her home.' The judge made this finding, and this is the basis of the argument above stated. But the judge also found specially that, when Mrs. Shaw removed from Palmer, the pauper, who was then employed in Hampden, 'took from the house of Mrs. Shaw, in Palmer, all the belongings which she cared to save, to the place of her employment in Hampden, having no intention of ever again making her home in Palmer.' These two findings of fact must be taken together, and they are not irreconcilable. To regard a place as a home after one has left it and removed all her belongings, is not equivalent to having no intention 'of ever again making her home there.' But, even if the pauper intended when she left Palmer to return at some indefinite time, this would not be enough to retain her domicile in Palmer. What constitutes domicile is mainly a question of fact, and the element of intention enters into it. Olivieri v. Atkinson, 168 Mass. 28, 46 N.E. 422. Mere intention, without proof of other facts with which such intention can be connected, is not enough. Holmes v. Greene, 7 Gray, 299. So, to acquire a new domicile, it is not necessary for a person to reside in a...