Inhabitants of Rockport v. Inhabitants of Searsmont

• Decision Date: 19 March 1906
• Citation: 101 Me. 257,63 A. 820
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF ROCKPORT v. INHABITANTS OF SEARSMONT.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

63 A. 820

101 Me. 257

INHABITANTS OF ROCKPORT v. INHABITANTS OF SEARSMONT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 19, 1906.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County.

Action by the inhabitants of Rockport against the inhabitants of Searsmont. The case was reported to the law court on a stipulation. Case to stand for trial.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and EMERY, WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, POWERS, and SPEAR, JJ.

Arthur S. Littlefield, for plaintiff. R. F. Dunton and Joseph E. Moore, for defendant.

SPEAR, J. This case comes up on report and involves the collection of expenses incurred by the town committing, against the town of pauper settlement, for the commitment of Grace E. Farnham to the Insane Hospital at Augusta and for support therein. It is not in controversy that the town of Rockport undertook to commit Grace E. Farnham to the hospital, and that the town of Searsmont is the place of her pauper settlement. Whether the plaintiff town succeeded so as to legally charge the defendant town with the expenses of commitment and support thereafter, to the date of the writ, is the first question in issue. The case shows that Grace E. Farnham was originally committed to the hospital by a certificate of commitment certified by the selectmen and attested by the town clerk on the 20th day of January, 1904; and that a regular pauper notice dated January 25, 1904, and a notice of commitment to the hospital dated January 28, 1904, specifying an expenditure of $120.43, were respectively sent by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and admitted to have been duly received and denials returned.

But, nearly a year after the commitment, the superintendent of the Maine Insane Hospital, having discovered or suspected an irregularity in the proceedings, thereupon, in accordance with sections 39 and 40, Rev. St. c. 144, made application to the municipal judge of the city of Augusta for an inquiry with respect to the legality of said commitment. After due notice and hearing upon this application, on the 14th day of January, 1905, the municipal judge issued his certificate recommitting said Grace E. Farnham to the hospital. No question is raised as to the legality of the proceedings involved in the recommitment. On the 27th day of February, 1905, the plaintiff town again notified the defendant town of the recommitment of Grace E. Farnham, and it is admitted that the notice was received and a denial returned. The defendant town further says in the report that, if competent to be proved, it is admitted "that no physician appeared and testified before the municipal officers, in regard to the insanity of Grace E. Farnham; that Grace E. Farnham at the time of the commitment, and for a longer or shorter period thereto, was living in the town of Rockport. The record erroneously states that the physicians did appear as required, before the municipal officers.

In view of the first part of the above admission, it requires but little discussion to establish the illegality of the original commitment. It is claimed, however, by the defendant town that the municipal officers, for the purpose of commitment to the insane hospital, act in a judicial capacity, and that their record is conclusive; citing as authority for their contention Eastport v. Belfast, 40 Me. 205, which holds that their record "cannot be impeached by parol evidence. If it is erroneous as a record it may be reversed. But, if the selectmen have jurisdiction of the case, it is competent proof of the judgment" The kernel of this citation in its application to the present case is contained in the clause "but, if the selectmen have jurisdiction of a case, it is competent proof of the judgment" Want of jurisdiction was the important defect in the proceedings of the municipal officers in this case.

One of the jurisdictional facts authorizing the selectmen of the town to act at all in a case of commitment to the insane hospital is the requirement of section 17, c. 144, that, "in all cases of preliminary proceedings for the commitment of any person to the hospital to establish the fact of the insanity of the person to whom insanity is imputed, the evidence of at least two reputable physicians given by them under oath before the board of examiners shall be required." It would seem from an examination of the statute that compliance with this section is imperative and amendatory, not necessarily as a matter of record, but as a matter of fact, independent of the other proceedings required by the statute. A moment's reflection reveals the importance of this evidence and the wisdom of the Legislature in requiring it. Above all things else, it should be made to positively appear, as a preliminary step to any action whatever on the part of the selectmen, that the person in contemplation of commitment is beyond question insane. To fail to make an adequate investigation in this respect, and thereby commit a person not insane, would be monstrous, if not criminal.

A careful comparison of sections 16 and 17 of chapter 144 will, we think, clearly substantiate this view that the above requirement is intended to be an independent jurisdictional fact. It will be observed by a careful reading that section 16 prescribes in detail all that is to be done by municipal officers to effect a legal commitment of a person to the hospital, including the form of certificate upon which the superintendent is to receive and hold such person until restored or discharged by law. Then the last clause of this same section provides that "the municipal officers shall keep a record of their doings and furnish a copy to any interested person requesting and paying for it." What "doings"? Only those specified in section 16. No future doings are, or, as is perfectly apparent, could be referred to. The language of the statute is specific. It leaves no room even for an inference as to a record of subsequent "doings." So that, apparently, everything necessary to be done is complete under section 16. Now, then, it should be emphatically noticed that this section does not require, and the record therein specified need not contain,...