Inhabitants of Sturbridge v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 29 November 1893 |
| Citation | 35 N.E. 669,160 Mass. 149 |
| Parties | INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF STURBRIDGE v. FRANKLIN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Frank P. Goulding, for plaintiffs.
Hopkins & Bacon and A.J. Bartholomew, for defendant.
This is an action at common law brought by a town, which has been obliged to pay for aid furnished to a woman as a pauper against her husband, to recover from him the amount so paid. The liability of a husband, under such circumstances, depends upon the same facts as his liability for necessaries furnished by an individual for the support of his wife while she is living apart from him. If she is living away from him with his consent, or for a justifiable cause, he is chargeable with her support, whether necessaries are furnished her by an individual on her application, or by a city or town under the laws for relief of paupers. Mayhew v. Thayer, 8 Gray, 172; New Bedford v. Chace, 5 Gray, 28; Inhabitants of Monson v. Williams, 6 Gray, 416; Inhabitants of Brookfield v. Allen, 6 Allen, 585. The plaintiff town contends, in support of its second request for a ruling, that it is enough if, upon the whole case, the person relieved is shown to have been the defendant's wife, and that the burden is upon the defendant to prove that she was living apart from him under such circumstances as to exempt him from liability for her support. But it is a part of the plaintiff's case to show affirmatively that the defendant is liable, and the burden is upon the plaintiff to satisfy the court that her absence was such as would enable her to use her husband's credit. Eames v. Sweetzer, 101 Mass. 81; Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 427. The plaintiff's first request for a ruling has not been argued, and we treat it as waived. The third request is founded on assumptions of fact which are shown by the finding to have been erroneous. The legal proposition involved relates chiefly to the burden of proof, which we have already considered. The other ruling in regard to the disposition of the case upon the evidence was "that the commencement of divorce proceedings by the defendant, under the circumstances, was not such conduct as justified the wife in leaving." This ruling is made to depend on the facts of the case. There had been altercations and quarrels between the parties, in regard to which the evidence was conflicting. There was evidence of a cruel and unjustifiable assault made by the wife upon the husband eight days before the libel for divorce was filed. This evidence was contradicted. There was evidence that the husband furnished provisions for her in his own house, and informed her that she could get others at a store where he had credit. There was a dispute at the trial as to the extent and adequacy of the provision so made for supplying her wants. In regard to all these matters the judge found, at least negatively, in favor of the husband. He found that there was no such cruelty or abuse by the husband, and no such neglect or failure to provide for her support, as would justify her in leaving his house. These are findings on matters of fact, which we cannot revise on this bill of exceptions. We are left, therefore, with the naked question whether the commencement of proceedings for a divorce by a husband against his wife on the ground of her cruelty towards him will, of itself alone, justify her in leaving his house, and enable her to carry his credit with her, if he is willing to provide proper...
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