Inhabitants of Town of Poland v. Inhabitants of City of Biddeford
| Decision Date | 24 December 1952 |
| Citation | 93 A.2d 722 |
| Parties | INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF POLAND v. INHABITANTS OF CITY OF BIDDEFORD. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Frank W. Linnell, Auburn, for plaintiff.
William P. Donahue, Biddeford, for defendant.
Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY and WILLIAMSON, JJ.
This is an action in assumpsit by the Town of Poland against the City of Biddeford to recover for pauper supplies and general relief furnished to Blanche Gagnon, wife of Joseph Gagnon, and their five minor children. The case is before us on exceptions: first, to the refusal of the presiding Justice to charge that there could be no recovery for general relief expenses after June 15, 1951 on the ground that the statute below providing therefor was unconstitutional; and second, to the admission of certain evidence relating to the settlement of Joseph Gagnon.
On May 5, 1951 Mrs. Gagnon sought aid for her children and herself from the overseers of the poor of the plaintiff. Her husband was then confined in jail. A 'pauper notice' alleging the place of settlement to be in Biddeford was sent to the defendant under date of May 7th. In turn the defendant gave to the plaintiff seasonable notice denying settlement.
Mrs. Gagnon also applied to the State for aid to her dependent children, and commencing June 15, 1951 aid was received under the 'A.D.C.' program. The plaintiff continued to furnish relief to Mrs. Gagnon until she moved with her children to Lewiston in November 1951, under the statute which reads in part, as follows:
'During the period of time that a relative with whom the child is living receives general relief under the provisions of this section, such relative shall not acquire or lose a settlement or be in the process of acquiring or losing a settlement.'
R.S.Ch. 22, § 227-A, enacted in P.L.1949, Ch. 396, § 2.
In argument the defendant urges that the jury improperly included in its verdict certain items, namely, debts of Mr. and Mrs. Gagnon. Neither by exception nor by motion for new trial are these objections properly before us. We point out that upon a new trial care should be taken to exclude from consideration items not legally recoverable. See Vinalhaven v. Lincolnville, 78 Me. 422, 6 A. 600.
First exception: Since under our view of the second exception the case must be returned for a new trial, we neither examine nor pass upon the constitutional question raised by the first exception. Payne v. Graham, 118 Me. 251, 107 A. 709, 7 A.L.R. 516; Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 83 A.2d 556; Bolduc v. Pinkham, 148 Me. 17, 88 A.2d 817.
Second exception: The principal issue for the jury was the determination of the settlement of Joseph Gagnon. Admittedly Mrs. Gagnon and the children had the same settlement as Joseph. The burden was upon the plaintiff to place the settlement in Biddeford, and the jury so found.
The objections center about the testimony of Mrs. Mathurin, clerk of the overseers of the poor of the defendant. Objection was made that the witness was allowed to testify without preliminary proof of compliance with R.S. Ch. 82, § 14, and was permitted to describe her duties and acts which she performed. Under the statute overseers of the poor may authorize a designated person (or persons, in the case of a city of the population of the City of Biddeford) 'to perform such of the duties imposed upon them by the provisions of this chapter [relating to paupers, their settlement and support] as they may determine; * * *.' The statute provides that before entering upon the performance of their duties the designated person or persons shall be sworn and give a bond. In the instant case the defendant in its bill of exceptions describes Mrs. Mathurin as clerk of the board of overseers, and in her testimony she said she had acted as clerk since 1939.
In our view a party in a case of this nature is not required to prove each step of the qualification of a clerk of overseers of the poor. The risk of a clerk or other person designated under the statute testifying without proper qualification or describing his duties inaccurately or falsely, is not heavy in comparison with the burden otherwise placed upon persons dealing in good faith with such a clerk. In this instance, for example, any limitations of authority as clerk upon the witness could readily have been shown by the defendant. There is no sound ground to exclude the testimony of the clerk for this reason.
The clerk testified in substance as follows: Since 1939 she has been the clerk of the board of overseers. In 1946 pauper support was given by the defendant to the Gagnon family. No application was made for reimbursement of such aid to any other town. She does not recall whether or not an application for reimbursement was made to the State. The City of Biddeford is reimbursing the State to the extent of 18% of the aid furnished the children of Joseph and Blanche Gagnon under the statute providing for recovery by the State 'from the city, town or plantation in which the child so aided has legal settlement * * *.' R.S.Ch. 22, § 234, P.L.1949, Ch. 416, and P.L.1951, Ch. 266, § 23.
The evidence of the aid in 1946 and of the payments to the State under the 'Aid to Dependent Children' or 'A.D.C.' program was properly admitted. The aid and the payments were acts by the city tending to prove settlement in Biddeford at the time. As we have seen, the settlement of father, mother and children was the same, and hence evidence of the settlement of the one would necessarily bear upon settlement of the other. The evidence was entitled to some weight but was not conclusive against the city. Rockland v. Farnsworth, 93 Me. 178, 44 A. 681. It was open to explanation on the part of the defendant, who could have been permitted to show, if it could, that the overseers acted under the entire misapprehension as to the facts. Harpswell v. Phipsburg, 29 Me. 313. See also New Vineyard v. Harpswell, 33 Me. 193; Appleton v. Belfast, 67 Me. 579; Weld v. Farmington, 68 Me. 301; Norridgewock v. Madison, 70 Me. 174; Fairfield v. Oldtown, 73 Me. 573; Brighton v. St. Albans, 77 Me. 177.
The clerk testified, it is to be noted, from her own knowledge or recollection. The evidence was admissible. We are not at this point concerned with the records of the defendant.
There remains the question of the admissibility of a certain paper or form headed 'Municipal Acknowledgment of Settlement' and testimony based...
To continue reading
Request your trial