Inhabitants of Town of Milford v. Com.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1887
• Citation: 10 N.E. 516,144 Mass. 64
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF MILFORD v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

144 Mass. 64

10 N.E. 516

INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF MILFORD v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 26, 1887

COUNSEL

H.E. Fales and

S.H. Tyng, for petitioners.

OPINION

There can be no doubt that there is here a "claim against the commonwealth," for the language of section 26 is "the expense *** shall be reimbursed by the commonwealth;" nor that such claim is "for the payment of money," for the language of the section is "the expense [i.e., the money expended] shall be reimbursed." The only remaining question is whether such claim is "founded on contract." This, being a remedial statute, should, in accordance with the familiar principle, be construed liberally. If it be construed with reference to Pub.St. c. 167, § 1, there can be no doubt that the remedy to recover the "expense" would, assuming that the statute has given the court jurisdiction of "actions" against the commonwealth, be found in the class of "actions of contract," as distinguished from "actions of tort" or "actions of replevin." If it be construed with reference to section 14 of chapter 84, the same result is reached. As the recovery of such "expense" against all persons or places except the commonwealth, ultimately liable therefor, had previously been provided for, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the legislature had this exception in mind at the time of the passage of St.1879, c. 255. The words "founded on contract" are even more general than the words "founded on any contract," contained in the insolvent laws. Pub.St. c. 157, § 81. See Hertzog v Hertzog, 29 Pa.St. 465; Com. v. Boston & M.R.R., 3 Cush. 45. We submit, therefore, that this claim for reimbursement is "founded on contract," within the fair intent and meaning of the statute, and that the exceptions should be sustained.

H.N. Shepard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

The only question presented in this action by the bill of exceptions is whether, because of the provisions of section 26 of chapter 86 of the Public Statutes, a "contract for the payment of money" by the commonwealth to the petitioners was made when the latter incurred the expenses set forth by them. It would be a judicial construction entirely new to hold that a claim against a sovereign for reimbursement under its statutes is a contract by it for the payment of money.

FIELD J.

The question of law to be decided is whether the claim that the commonwealth reimburse to the town the expenses incurred in the support of a state pauper under Pub.St. c. 86, §§ 25, 26, is a claim which is founded upon a contract for the payment of money within the meaning of St.1879, c. 255, (Pub.St. c. 195.) See St.1865, c. 162; St.1869, c. 12 St.1879, c. 211, § 3. The court of claims of the United States, under statutes which give it jurisdiction to hear and determine "all claims founded upon any law of congress, *** or upon any contract, expressed or implied, with the government of the United States," etc., have heard and determined claims for salaries or pay established by a law of the United States, and these have been sometimes spoken of as claims founded on contract, although it is not clear that they ought not to be regarded as claims founded upon a law of the United States. Rev.St.U.S. § 1059; Patton v. U.S., 7 Ct.Cl. 362, 371; French v. U.S., 16 Ct.Cl. 419; Collins v. U.S., 15 Ct.Cl. 22; Mitchell v. U.S., 18 Ct.Cl. 281, 109 U.S. 146, 3 S.Ct. 151; U.S. v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389, 6 S.Ct. 1185.

In matters of procedure; penalties have usually been regarded as debts. In Pub.St. c. 167, § 1, actions for penalties are excluded from actions of contract, and are included in actions of tort, but actions under statutes to recover for money expended have usually been actions of contract. New Salem v. Wendell, 2 Pick. 341; ...