Inhabitants of Twon of Harpswell v. Kane, CUM AP-00-003
| Decision Date | 09 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | CUM AP-00-003 |
| Parties | INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN OF HARPSWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee v. MITCHELL AND ALICE KANE, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION
The Inhabitants of the Town of Harpswell ("Town") brought a forcible entry and detainer ("FED") action in the District Court, against Defendants Mitchell and Alice Kane ("Kanes"), pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §6008 and M.R. Civ.P. 80D. The Town had a properly created and perfected statutory tax lien on property of Francis J Pagurko ("Pagurko"),[1] on which Defendants live. Stipulation ("Stipulation"), ¶3. Pagurko was the record owner of the land at the time of the Town's foreclosure action. Defendants had entered into an installment sales contract with Pagurko in 1991, which was not recorded in the registry of deeds until January of 1995. Stipulation, ¶2.
Prior to the FED action, the parties entered into a Court-approved settlement, dated July 29, 1996 (Saufley, J.), whereby Pagurko and the Kanes agreed to pay the Town $11,700. Under the repayment plan, Pagurko was obligated to pay the Town $8,000 plus interest, while the Kanes were obligated to pay $3,700 plus interest[2]. The parties agreed that if the amount due from the Kanes was not paid at the time the lien matured (December 14, 1997), the Town could take possession of the property at that time. The Town foreclosed on its statutory tax lien mortgage on December 14, 1997 and, in this proceeding, seeks possession of the property from the Kanes.
In September of 1997, Defendants filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine. See Adversary Complaint, ¶24. Defendants then filed for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy on the date originally scheduled for the FED hearing in the District Court, June 2 1999. See Stipulation, ¶9. On August 6, 1999 Defendants filed an adversary complaint in the Bankruptcy Court seeking to determine the validity and priority of the Town's lien on the land. In the complaint, the Defendants asserted that they did not receive notice of the Town's foreclosure action, nor did the Town permit them to tender certain payments. See id., ¶¶25,31. Notwithstanding the Defendants' contentions, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case, holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy because the Kanes had no interest in the property. See Order dated October 18, 1999; Stipulation, ¶11. In so holding, the Court referred to a previous ruling of the Bankruptcy Court in Defendants' Chapter 7 case, determining that any rights the Defendants had in the property were lost and that the Town was relieved from a bankruptcy stay and could proceed with the action. See Transcript of Ruling from the Bench, August 9, 1999.
The parties were heard on the FED case in the District Court October 20, 1999. The District Court allowed both parties to submit affidavits and memoranda of law in addition to a jointly filed stipulation of facts. The District Court (Field, J.) granted judgment in favor of the Town on December 8, 1999. Defendants appealed to this Court, demanding a jury trial de novo, and Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal.
A party bringing an appeal by jury trial de novo, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f), must show by specific facts that there is a "genuine issue of material fact as to which there is a right to trial by jury." M.R. Civ. P. 80D(f)(5) provides that if the court finds that the appellant has not shown a genuine issue of fact necessitating a jury trial de novo, the court shall dismiss the appeal.
The Defendants' affidavits have not set forth any genuine issues of material fact. Defendants attempt to raise a genuine issue with respect to payments made pursuant to the court-approved settlement well before August of 1999, the date of the first time the Bankruptcy Court determined that the Kanes had no interest in the property. Defendants are barred by res judicata from relitigating the validity of the Town's foreclosure action as against them[3]. See Cline v. Maine Coast Nordic, 1999 ME 72, ¶9, 728 A.2d 686, 688 (). The Bankruptcy Court twice held that Defendants, as both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors, do not have a valid interest in the property.[4] See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Assoc. v. Guilford Transp. Indus. Inc., 989 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1993) ().
The entry is
Defendants' appeal is DISMISSED.
CUMBERLAND County
INHABITANTS OF THE TOWN OF HARPSWELL vs. MITCHELL KANE and ALICE KANE
PO BOX 4510, PORTLAND ME 04112
Defendant's Attorney
RALPH BROWN ESQ 773-3133 (Both)
PORTLAND MAINE 04102
Date of Entry
2000 Jan. 10 Received 01-10-00:
All paperwork received from Sagadahoc County Superior Court.
Change of Venue Purusant to Order signed 01-03-00 (Mills, J.)
Jan 14: Received 1-13-00.
Order - Forcible Entry and Detainer, filed. (Crowley, J.)
Hearing on entitlement to jury trial de novo to be taken up at time of hearing on motion to dismiss.
Copies mailed Sally Daggett, Esq. and Ralph Brown, Esq. on 1-14-00.
Jan. 27 Received 01/25/00:
Affidavit of Mitchell E. Kane filed.
"" "" Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion to Dismiss filed.
Jan 28: On 1-28-00.
Notice of Setting for hearing on Plaintiff-Appellee Inhanbitants of the Town of Harpswell's Motion for Writ of Possession and Entry of Judgment Dismissing the Appeal scheduled for February 16, 2000 at 9:30 a.m. mailed Sally Daggett, Esq. and Ralph Brown, Esq. this day.
Feb. 02 Received 02/01/00:
Plaintiff-Appellee's Reply to Defendants-Appellants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Issuance of the Writ of Possession and Entry of Judgment dismissing the Appeal filed
Feb 23: On 2-16-00.
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