Inland Motor Freight v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 January 1941
• Docket Number: No. 1475.,1475.
• Citation: 36 F. Supp. 885
• Parties: INLAND MOTOR FREIGHT et al. v. UNITED STATES (INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Intervenor).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Idaho

36 F. Supp. 885

INLAND MOTOR FREIGHT et al. v. UNITED STATES (INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Intervenor).

No. 1475.

District Court, D. Idaho, N. D.

January 4, 1941.

Maurice H. Greene, of Boise, Idaho, for plaintiffs.

John A. Carver, U. S. Dist. Atty., and E. H. Casterlin and Paul S. Boyd, Asst. U. S. Dist. Attys., all of Boise, Idaho, for defendants.

Before HEALY, Circuit Judge, and PRAY and CAVANAH, District Judges.

CAVANAH, District Judge.

This suit is brought by the Inland Motor Freight, a corporation, and the Star Dray & Transfer Company, a corporation, to vacate and annul an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission made on July 22, 1940, granting the application of Virgil Hoene and Arley Haener, copartners doing business as the Grangeville Auto Freight, for a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing the applicants to operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle in interstate and foreign commerce of property over United States Highway 95 between Lewiston and Grangeville, Idaho, and which became effective on September 10, 1940.

Answers were filed by the defendants and intervenors which present an issue as to the validity of the Commissioners' report and order with respect to present and future public convenience and necessity of applicants' operation.

On proceedings had, a hearing was had on the application before a joint board as required by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq., and at which applicants and the plaintiffs, among others, appeared and presented evidence. Thereafter, on July 22, 1940, the Interstate Commerce Commission rendered an official report on the application, and made and entered its findings and order that the applicants had made sufficient showing that public convenience and necessity required the continuance of their service.

The plaintiffs challenge the validity of the Commissioners' findings and order, upon the grounds that the Grangeville Auto Freight did not produce at the hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission substantial evidence that public convenience and necessity requires the operation of the Grangeville Auto Freight between Lewiston and Grangeville, Idaho; that the Commission did not attempt to make findings that the service of the plaintiffs and the Railroad Company were in any way inadequate; that the plaintiffs and the Railroad Company could not efficiently handle all available traffic between Lewiston and Grangeville, Idaho; that the service of the Grangeville Auto Freight was in any way an improvement over the service of the existing carriers or furnished any different service than was already being performed by other carriers; that there was sufficient traffic to support three truck lines and the railroad and that there was need for additional competitive service between Lewiston and Grangeville, and urges that the failure to make findings upon these matters is vitally material in determining whether the Commission's decision was arbitrary and in disregard of the evidence, as they are fundamental issues to be determined in ascertaining whether public convenience and necessity would require operation by the applicants.

In view of the issues and the evidence presented to the Interstate Commerce Commission and now presented here, renders pertinent a study of the scope of the review to be given orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in applications of this kind. The inquiry of the Court must be directed to determine whether the Commission acted within its constitutional authority and within correct legal principles. The provisions of the law for a hearing before the Commission implies the privilege of introducing evidence and the duty of deciding in accordance with it, and a refusal to consider the evidence introduced or to make essential findings without supporting evidence is arbitrary action. The Chicago Junction Case, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 264 U.S. 258, 44 S.Ct. 317, 68 L.Ed. 667.

The jurisdiction to set aside and annul orders of the Commission is vested in the United States District Courts, and who are proper parties to maintain the suit is left to the general rules and practice of equity, and whether a legal interest is affected. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees et al. v. United States, Interstate Commerce Commission et al., 263 U.S. 143, 44 S.Ct. 72, 68 L.Ed. 216. If it is established that the plaintiffs have an interest appearing and it is sustained, its legal right then would be invaded and affected by the order of the Commission and shall be subject to the right of relief in Court under 49 U.S.C. A. § 305(h), which provides that "any final order made under this chapter shall be subject to the same right of relief in court by any party in interest as is now provided in respect to orders of the Commission made under Chapter 1 of this title." This provision of the Statute has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in which it is held that under Chapter 1, a competing carrier who is directly affected by an Order of the Commission and if their revenues are affected, have a legal interest. The Chicago Junction Case, supra; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. et al. v. Interstate Commerce Commission et al., Com.Ct., 194 F. 449. As to what is the standard of review of the Commission's findings as to whether the evidence before the Commission was sufficient or not, to support them, it is now settled by the Supreme Court to be "substantial evidence," and "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" and not where the record is "wholly barren of evidence."

The standard adopted by the Court is expressed as: "The companies contend that the Court of Appeals misconceived its power to review the findings and, instead of searching the record to see if they were sustained by `substantial' evidence, merely considered whether the record was `wholly barren of evidence' to support them. We agree that the statute, in providing that `the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive', section 10(e), 29 U.S.C.A. 160(e), means supported by substantial evidence." Consolidated Edison Co. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board et al., 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126; National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660. As expressed by the Court in the case of Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, D.C., 5 F.Supp. 929, 931, the...