Inland Waterway Development Co. v. City of Jacksonville
| Decision Date | 17 December 1948 |
| Citation | 38 So.2d 676 |
| Parties | INLAND WATERWAY DEVELOPMENT CO. et al. v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Bayard B. Shields Judge.
William D Jones, Jr., of Jacksonville, for appellant Inland Waterway Development Co.
George E Turner and James R. Boyd, Jr., both of Jacksonville, for appellant Jacksonville Baseball Exhibition Co.
W. M Madison and Inman Crutchfield, both of Jacksonville, for appellee.
The City of Jacksonville exhibited its petition in the Circuit Court alleging among other things that it was 'vested by law with the power of eminent domain to condemn all lands necessary for its corporate purposes.' The object of the petition was to acquire title by condemnation to certain lands within the corporate limits of the city for the location of an electric generating plant. The lands described in the petition were owned by Inland Waterway Development Company which was made a party defendant and will hereafter be referred to as the Development Company. Jacksonville Baseball Exhibition Company, a corporation, claiming some interest in the lands, was permitted to intervene and became a party defendant and will hereafter be referred to as the Baseball Company.
Demurrers to the petition challenging its sufficiency in law were proffered by the Development Company and the Baseball Company and were overruled. Answers were seasonably filed by both defendants. The answer of Development Company alleged that it was vested with a fee simple title to the lands described in the petition and charged that the said lands amounted to approximately 36 acres, that such a large acreage was totally unnecessary for the erection of a 60,000 K.W. Electric generation station, the capacity of the station proposed to be erected by the city, that the proposal to exercise the power of eminent domain to condemn such a large area in excess of the normal requirement for that purpose, amounts to an abuse of power and the appropriation of Development Company's property without just cause and should not be permitted.
The answer of the Baseball Company was not materially different from that of the Development Company except that it contained allegations with reference to the proportion and capacity of the electrical generating station in present use by the city as compared with the one proposed to be erected, all of which was to show the want of necessity for the unreasonable exercise of the power of eminent domain to appropriate such a large area of defendant's lands. A motion to strike was granted as to these allegations in the answers of both defendants. A motion to amend paragraph 11 of the answer on the part of the Baseball Company was overruled. The case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict for the city on which final judgment was entered. The city paid into the registry of the Court the amount of the judgment including the sum awarded as attorney's fee.
The Development Company then presented its petition for taxing costs, amounting to $2180.80, which was denied. A motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment was likewise denied. Development Company and Baseball Company filed separate appeals which were consolidated by order of this Court. We are concerned at this time with the consolidated appeal.
At the outset the Development Company filed a suggestion to the effect that the consolidated appeal was moot and should be dismissed because of failure on part of the city to pay into the registry of the Court within ten days after final judgment the full compensation awarded by the jury for the condemned property, including costs, the amount in question being $887.50, accruing to the Clerk of the Circuit Court as costs under Section 28.24, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. In an opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Sebring and filed October 29, 1948, under same title as this one, that contention was rejected. Fla., 37 So.2d 333.
It is first contended that the petition to condemn is legally insufficient because it fails to allege the constitutional or statutory authority under which the petitioner proposes to acquire title to the lands in question for municipal purposes.
We do not think there is any merit to this contention.
The petition alleges 'that your petitioner, City of Jacksonville, is a municipality under the laws of the State of Florida, and is vested by law with the power of eminent domain to condemn all lands necessary for its corporate purposes.' This allegation is followed with a statement of the public use for which the city purposes to acquire said property and that it is necessary for that purpose. Attached to and made a part of the petition is a copy of the resolution of the City Commission reciting these and other facts showing the public necessity for the acquisition. It is further pointed out that Section 167.65, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., authorizes the City of Jacksonville, and other municipalities, to 'exercise the right and power of eminent domain, that is the right...
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