Inlow v. Bybee

Decision Date05 February 1907
Citation99 S.W. 785,122 Mo.App. 475
PartiesINLOW, Appellant, v. BYBEE, Respondent
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from Audrain Circuit Court.--Hon. Houston W. Johnson, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT.--On June 2, 1904, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract, of which the parts material to the case are as follows:

"This contract by and between C. C. Bybee and J. S. Inlow, both of Audrain county, Missouri, in effect that J. S. Inlow of Farber, Missouri, this day sells unto C. C. Bybee the following real estate, his house and ground located on Main street in Farber, Audrain county, Missouri, for the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars. Also his general stock of merchandise and fixtures, consisting of dry goods, clothing boots, shoes, groceries, etc., in fact such and all goods kept on sale by said J. S. Inlow and contained in building located in Farber, Missouri, said building now owned by Lawder Bros. & Peterson, said stock of merchandise to be invoiced at St. Louis cost with five per cent to be added to said St. Louis cost for carriage, said J. S. Inlow to furnish C. C. Bybee with merchantable title, or, that is to say abstract showing merchantable title to said residence property and give C. C. Bybee a clear receipt for said stock in consideration or exchange said C. C. Bybee sells to said J. S. Inlow his 242.14 acres of land, more or less, more particularly described, to-wit: (Here follows description.) . .

"This contract shall be in full force as soon as signed by both parties heretofore mentioned, a failure upon the part of either of signers of this contract to fulfill his part thereof he shall be liable therefor and agrees to pay unto the other party of this contract damages to the amount of $ 500. The invoice of stock to be begun Monday, June 6, 1904 and completed as soon as possible, each party to be represented by two parties whom he shall select himself."

The petition alleges, in substance, that plaintiff, on the date of the signing of the contract, and thereafter up to the tenth of the same month, was ready and willing to fulfill the agreement on his part, in all respects, and offered to accept a conveyance from defendant of his farm and tendered the purchase price of $ 12,800, by conveying to him the Farber property and the stock of goods mentioned in the contract but that defendant refused to convey his said farm to plaintiff and has continued to refuse so to do, to the plaintiff's damage in the sum of $ 500.

The answer was a general denial and a counterclaim for five hundred dollars damages, alleged to have accrued on account of the failure of plaintiff to invoice the stock of goods, or to convey the Farber property to defendant. The issues were tried to a jury, who found against plaintiff on his petition, and in favor of defendant on his counterclaim, but refused to allow him any damages. Defendant acquiesced in the verdict, but plaintiff appealed.

On the tenth of June, 1904, plaintiff executed a deed to defendant for the Farber real estate, but never delivered or offered it to him. Plaintiff selected Noah Mitchell and Artie Lee to represent him in taking an invoice of the goods, Lee to act as his bookkeeper. Defendant selected Dan Quinlan and Charles Tanner to represent him, Tanner to act as his bookkeeper. These four men, in the presence of plaintiff and defendant commenced to invoice the goods at about three o'clock in the afternoon of June sixth and continued until about 7:30 p. m., when, on account of objections made by Quinlan and his refusal to proceed, the work was stopped and was not thereafter resumed. It appears that Mitchell was a merchant of long experience, and in previous years had been plaintiff's partner and had marked some of the goods and was familiar with the kind of goods plaintiff had in stock, and with their cost in the St. Louis market. Quinlan, who was a farmer, had had but two years experience as a country merchant, and was unfamiliar with the cost price of plaintiff's goods, with the exception of a few brands of shoes in stock. Plaintiff's evidence is that he had a cost mark and all of the goods, except groceries, were marked with this original price, plus ten per cent; Mitchell knew his cost mark and Quinlan was put in possession of it before the invoice was begun. Plaintiff's evidence further tends to show that the understanding when the invoice commenced, was that the goods should be invoiced by the cost marks thereon, from which ten per cent should be deducted and five per cent added to the remainder to ascertain their cost to defendant. Mitchell and Quinlan began the invoice by taking the shoes, Mitchell working in the lead. These shoes were in boxes on shelves, the cost mark being written on the boxes. Mitchell would count all the shoes having the same stock and cost mark, call the number of pairs and the cost, which call would be entered by Lee and Tanner. Quinlan would look at some of the shoes and the cost marks, and if he thought the call by Mitchell was correct, he let it pass. Presently a mixed lot of shoes was encountered, and Quinlan found shoes that did not fit the boxes they were in and refused to consent to let such shoes be invoiced at the cost marked on the boxes, and called for the original invoices. Plaintiff was unable to produce the invoices for some of such shoes, and Mitchell testified, they were put aside for the time being, and for the purpose of agreeing on their cost price at a future time. According to plaintiff's evidence, after finding four or five pairs of shoes in boxes where they did not belong, Quinlan quit, saying he was "not competent to do the work," and plaintiff would have to get some one else. Plaintiff telephoned John Abbay, an experienced merchant, who came up the next morning, but took no part in invoicing the goods and left in the afternoon. Plaintiff insisted on proceeding with the invoice and told defendant he would furnish every evidence at his command to satisfy him of the St. Louis cost of the goods, but he could not produce all the invoices for the reason some of them had been misplaced. Defendant refused to proceed with the invoice, unless plaintiff would produce the original invoices of the goods, and left without taking any further action in the matter. Plaintiff testified he had purchased a portion of the stock at second-hand and had in his possession the invoice of the goods taken at the time of the purchase, showing the original cost price, and with this invoice, and invoices he had made of his stock at subsequent times, and with the wholesale merchants' invoices he had in his possession, the exact cost price of all the goods he had in stock could have been ascertained, and that he offered to put all these...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT