Int'l Ass'n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail & Transp. Workers, Transp. Div. v. BNSF Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20 C 4220,20 C 4220
• Citation: 546 F.Supp.3d 721
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SHEET METAL, AIR, RAIL AND TRANSPORTATION WORKERS, TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, SMART-TD General Committee of Adjustment GO-01, SMART-TD GCA GO-009, SMART-TD GCA GO-393, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

546 F.Supp.3d 721

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SHEET METAL, AIR, RAIL AND TRANSPORTATION WORKERS, TRANSPORTATION DIVISION,¹ SMART-TD General Committee of Adjustment GO-01, SMART-TD GCA GO-009, SMART-TD GCA GO-393, Plaintiffs,

v.BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 20 C 4220

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed July 1, 2021

Kevin C. Brodar, Erika A. Diehl-Gibbons, Shawn McKinley, Smart Transportation Division, North Olmsted, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Aaron S. Markel, Pro Hac Vice, Jones Day, Detroit, MI, Daniel J. Mohan, Sean M. Sullivan, Kerry Mohan, Daley Mohan Groble PC, Chicago, IL, David Michael Pryor, Pro Hac Vice, Bnsf Railway, Ft. Worth, TX, Donald J. Munro, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM T. HART, United States District Court Judge Plaintiff International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers, Transportation Division ("SMART-TD" or the "Union")² brings this action under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. , against Defendant BNSF Railway Company ("BNSF") on behalf of the unionized Yard Foreman employees at BNSF. The Union alleges that BNSF is attempting to unilaterally alter the working conditions of the Yard Foreman position in Chicago and Seattle areas by requiring that the position becomes Engine Service Qualified without engaging in the mandatory collective bargaining process required by the Railway Labor Act. It seeks a declaration that BNSF's unilateral action violates the Act, and an injunction preventing a change to the requirements of the position until the parties engage in the mandatory bargaining process required by the Act. The parties bring cross motions. (Dkt. 16; Dkt. 17.) This Court concludes the parties present a "minor" dispute that must be resolved via arbitration under the Act. Consequently, for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants BNSF's motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction, (Dkt. 17.) and denies the Union's motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 16.)

I. BACKGROUND

This case involves the Yard Foreman position, a subset of the train service employees, at BNSF. (Dkt. 21-1, pg. at 4.) Train service and engine service employees are two categories of workers at BNSF. Id. at 2-3. Train service employees are represented by the Plaintiff Union, while a separate union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, ("Engineers’ Union") which is not party to this litigation, represents the engine service employees. Id. BNSF and the Union have entered into several collective bargaining agreements governing the terms and conditions of employment for the train service employees. Id. at 2.

The Union has a three-tier organization system with Plaintiff SMART-TD as the administrative head, mid-level semi-autonomous general committees of adjustment, that are responsible for negotiating and enforcing collective bargaining agreements with their respective railroads, and locals for the rank and file members. Id. at 1. The Union's structure is largely irrelevant to the case other than to note that three intermediate general committees of adjustment are also Plaintiffs in this action along with SMART-TD. The Court refers to the Plaintiffs as the "Union" unless a specific reference to the subpart of the Union is required.

The parties’ dispute centers on whether BNSF may require the Yard Foreman position to be Engine Service Qualified.

Federal law mandates that only a properly qualified worker may operate a locomotive. 49 C.F.R. § 240.1(a) ; (Dkt. 18-1, pg. 2.) In July 2020, BNSF notified the Union of its intent to require the Yard Foreman position in Chicago and Seattle to be Engine Service Qualified. (Dkt. 21-1, pg. 9.)

The Yard Foreman is a freight conductor working in the rail yard. Id. at 4. When assigned to a yard switcher crew, the position is primarily responsible for the safe and proper switching of inbound and outbound trains. Id. Other duties of the Yard Foreman include: advising his or her crew on safety related issues, train movements, track switch alignments, the coupling and uncoupling of rail cars, air hose connections, air brake inspections when car department personnel are unavailable, and timekeeping for members of the yard crew. Id.

"Switching" consists of the sorting of rail cars onto various tracks and connecting them with each other and one or more locomotives to form trains. Id. This work can be performed in multiple methods including by a yard service crew or by an engineer operating the locomotive to move the train cars. Id. An additional method of switching, which is of importance to this case, is performed with a remote control device. Id. at 5. The remote control allows the Yard Foreman and an assistant, who is also a train service employee represented by the Union, to move the locomotive to conduct the switching without being on-board. Id.

Despite moving a locomotive via remote control when performing switching, the Yard Foreman position is not presently required to be Engine Service Qualified. (Dkt. 18, pg. 7.) The Union explains that the qualification is not required for the remote control work because the Yard Foreman is not operating the locomotive's controls, but instead is only "directing as he would do with an Engineer in the cab of the locomotive." (Dkt. 22-1, pg. 5.)

BNSF desires the Yard Foreman position to be Engine Service Qualified because there are times that the Yard Foreman cannot conduct the necessary switching work using the remote control. (Dkt. 18, pg. 7.) Some switching work must be done conventionally using the locomotives throttle instead of via remote control. Id. BNSF wants the Yard Foreman to be able to perform the conventional movement of the locomotives during switching and so is now mandating that they be Engine Service Qualified. Id. The Court is uncertain whether there is a substantive difference between "directing" the locomotive via a remote control (which does not require the qualification) and operating the locomotive manually (which does) other than one requires a physical presence on the locomotive while the other does not. Regardless, it is clear that the parties do not dispute that the Yard Foreman may perform the remote control work without being Engine Service Qualified, and that BNSF now wants them to become qualified so they can perform manual movement of the locomotive.

The Union brings the present suit under the Railway Labor Act challenging BNSF's actions. The Union has an instant motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 16.) and BNSF responds with its own motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction or in the alternative summary judgment. (Dkt. 17.) The Union argues that BNSF's attempt to alter the Yard Foreman position is a break with past agreements and practice making it a "major" dispute under the Act. As such, the Union claims it is entitled to an injunction prohibiting BNSF from unilaterally requiring that the Yard Foreman position be Engine Service Qualified and directing that they engage in collective bargaining on this point. BNSF counters that this is a "minor" dispute under the Act that must be resolved by the arbitrator, and the instant case should be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Analysis

At the outset, the Court notes that BNSF moves to dismiss the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction or alternatively seeks a grant of summary judgment. At first blush, one might think the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this action. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the Court to resolve the merits of the case before it. Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 553, 562, 196 L.Ed.2d 493 (2017) (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. , 526 U.S. 574, 583-85, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999) ). The complaint alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because the case presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and involves an Act regulating commerce, 28 U.S.C. § 1337. (Dkt. 1, pg. 2.) Plaintiff is requesting the Court interpret a federal statute as it relates to the present dispute between the parties under the Court's Article III authority to address cases and controversies and order applicable relief. That would seem sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

The question, however, is complicated by this area of law. Historically, the Seventh Circuit instructs that a "minor" dispute that must be resolved via arbitration is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and consequently, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Brotherhood of Maint. Of Way Employees Division/IBT v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co. , 745 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2014) (" Brotherhood 2014 "). The Court of Appeals has clarified, however, that its historical practice of dismissing for want of subject matter jurisdiction has not taken into consideration recent Supreme Court case law instructing that "whether a party's failure to meet a statutory requirement deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction must be based on whether Congress clearly indicated that it was setting a jurisdictional limitation." Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 758 F.3d 819, 831 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 510-11, 515-16, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ); see also Miller v. Sw. Airlines Co. , 926 F.3d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2019) (recognizing issue). The Seventh Circuit has declined to consider whether the intervening Supreme Court case law alters its historical practice of dismissing "minor" disputes for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Miller , 926 F.3d at 901 ; Brotherhood 2014 , 758 F.3d at 831. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's case law on this point remains binding because this Court, as an inferior court to the Seventh Circuit, has no authority to reexamine a superior court's precedents. State Oil Co. v. Khan , 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (19...