Int'l Ass'n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, & Transp. Workers v. Iowa N. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 24 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-2608 |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SHEET METAL, AIR, RAIL, AND TRANSPORTATION WORKERS; Smart- TD General Committee of Adjustment GO-433, Plaintiffs - Appellants v. IOWA NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Kevin C. Brodar, Erika A. Diehl-Gibbons, Associate General Counsel, Smart, Transportation Division, North Olmsted, OH, Mark Hedberg, Hedberg & Boulton, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
James Daniel Helenhouse, Chloe G. Pedersen, Fletcher & Sippel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
Iowa Northern Railway Company ("Iowa Northern") and the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (the "Union") are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") that is subject to the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. In August 2019, Iowa Northern offered to raise pay for its unionized Train and Engine employees to $300 per day because Iowa Northern was having trouble attracting and retaining these employees at the $271 daily rate the CBA then provided. The Union1 tentatively agreed and submitted this proposal to its members, but they voted it down in October.
On April 1, 2020, the 2015 CBA's moratorium on proposing changes expired, and the Union served a "Section 6 notice" on Iowa Northern. Under the RLA, "major disputes" are those in which a party seeks to create or amend contractual rights. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989). A party seeking to negotiate CBA amendments commences a major dispute by serving a Section 6 notice. See 45 U.S.C. § 156. "The effect of § 6 is to prolong agreements subject to its provisions regardless of what they say as to termination." Manning v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817, 85 S.Ct. 33, 13 L.Ed.2d 29 (1964).
On May 4, 2021, Iowa Northern served a Section 6 notice on the Union, proposing changes to the CBA, including amending the CBA's rates-of-pay provision. When the Union failed to respond within the time periods prescribed in Section 6,2 Iowa Northern gave notice it would resort to self-help. It increased the daily pay rate to $300 and ceased deducting union dues from member pay checks effective June 16.
The Union filed this action on June 30, contending that Iowa Northern violated the RLA by unlawfully resorting to self-help. It promptly moved for a preliminary injunction ordering Iowa Northern "to return to the status quo that existed prior to June 14, 2021, including the negotiated rate of pay and deduction of dues." The district court3 denied preliminary injunctive relief, concluding the Union did not meet its burden of establishing likelihood of success on the merits. Int'l Ass'n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail & Transp. Workers - Transp. Div. v. Iowa N. Ry. Co., No. C21-2038-LTS, 2021 WL 3038874, at *5 (N.D. Iowa July 19, 2021) (the " Order"). The Union appeals the interlocutory Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). "Denial of injunctive relief will not be reversed on review unless the trial court clearly erred in its characterization of the facts, made a mistake of law, or abused its discretion in considering the equities." Sheet Metal Workers’ Int'l Ass'n v. Burlington N. R.R., 893 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). Applying this deferential standard of review, we affirm.
Reflecting the importance of transportation to the nation's economic prosperity and security, the RLA imposes a judicially enforceable legal obligation on railroads and employee unions to bargain in good faith. 45 U.S.C. § 152, First; Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 576-79, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 (1971). For major disputes, Sections 5 to 10 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 155 - 60, require the parties to undertake an "almost interminable process":
If direct negotiation fails ... either party may invoke the services of the National Mediation Board (NMB). If mediation fails, the NMB must attempt to persuade the parties to submit the controversy to arbitration, which is binding only if both parties consent. If the parties fail to submit to arbitration, the President may create an Emergency Board to help resolve the dispute. During this entire process, neither party may unilaterally alter the status quo.
Sheet Metal Workers’, 893 F.2d at 202 (cleaned up). The status quo provision at issue in this case is Section 2, Seventh, which provides that no carrier "shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees" except as prescribed in a CBA or in Section 6. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh. "Implicit in the statutory scheme, however, is the ultimate right of the disputants to resort to self-help -- the inevitable alternative in a statutory scheme which deliberately denies the final power to compel arbitration." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 379, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 22 L.Ed.2d 344 (1969) (quotation omitted); see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 724-25, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945).
In this appeal, the Union seeks a preliminary injunction compelling Iowa Northern to reverse an action it took during the parties’ labor dispute. The requested relief implicates another fundamental federal labor law statute, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which broadly provides that "No court of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction to issue any ... temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter ...." 29 U.S.C. § 101. Section 104 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act enumerates specific acts that may not be enjoined.
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court addressed the seeming inconsistency between judicially enforcing the RLA's mandatory major dispute procedures and adhering to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction mandate. The Court concluded that a district court "has jurisdiction and power to issue necessary injunctive orders to enforce compliance with the requirements of the RLA notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 513, 109 S.Ct. 2584, 105 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989) (quotations omitted). "The specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act take precedence over the more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id. (quotation omitted).
Maintaining the status quo during major disputes is "central to [the RLA's] design." Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 150, 90 S.Ct. 294, 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969). Thus, a district court's equitable jurisdiction includes the power to enjoin a failure to maintain the status quo before these mandatory dispute resolution procedures have been completed. Id. at 150-54, 90 S.Ct. 294. "However, the policy of the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act suggests that the courts should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff's right." Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961).
Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act contains an additional prohibition that is relevant to this appeal:
No ... injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.
29 U.S.C. § 108 (emphasis added).4 This provision has a companion in Section 2, First of the RLA, which requires that carriers and employees "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements ... and to settle all disputes ... to avoid any interruption of commerce or to the operation of any carrier." In holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not bar a court of equity from compelling compliance with a railroad's Section 2 duty to bargain, the Supreme Court observed that "whether action taken or omitted is in good faith or reasonable, are everyday subjects of inquiry by courts in framing or enforcing their decrees." Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 550, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937). Three decades later, in Chicago & N.W. Ry., the Court noted the language of Section 8 -- "failed to make every reasonable effort" -- and stated it had "no reason to believe that the district courts are less capable of making the [equitable] inquiry in the one situation than in the other." 402 U.S. at 579, 91 S.Ct. 1731.
Though we have not addressed the issue, given this Supreme Court guidance it is not surprising that "[t]he vast majority of courts to consider this question have applied Section 8 to disputes that the RLA governs." Aircraft Serv. Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 779 F.3d 1069, 1074 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit treats Section 8 as an independent issue in cases where the RLA "trumps" Section 4, holding "that a party must comply with Section 8 of the [Norris-LaGuardia Act] before seeking an injunction under the RLA." Id. at 1075, 1079. We agree. Therefore, a party seeking a preliminary injunction to enforce the RLA's duty to maintain the status quo during a major dispute must satisfy Section 8's "every reasonable effort to settle" requirement to establish jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and then must establish that our customary Dataphase standards5 warrant a preliminary injunction. See Great Lakes Aviation, Ltd. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Civ. No. 07-4314, 2007 WL 3244077, at *4-6 (D. Minn. Nov. 1, 2007) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial