Inter-County Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Reeves
Decision Date | 26 March 1943 |
Parties | INTER-COUNTY RURAL ELECTRIC CO-OPERATIVE CORPORATION v. REEVES, Com'r of Revenue, et al. |
Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied June 22, 1943.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; W. B. Ardery, Judge.
Action under Civil Code Practice, § 639a--1 et seq., by Inter-County Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation against H. Clyde Reeves, Commissioner of Revenue, and others, for a declaration of plaintiff's right to exemption from taxation. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
E. C Newlin, of Danville, H. W. Alexander, of Owenton, and J Smith Barlow, Jr., of Bardstown, for appellant.
Hubert W. Meredith, Atty. Gen., M. B. Holifield, Asst. Atty. Gen for appellees.
John Francis Williamson, of Louisville, amicus curiae.
VAN SANT, Commissioner.
Appellant Inter-County Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation, is a non-profit corporation organized and operating under the provisions of KRS 279.010 to 279.990, inclusive. It has no capital stock and the rights and interests of each member of the corporation in respect to the property of the corporation and in respect to voting at membership meetings are equal. Any person may become a member upon payment of the membership fee, agreeing to purchase electric energy from the corporation, and agreeing to comply with the articles of incorporation, the by-laws, and the rules and regulations adopted by the board of directors; provided that no person may become a member except upon approval of the board of directors or a majority of the membership.
The corporation is the owner and operator of an electric distribution system including wires, poles, and other paraphernalia necessary and expedient to the distribution of electricity. The act provides that upon dissolution, the assets remaining after the payment of all liabilities and obligations shall be ratably distributed to the members of the corporation. KRS 279.180. It further provides (279.200) that a corporation organized under the act shall be exempt from taxation in the following language:
Conceiving the tax exemption provision to be in violation of the Constitution, the Commissioner of Revenue instructed appellant to file returns and schedules of its property and to pay taxes thereon in like manner and to the same extent required of other persons, firms, and corporations owning like property and rendering similar service, but who have not been organized under the Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation Act. Appellant then filed this action under section 639a--1 et seq. of the Civil Code of Practice petitioning the court for a declaration of its right to be, or not to be, exempt from taxation. The court was asked specifically to determine: (1) Whether appellant's property is "public property used for public purposes" within the purview of Section 170 of the Constitution of Kentucky: (2) Whether Section 27 of the Rural Electric Cooperative Act ( ) violates any of the provisions of the Constitution of Kentucky, in particular Sections 3, 59, 170, 171, 172, 174, 181, or 181a thereof; (3) Whether appellant's property, if subject to taxation at all, is subject to the ad valorem tax and to none other; (4) Whether appellant's property is subject to State ad valorem taxation only and exempt from local ad valorem taxation; and, (5) Whether appellant's property, if subject to taxation at all, "shall be considered as real property or as personal property."
Section 170 of the Constitution provides:
Section 171, in so far as pertinent recites:
It is contended by appellant that the property appellee seeks to tax is "public property used for public purposes" and therefore exempt from state taxation. That if it be considered to be wrong in that contention, the Legislature, under section 171, supra, had the right to, and it actually did, divide the property owned by the corporations organized under the act into a class apart from similar property owned by persons, firms, or corporations not organized under the act. That under that section, the Legislature had the right to, and it actually did, exempt the property so classified from local taxation. Sections 171, 172, 174, and 202, of the Constitution provide for uniform taxes to be levied, assessed, and collected on all property. It is contended by appellees that these provisions as to uniformity would be violated by an attempt of the Legislature to classify property as to ownership and not as to kind. Appellant strikes at this argument with the assertion that the uniformity provisions require uniformity only within the class and not uniformity as between classes.
The Attorney General has conceded that the property owned by appellant is held and used for a public purpose, or at least, if it be determined to be public property, he concedes it follows as a necessary corollary that the property is being used for a public purpose; but he insists that the property has no aspect of public ownership and therefore, cannot be declared to be public property within the meaning of the Constitution.
Therefore to answer the first question specifically presented, we must inquire into the meaning of the word public as...
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