Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 30 March 1989 |
Docket Number | No. D008677,D008677 |
Citation | 257 Cal.Rptr. 37,209 Cal.App.3d 177 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of, California, County of San Diego, Respondent. Jackie F. PACKHAM, Real Party in Interest. |
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, San Diego, William S. Boggs, Pasadena, and Laura Whitcomb Halgren, San Diego, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Churchill and Kaplan, Robert J. Kaplan and Beth S. Schiralli, San Diego, for real party in interest.
After the trial court overruled its general demurrer based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California (Auto Club) petitions for a writ of mandate We have concluded the issue of the effectiveness of Packham's assent to a January 1985, release she executed was finally adjudicated in a July 2, 1986, summary judgment which was affirmed on appeal. Her assent was adjudicated to be effective. Thus, the release was an effective bar to her personal injury action against Simone Billuni, who with Packham was insured by the Auto Club. The matters in Packham's present complaint, including fraud and overreaching, were within the scope of the summary judgment adjudication of the effectiveness of Packham's assent to the release, the only issue actually litigated in that action. The matters in Packham's present complaint relate to that adjudicated subject matter and were relevant to that issue so that they could have been raised in the summary judgment adjudication of the matter of her assent. Accordingly, the summary judgment is conclusive of any matter going to the effectiveness of Packham's assent to the release, whether or not it was urged in the summary judgment. Thus, we grant the writ.
seeking to compel the trial court to sustain its demurrer. The subject of the demurrer is the April 5, 1988, complaint of real party in interest Jackie L. Packham against the Auto Club for damages for "BAD FAITH BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACT (i.e., TORTIOUS BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING); VIOLATION OF STATUTORY DUTIES; CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD AND FRAUDULENT DECEIT."
As a result of a December 1984 rear-end collision between Auto Club's insureds, Packham and Belluni, Packham went to Auto Club's office in January 1985 and for a payment of $1080.90 signed a release of Billuni for all claims connected with the collision. Before signing the release, Auto Club representative Mrs. Robinson told Packham she wanted to terminate Packham's claim so she would not have two open files. Robinson totaled the bills for Packham's medical treatment to date, added the car rental and other miscellaneous bills, and said she would give Packham $500 more.
There was no discussion on whether Packham was ready to settle. Nonetheless, Packham understood she was talking to Robinson about settling her claim and the settlement offer was greater than she requested or expected. Packham read the release carefully and discussed it with her husband before signing. She knew she was releasing her claim by signing the form and she intended to do so.
One month after Packham signed the release, Auto Club refused to renew her insurance. In September 1985, Packham filed her action for damages for negligence against Billuni. Billuni moved for summary judgment based on the release Packham signed and her deposition testimony. In her deposition, Packham admitted she filed the lawsuit because she was upset with the Auto Club for not renewing her insurance.
Packham opposed Billuni's motion for summary judgment on grounds she was confused about the reason for her meeting with the Auto Club, confused as to the meaning of the release and its full legal effect, and confused as to what the dollar amount of the settlement represented. She argued she did not in reality assent to the provisions of the release. The trial court granted Billuni's summary judgment motion and Packham appealed to this court.
In our unpublished opinion we pointed out, "[s]pecific issues of fraud and overreaching were not presented to the trial court." (D004961, p. 3.) On her appeal, however, Packham for the first time raised issues of fraud and overreaching, including assertions that Auto Club breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to her. In this court's opinion affirming the summary judgment, we stated, in part:
The Remittitur was issued from this court on April 4, 1988.
On April 5, 1988, Packham filed the complaint for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On August 15, 1988, the trial court overruled Auto Club's demurrer. The trial court stayed further proceedings and Auto Club filed its petition for writ of mandate on September 6, 1988. On September 19, 1988, we issued an order to show cause. 1
The doctrine of res judicata giving certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in a later action seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration. (7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment, § 188, p. 621.) Concerning the aspect of res judicata applicable to this case, "in a new action on a different cause of action, the former judgment is not a complete merger or bar, but is effective as a collateral estoppel, i.e., it is conclusive on issues actually litigated between the parties in the former action." (7 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 189, p. 623, original italics; see Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1010, 155 Cal.Rptr. 342.)
"[A] former judgment is not a collateral estoppel on issues which might have been raised but were not; just as clearly, it is a collateral estoppel on issues which were raised, even though some factual matters or legal arguments which could have been presented were not." (7 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 257, p. 696, original italics.)
The fact that different forms of relief are sought in the two lawsuits is irrelevant, for if the rule were otherwise, "litigation finally would end only when a party ran out of counsel whose knowledge and imagination could conceive of different theories of relief based upon the same factual background." (Kronkright v. Gardner (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 214, 216, 107 Cal.Rptr. 270.) Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 202, 99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497, discusses and explains the distinction between issues litigated and legal theories, as follows:
" (Italics added.)
The issue actually litigated in the first action resulting in a summary judgment on the merits (see State Farm etc. Ins. Co. v. Salazar (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d Supp. 861, 865, 318 P.2d 210; 7 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 219, pp. 655-656) was whether Packham effectively assented to the release. Her claimed confusion as to the reason for her meeting with the Auto Club, the meaning of the settlement agreement and its full legal effect and as to what the dollar amount of the settlement represented were the particular grounds she urged in the trial court in order to reach a favorable result on the issue.
As this court pointed out in its opinion on her appeal from the adverse summary judgment, Packham did not urge in the trial court her legal theories of fraud and overreaching which, if accepted, could have produced a favorable result for Packham in the first action resulting in the summary judgment. Instead, Packham urged the fraud and overreaching theories for vitiating her assent for the first time on appeal, and for that reason this court did not consider those theories.
The fact Packham urged the fraud and overreaching theories on her appeal from the adverse summary judgment demonstrates she could have raised those matters in the adjudication of the summary judgment motion. 2 There is no question that the factual background for the fraud and overreaching allegations is the same as that for Packham's complaint for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
We conclude that as a result of the final adjudication of the issue of the effectiveness of Packham's assent to the release based on a factual background in which Packham could have urged theories of fraud and overreaching as bases for vitiating her...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Diamond S.J. Enter., Inc. v. City of San Jose
...to those matters that might have been raised in support of the claim actually raised"); Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court , 209 Cal. App. 3d 177, 182, 257 Cal.Rptr. 37 (1989) ("Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised o......
-
Smith v. Harrington
...under the penalty of forever losing the right to thereafter so urge them." ' " (Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 177, 181-182, 257 Cal.Rptr. 37 (Interinsurance), italics omitted; accord, Mobilepark West Homeowners Assn. v. Escondido Mobilepar......
-
Nails v. Su
...what issues are adjudicated, not the nature of the proceeding or the relief requested”]; Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 177, 181, 257 Cal.Rptr. 37 [“that different forms of relief are sought in the two lawsuits is irrelevant” to application......
-
Villacres v. Abm Indus. Inc.
...or against it matters which, if urged, would have produced an opposite result...." ' " ( Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 177, 181-182, 257 Cal.Rptr. 37, citations & italics omitted.) " 'In California the phrase "cause of action" is often use......